Sometimes it may be that we're coming at a problem all wrong. For instance, I'm told (I have no way to evaluate this claim) that the age we place upon the stars does not seem to take into account that it is not merely light, but space that is moving.
On the same token, I have this simple question for you:
What if it is not that God positively causes an evil action to be performed by otherwise good men, but that men, who would do nothing but evil with every action without restraint, are hindered by God from doing evil until He lets loose those evil actions that they would normally do to take place?
In other words, what if God's causation of evil actions has more to do with Him taking away His normal restraints upon wicked humanity so that it performs what comes natural to it--all to accomplish good by letting chaos out of the box when necessary to achieve His goal?
What this would mean is that God is not actively causing a wicked man to do an evil, but He is merely taking away the restraint upon a rabid dog who wants nothing more than to tear into another in order to accomplish His necessary goals. His normative work in the world, then, is to cause good by restraining the infinite amount of evil that would be accomplished by mankind, and only letting that evil become less restrained when a greater good is in view.
Of course, this is still God causing all of these events. I'm merely posing a question that seeks to understand how He does that. One could say the same for natural disasters (i.e., that chaos would ensue without God upholding the order in the universe by His Word and He occasionally lets that go to accomplish a greater good).
Just a thought I'm pondering. Not something I've thought too much about just yet, so feel free to object. ;-)
Monday, May 27, 2013
Friday, May 24, 2013
A Tale of Two Theological Trajectories
Liberalism - theology is anthropocentric and revealed by studying man (i.e., what man thinks and has thought of God and religion). Hence, theology is nothing more than the study of man, and more appropriately called "anthropology."
Orthodoxy - theology is theocentric revealed by studying God's revelation/Scripture (i.e., what God thinks of Himself, man, and religion). Theology, therefore is the study of what God has said, and is appropriately called "theology."
Orthodoxy - theology is theocentric revealed by studying God's revelation/Scripture (i.e., what God thinks of Himself, man, and religion). Theology, therefore is the study of what God has said, and is appropriately called "theology."
Apostasy Is the New Black
It almost seems today that apostasy is cool. Apostasy is the new black. It means you're a thinking Christian, and you can just claim that name even if you reject everything that it historically means at its core, and that you'll only get flack for it by those unthinking dinosaurs who can't change with the times.
When I grew up, the bigger threats to orthodoxy were found in the cults. Mormons, Jehovah Witnesses, Christian Scientists, etc. all worked to undermine orthodox theology.
Now, however, because we exist in a hyper-individualistic culture, we don't join churches, denominations, or even cults. Instead, our apostates grow up within our ranks and stay there. They identify themselves as believers, attend churches that supposedly believe, and claim titles for themselves that were once only given to orthodox Christians.
What is interesting about this is that if a Joseph Smith or Charles Russell were to grow up and teach in the church today, they would likely just stay in it. They would have a blog and just argue that any Christians trying to push them out of the church are just a bunch of close-minded gatekeepers who have to make theology a litmus test for Christian faithfulness. They would work to marginalize the orthodox rather than to be marginalized and excommunicated by them.
That brings us to this question: Have evangelicals and emergings worked so hard to include people into their groups that they are no longer capable of identifying anyone as an apostate, but only Christians with different gods, theologies, ethics (i.e., Christians with different religions)?
If you think I'm off on this, let's look at a specific case. Rachel Evans, by her own admission, does not worship the God of John Piper. She continually puts his deity in lower case, implying that her god is not the same as his. She also repudiates his God. So let's look at this.
What she is essentially saying is that she and John Piper do not worship the same deity. What this means for biblical Christianity is that either Rachel is a Christian or John Piper is, or neither one is, but both cannot be.
I would argue, of course, that since John Piper's God is that of the Puritans, Reformers, Church Fathers, and Apostles and Prophets, that proves that Rachel, by her own admission (not mine), is not a Christian. She, by arguing that John Piper's God is evil, is arguing that she rejects the God of Christianity that looks exactly like John Piper's God and not Rachel's.
However, she still wants to be considered a Christian. She still wants to be considered in the fold. And the point I want to make from above is that many who claim to be Christians want to consider her a Christian as well. Why? Well, we don't want to be judgmental or make theology a big issue in identifying Christians. Um, OK. Then that pretty much proves the point that apostasy is impossible in false Christianity, which is yet another mark that it is not the faith of the prophets and apostles.
Come out from among them and do not be partakers with them and THEN you will be considered the sons and daughters of God. Otherwise, if these supposed churches do nothing to excommunicate these apostates and state clearly that they are not Christians, they will not only throw immature Christians who don't know better to wolves, but they will also prove themselves to be one with those who repudiate true Christianity.
But apostasy is the new black, so it's going to take a love of God and courage that transcends the need for the deluded masses to speak well of you.
When I grew up, the bigger threats to orthodoxy were found in the cults. Mormons, Jehovah Witnesses, Christian Scientists, etc. all worked to undermine orthodox theology.
Now, however, because we exist in a hyper-individualistic culture, we don't join churches, denominations, or even cults. Instead, our apostates grow up within our ranks and stay there. They identify themselves as believers, attend churches that supposedly believe, and claim titles for themselves that were once only given to orthodox Christians.
What is interesting about this is that if a Joseph Smith or Charles Russell were to grow up and teach in the church today, they would likely just stay in it. They would have a blog and just argue that any Christians trying to push them out of the church are just a bunch of close-minded gatekeepers who have to make theology a litmus test for Christian faithfulness. They would work to marginalize the orthodox rather than to be marginalized and excommunicated by them.
That brings us to this question: Have evangelicals and emergings worked so hard to include people into their groups that they are no longer capable of identifying anyone as an apostate, but only Christians with different gods, theologies, ethics (i.e., Christians with different religions)?
If you think I'm off on this, let's look at a specific case. Rachel Evans, by her own admission, does not worship the God of John Piper. She continually puts his deity in lower case, implying that her god is not the same as his. She also repudiates his God. So let's look at this.
What she is essentially saying is that she and John Piper do not worship the same deity. What this means for biblical Christianity is that either Rachel is a Christian or John Piper is, or neither one is, but both cannot be.
I would argue, of course, that since John Piper's God is that of the Puritans, Reformers, Church Fathers, and Apostles and Prophets, that proves that Rachel, by her own admission (not mine), is not a Christian. She, by arguing that John Piper's God is evil, is arguing that she rejects the God of Christianity that looks exactly like John Piper's God and not Rachel's.
However, she still wants to be considered a Christian. She still wants to be considered in the fold. And the point I want to make from above is that many who claim to be Christians want to consider her a Christian as well. Why? Well, we don't want to be judgmental or make theology a big issue in identifying Christians. Um, OK. Then that pretty much proves the point that apostasy is impossible in false Christianity, which is yet another mark that it is not the faith of the prophets and apostles.
Come out from among them and do not be partakers with them and THEN you will be considered the sons and daughters of God. Otherwise, if these supposed churches do nothing to excommunicate these apostates and state clearly that they are not Christians, they will not only throw immature Christians who don't know better to wolves, but they will also prove themselves to be one with those who repudiate true Christianity.
But apostasy is the new black, so it's going to take a love of God and courage that transcends the need for the deluded masses to speak well of you.
What Did the Pope Mean by Saying that Atheists Can Be Saved Too?
Pope Francis recently made a comment that has gotten quite a bit of press lately. I just wanted to explain what he meant and why it isn't biblical. He stated:
"The Lord created us in His image and likeness, and we are the image of the Lord, and He does good and all of us have this commandment at heart: do good and do not do evil. All of us. ‘But, Father, this is not Catholic! He cannot do good.’ Yes, he can... "The Lord has redeemed all of us, all of us, with the Blood of Christ: all of us, not just Catholics. Everyone! ‘Father, the atheists?’ Even the atheists. Everyone!".. We must meet one another doing good. ‘But I don’t believe, Father, I am an atheist!’ But do good: we will meet one another there.”
What he is arguing for is inclusivism. Some have thought it is universalism. Some have thought it just refers to unlimited atonement. Although what he is saying is a partial universalism that assumes unlimited atonement, he is not directly arguing for either of these.
Now, we might say that he's only arguing that other people can do good besides Catholics, but it seems clear that his argument is based on the inclusivism of Vatican II. So it is talking about being redeemed and accessing that redemption via good works.
What he is saying is that Christ has provided redemption for all people, and one might follow Christ without exercising faith in the explicit gospel. In other words, one is united to Christ by following Christ in doing good works. Hence, one may do the works of Christ without ever knowing or even acknowledging Christ. Hence, even an atheist can follow Christ through their good works.
The problem with this?
1. We are not united to Christ through good works. Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians make that clear. We are united by faith.
2. Now, a Roman Catholic might include good works and faith as one, and hence, doing good works is not divorced from having faith.
The problem with this is that faith is not described as works in the New Testament. It is described as a trusting response in the explicit, verbal message of the gospel.
3. Hence, faith comes through hearing and hearing through the Word of God. Those who are predestined are called and are justified because they answer that call. Election, therefore, does not work apart from the means of salvation, as though one can be saved by stepping over the call of the gospel and a willful faith decision made to adhere to it. To say otherwise, ironically, is a hyper-calvinist position, where God elects regardless of the means to salvation. Biblical election shows us that God elects us to hear the gospel and respond to it in faith so that we might be united to Christ and be saved by it.
4. I've argued before on this blog that other religions are a manifestation of the religion of Self, and therefore, are rejected by Christ as a path to follow Him.
5. I've also argued before that the "good works" in other religions and worldviews are actually evil and not good at all. Hence, they are not the works of Christ.
6. Paul argues that, If righteousness can come through the law, then Christ died for nothing. But if inclusivism is true, then Paul should have said that righteousness does not come from the law until Christ dies. Instead, he divorces the works of the law and faith given by the Spirit of God in Christ's death. If inclusivism was true, there should be no dichotomy between faith and works to where Paul is arguing that those who follow the law now are lost. They ought to be united to Christ through following the law. This turns the entire message of the New Testament gospel on its head.
Ergo, inclusivism flat out rejects the biblical means to salvation. There is no mystical connection to Christ that we get by doing good works. All who might be saved by Him must be united to Him via faith in His Person and Work. You must believe that He died for our sins and rose again from the dead to create in us new life for the purpose of good works. We need to realize that our believing is the gift of God and not of works, lest any man might boast.
"The Lord created us in His image and likeness, and we are the image of the Lord, and He does good and all of us have this commandment at heart: do good and do not do evil. All of us. ‘But, Father, this is not Catholic! He cannot do good.’ Yes, he can... "The Lord has redeemed all of us, all of us, with the Blood of Christ: all of us, not just Catholics. Everyone! ‘Father, the atheists?’ Even the atheists. Everyone!".. We must meet one another doing good. ‘But I don’t believe, Father, I am an atheist!’ But do good: we will meet one another there.”
What he is arguing for is inclusivism. Some have thought it is universalism. Some have thought it just refers to unlimited atonement. Although what he is saying is a partial universalism that assumes unlimited atonement, he is not directly arguing for either of these.
Now, we might say that he's only arguing that other people can do good besides Catholics, but it seems clear that his argument is based on the inclusivism of Vatican II. So it is talking about being redeemed and accessing that redemption via good works.
What he is saying is that Christ has provided redemption for all people, and one might follow Christ without exercising faith in the explicit gospel. In other words, one is united to Christ by following Christ in doing good works. Hence, one may do the works of Christ without ever knowing or even acknowledging Christ. Hence, even an atheist can follow Christ through their good works.
The problem with this?
1. We are not united to Christ through good works. Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians make that clear. We are united by faith.
2. Now, a Roman Catholic might include good works and faith as one, and hence, doing good works is not divorced from having faith.
The problem with this is that faith is not described as works in the New Testament. It is described as a trusting response in the explicit, verbal message of the gospel.
3. Hence, faith comes through hearing and hearing through the Word of God. Those who are predestined are called and are justified because they answer that call. Election, therefore, does not work apart from the means of salvation, as though one can be saved by stepping over the call of the gospel and a willful faith decision made to adhere to it. To say otherwise, ironically, is a hyper-calvinist position, where God elects regardless of the means to salvation. Biblical election shows us that God elects us to hear the gospel and respond to it in faith so that we might be united to Christ and be saved by it.
4. I've argued before on this blog that other religions are a manifestation of the religion of Self, and therefore, are rejected by Christ as a path to follow Him.
5. I've also argued before that the "good works" in other religions and worldviews are actually evil and not good at all. Hence, they are not the works of Christ.
6. Paul argues that, If righteousness can come through the law, then Christ died for nothing. But if inclusivism is true, then Paul should have said that righteousness does not come from the law until Christ dies. Instead, he divorces the works of the law and faith given by the Spirit of God in Christ's death. If inclusivism was true, there should be no dichotomy between faith and works to where Paul is arguing that those who follow the law now are lost. They ought to be united to Christ through following the law. This turns the entire message of the New Testament gospel on its head.
Ergo, inclusivism flat out rejects the biblical means to salvation. There is no mystical connection to Christ that we get by doing good works. All who might be saved by Him must be united to Him via faith in His Person and Work. You must believe that He died for our sins and rose again from the dead to create in us new life for the purpose of good works. We need to realize that our believing is the gift of God and not of works, lest any man might boast.
Thursday, May 23, 2013
The God of Love and Wrath Are the Same God in the Bible
Dean,
Thanks for your input. I'm afraid you've completely bypassed (and misunderstood) my argument, and by doing so, have merely begged the question. My point is that Jesus isn't contradicting the OT in His view of God's love. It's just as exclusive.
"Say's who?"
Well, Jesus does. He tells us that His teaching does not nullify/contradict any of the Old Testament, even down to the last yod and tittle.
And beyond that explicit statement, I would say the context gets to dictate that, lest we end up with the "Life of Brian," unhinged speculations one often sees put forward in these types of debates.
But if you want to argue that the biblical vision of God is contradictory, then please provide examples of Jesus' concept of love as being inclusive, rather than exclusive. Give me an example where Jesus is offering God's love to the unrepentant, regardless of whether they place themselves in the group of the repentant. I'd be happy to look at that. As of right now, I'm completely unaware of any passage within the entire Scripture, primary or secondary, according to your tier, that presents God's salvific love as inclusive. Hence, I'm not taking the word of the Prophets over what Jesus says. I'm taking what Jesus says and comparing that to the Word of the Prophets, and they end up being the same thing in context.
If everyone is so concerned about evangelicals being honest with the text, one might ask the same of the non-evangelicals critiquing them. There is no inclusive Jesus in the Bible, and hence, wrathful exclusivism is the other side of the coin of loving exclusivism. Ergo, to reject the God of the one is to reject the God of the other, which is why one doesn't have the God of the Bible anymore once that is done. That seems pretty basic, but I realize that would rock the paradigm in which many fleeing evangelicalism have found comfort.
******************UPDATED***********************
Dean
Bryan Hodge
•
5 hours ago
Dean
Bryan Hodge
•
5 hours ago
Bryan Hodge
Dean
•
2 hours ago
Thanks for your input. I'm afraid you've completely bypassed (and misunderstood) my argument, and by doing so, have merely begged the question. My point is that Jesus isn't contradicting the OT in His view of God's love. It's just as exclusive.
"Say's who?"
Well, Jesus does. He tells us that His teaching does not nullify/contradict any of the Old Testament, even down to the last yod and tittle.
And beyond that explicit statement, I would say the context gets to dictate that, lest we end up with the "Life of Brian," unhinged speculations one often sees put forward in these types of debates.
But if you want to argue that the biblical vision of God is contradictory, then please provide examples of Jesus' concept of love as being inclusive, rather than exclusive. Give me an example where Jesus is offering God's love to the unrepentant, regardless of whether they place themselves in the group of the repentant. I'd be happy to look at that. As of right now, I'm completely unaware of any passage within the entire Scripture, primary or secondary, according to your tier, that presents God's salvific love as inclusive. Hence, I'm not taking the word of the Prophets over what Jesus says. I'm taking what Jesus says and comparing that to the Word of the Prophets, and they end up being the same thing in context.
If everyone is so concerned about evangelicals being honest with the text, one might ask the same of the non-evangelicals critiquing them. There is no inclusive Jesus in the Bible, and hence, wrathful exclusivism is the other side of the coin of loving exclusivism. Ergo, to reject the God of the one is to reject the God of the other, which is why one doesn't have the God of the Bible anymore once that is done. That seems pretty basic, but I realize that would rock the paradigm in which many fleeing evangelicalism have found comfort.
******************UPDATED***********************
-
Bryan Hodge Dean • 3 hours ago
Necessary/Ultimate Beliefs and Evidence
This is a conversation I had on Dr. Enns' blog about a month ago. To me, this is one of the most significant observations that theological debates today often ignore. The thread got really disorganized, so I tried to put it in order as much as possible, but it is what it is.
Bryan Hodge John Osborn • a month ago
John, as someone who actually
understands epistemology and how knowledge really works, I sympathize with you.
But you're not going to make much progress with this crowd until you can get
Dr. Enns and the others above to acknowledge that what they're hearing
evangelicals say is not what evangelicals are actually saying. That's clear
with the strawman arguments they present as the evangelical positions, as well
as the proposed solutions (i.e., we'll just look at evidence).
The problem is that when evangelical
philosophers speak of presuppositions they're not talking about biases, which
is what Dr. Enns and these others are hearing. They're talking about
ulimate/necessary beliefs that determine the boundaries for what conclusions
can and cannot be made of the evidence. So, yes, one is able to challenge the
consensus within certain boundaries, but anything beyond that violates the necessary
beliefs that are assumed as absolute. Hence, anyone going outside that box is
seen as dishonest with the evidence, just trying to save his faith position
(which, of course, he is like--just everyone else), etc. That's why you don't
get university positions if you hold to certain views that run counter to those
presuppositions, even if you can work out the evidence to favor that position.
It's just plain seen as absurd, not because of data (data says nothing), but
because of the ultimate beliefs that control what one is capable of arguing
with that data, and the subsequent consensus that reliance upon such necessary
presuppositions brings.
I don't know a single evangelical
scholar who doesn't work out the data consistently with their presupps. But
their conclusions are not consistent with the ultimate beliefs that govern the
methodologies of inquiry within the secular academy. Until we realize that this
is a conflict of beliefs, we're not going to get anywhere. And we're going to
continue to fight over who is the biggest group of idiots because they just
don't accept the clear "evidence" in front of them 'til the world's
ending.
And just to add a little log to the
fire, perhaps the reason why the consensus within the academy is so different
on some issues than the consensus among the populace is not simply due to the
uneducated superstition of the populace, but to the fact that they have not
been conditioned by the same culture/subculture. Hence, their presuppositions
are often completely different than those adopted by the academy (and a lot of
that has to do with the religious nature of the larger culture).
And while I;m at it, let me just add
to the possibly interesting discussion that was brewing, but too soon
dismissed, above concerning Romans 1. The reason why a scientist whose science
has implications concerning the Creator is more affected by what Romans 1 would
say to him is due to the fact that the passage deals with suppressing truths
that would make him, as a sinner, accountable to God in judgment for his sin. A
guy working on the electric car or a rocket isn't dealing with that type of
analysis of creation. Hence, if there is going to be any suppression of the
truth about God as evidenced in creation, it would be here more than anywhere
else, save the area of biblical scholarship. Now, it could be that there is no
suppression going on at all in our culture, and those areas are right as rain,
but how exactly would you go about proving that? Or is it merely up to what
presuppositions you hold about the subject?
·
Stephen • a month ago
Bryan,
Thanks for your feedback, though
your rhetorical framing is a bit off-putting; i.e., “as someone who actually
understand epistemology and how knowledge really works.” Talk about an attempt
at the outset to stack the relevance deck in your favor!
Several points:
(1) You may want to keep in mind that Enns was part of the “presuppositional” apologetics and epistemology seminary par excellence for, what, 20-25 years? I guess it’s possible that he has forgotten what evangelicals who talk in terms of presuppositions mean, or that he never understood in the first place, but…well, you get the point.
(1) You may want to keep in mind that Enns was part of the “presuppositional” apologetics and epistemology seminary par excellence for, what, 20-25 years? I guess it’s possible that he has forgotten what evangelicals who talk in terms of presuppositions mean, or that he never understood in the first place, but…well, you get the point.
(2) You’re presuming an (what is
rapidly becoming) outdated view of epistemology, knowledge, and how the brain
works. Folks are moving away from the idea of overarching determinative
“worldviews,” “presuppositions,” “ultimate/necessary beliefs” that “determine
the boundaries for what conclusions can and cannot be made of the evidence” as
an accurate description of how the human brain works.
In short, this model tends to
presume a singular and unitary model of the brain, as though it’s one big
supercomputer with one central control center. In fact, the “modular” (or
similar; e.g., “dual processing” and other) view of the brain is becoming much
more prevalent, wherein our brains are made up of thousands (zillions?) of
little computers, most of which operate independently of the others and most of
which operate without the parts of our brain that we tend to term our
“consciousness” being aware of what they’re doing.
The upshot here is, for example,
that many of these modules are for the most part universals among people.
That’s why the non-malfunctioning person has the same intuitive/folk physics,
biology, and psychology (i.e., “Theory of Mind”) as everyone else.
Though there are parts of our brain
that hold the kinds of beliefs and commitments you’re talking about, those
parts of the brain do not necessarily control, override, or even communicate
with (astonishingly) all the other parts of our brain that control things like
our intuitive physics, Theory of Mind, and other ways that we (by default)
interact with the world around us. While these parts of our brain that do hold
the beliefs you’re talking about do have profound effects on how we behave and
(at least parts of us) think, their beliefs simply do not exercise “worldview”
level of unitary and determinative control over the other parts of our
cognition.
BTW, these modular kinds of
approaches to the brain have proven incredibly useful for psychologists,
sociologists, and others who study ubiquitous but seemingly bizarre human
phenomena, like why is it the case that people everywhere seem to be
“hypocrites”? This approach allows us to go further than simply saying that
it’s because people are sinners. Instead, for example, it becomes relevant if
the parts of our brain that hold certain “moral” beliefs or engage in
“moralizing” (i.e., holding and propagating beliefs about how people should behave)
are different from the parts of our brain that most directly influence how we
actually behave. At this point it also becomes quite interesting to study the
possible extents of interaction between these different parts of our brain.
So, before moving on to the next
point, could you spell out for us the actual cognitive and psychological
mechanics of your determinative “worldviews”?
(3) There are cognitive scientists,
psychologists, epistemologists, sociologists, and anthropologists who work
within the above kind of framework to study the kinds of beliefs you are
talking about. For example (and please forgive use of the term “bias”), it is
widely held that properly cognitively functioning people have what’s called “the
Confirmation Bias,” whereby certain modules of our brain work together
(especially with the parts of our brain that we tend to consider our
“conscious” and “reasoning” parts of the brain) to prefer evidence that
conforms to positions we (or a group with which we self-identify) hold and to
discount evidence and arguments that militate against a certain subset of our
beliefs.
Related to the Confirmation Bias is
the sociological phenomenon that when you put a bunch of people who already
agree with each other together in some kind of (insular) network or group, they
tend (if anything) to adopt more extreme versions of the views they already
hold, and they certainly do not tend to be self-critical.
FWIW, in my experience this tends to
be the closest that cognitive science has come to explaining what certain kinds
of philosophers and epistemologists (and Evangelical Apologists!) mean when
they talk about overarching and unifying determinative presuppositions and
“ultimate/necessary” beliefs that predetermine what can and can’t count as
evidence, etc. In fact, there have been numerous detailed studies that bring
these psychological and cognitive science findings to bear on phenomena
parallel to what we are discussing here about Evangelicals on science, faith,
evolution, the Bible, their disagreements, and how different “sides” seem to
have determinative presuppositions that control how they treat potential
“evidence.” To pick from among accessible books written by big names in these
cog-sci and psychology fields of research, see Jonathan Haidt’s recent book, The
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religions
(2012). Also relevant, see Robert Kurzban’s recent, Why Everyone (Else) is a
Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind (2010).
Of course, much work has been done
on the social and cognitive conditions that (on average) counteract the
Confirmation Bias and its “groupthink” manifestations. E.g., you tend to need
non-insular settings, networks, or groups in which not everyone already agrees
and in which one’s views are up for (acknowledged) peer-criticism by those who
disagree.
(4) Ironically, the epistemological
positions with which you operate are most closely paralleled in the broader
academy (i.e., outside of certain philosophy departments and then outside of
the Evangelical apologetics world) by people that I assume you would consider
the “radical relativists” in the Humanities of the University. As someone who
works in the humanities, I most often encounter ideas of determinative
ultimate/necessary beliefs and worldviews that color all other cognition
(especially weighing of evidence, arguments, and “values”) among those we would
categorize as thoroughgoing “post-modernists” who talk constantly of extreme
cultural diversity and incommensurability. It’s among these types that you find
the most eager and energetic analyses of “science” along the lines of yours:
i.e., what really matters are the assumptions and presuppositions, not
“evidence,” despite the (naïve) pretentions of scientists to be engaged in
empirical study, etc. etc. etc.
(5) Finally, just for fun, how in
your model do you explain and account for people who change their minds about
matters relating to such “ultimate/necessary” beliefs, worldviews, and
presuppositions? I assume that you consider this possible. How does it happen?
Sorry for the long comment.
Bryan Hodge Stephen • a month ago
Thanks Stephen. Let me clarify a few
things that I think were misunderstood, and continue to be, precisely due to
word confusion when we speak of bias, presupposition, ultimate/necessary
beliefs, and presuppositionalism.
1. Dr. Enns was actually a professor
of mine at Westminster, which, as you say, is the center for presuppositional
apologetics, which is related, but not identical, to the idea I'm discussing here
. That a school is well known for a particular position also doesn't mean that
everyone who teaches there has a good grasp of it. I read Dr. Enns' blog almost
every day, and from things he says, it indicates to me that he is confusing
bias with presuppositinal ultimate beliefs. If he wasn't then he wouldn't be
able to say that he can adjust them over time or be self critical of them to
accord with the evidence. It also seems clear to me that you may be doing the
same by what you say in your comments (but I'll address that below). If,
however, I've misunderstood what he, or any of you, were saying, I do apologize
and am fully ready to receive any correction. But having said that, I don't
know how the statements made are reconciled to the fact that necessary beliefs
can't be changed using logical argumentation and data without assuming another
ultimate belief that governs both.
2. There is a lot of confusion in
what you're saying between how the brain functions and how we come to beliefs
versus our critical analysis and building our arguments to support our beliefs.
The former is irrelevant to the latter, as it is often either not conscious of
why we hold particular ideas or it is not critical and seeks to build an
argument using logic, which must be based in ultimate beliefs. There is no
theory that can negate such a thing without proving its validity.
3. Again, here, by bringing up
confirmation bias, it really does tell me we are speaking past one another.
Confirmation bias is what I would consider bias, not presuppositions rooted in
ultimate beliefs. The nature of reality must first be settled in one's
assumptions, whether he even is aware of those assumptions in his argument,
before an argument based upon those assumptions can be made. I think you would
agree that this is obvious, but this is precisely the problem when evaluating
data.
4. Actually, it's not that ironic,
since I consider myself a postmodern theist. I am radically skeptical, and an
outright unbeliever, in the concept that one can build a view of reality that
is analogically accurate to the objective existence of reality without
revelation and the aid to understand it. What that means is that I don't
believe sufficient knowledge is possible without assuming a particular view of
reality that is sufficiently descriptive of that objective reality. Hence, if
you have a wrong ultimate belief, you have an insufficient and distorted view
of the meaning of everything, not just some things.
5. That's a great question, and what
I was arguing for above. People don't change their minds between ultimate
beliefs based on reasoned arguments or evidence. If they did, they wouldn't be
ultimate beliefs. They change them by shifting their faith in one to the other.
That happens for a variety of reasons, some of which you mention above; but as
I said, it doesn't come from pure argumentation or evidence, because such is
impossible. If a person believes otherwise, it is likely he is thinking of
biases, which can be changed with reason and evidence (although those are still
difficult to change, it does happen often), and not necessary beliefs that rule
logical argument and the interpretation of data.
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Stephen Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Oops,
posted my reply below and not in this thread.
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peteenns Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Bryan,
just to make sure I get what you are saying---presuppositions are not open to
reasonable critique, but change for more subtle reasons? Do you feel that
presuppositions are open to critique, i.e., that presuppositions can be
unwarranted? Do you deny that presuppositions are largely a function of our own
limited experiences, and therefore are intimately and invariably tied to
psychology, sociology? I ask that last question because,in retrospect, what WTS
calls "presuppositions" are, frankly, quite open to logical critique.
Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Hi Dr. Enns. Great to speak to you
again. To answer you questions:
1. "presuppositions are not
open to reasonable critique, but change for more subtle reasons?"
If by "presuppositions" you mean "necessary beliefs" and by "reasonable critique" you mean "critical analysis that judges whether it is true," then, yes, by virtue of the belief being necessary, it cannot be proved or disproved (otherwise, it isn't necessary/ultimate). One can only believe or disbelieve it and then move on in one's argumentation from there. Hence, we may move in and out of them for a complexity of reasons, but if we think one of those reasons is because they are proved or disproved, then we're mistaken.
If by "presuppositions" you mean "necessary beliefs" and by "reasonable critique" you mean "critical analysis that judges whether it is true," then, yes, by virtue of the belief being necessary, it cannot be proved or disproved (otherwise, it isn't necessary/ultimate). One can only believe or disbelieve it and then move on in one's argumentation from there. Hence, we may move in and out of them for a complexity of reasons, but if we think one of those reasons is because they are proved or disproved, then we're mistaken.
2. "Do you feel that
presuppositions are open to critique, i.e., that presuppositions can be
unwarranted?"
Again, this really depends on what
is meant by "presupposition." I think what I was trying to say above
is that a lot of the problem is in the nomenclature. Ultimate beliefs cannot be
warranted, and hence, they cannot be unwarranted by anything else other than
the conflicting ultimate beliefs of others. They themselves warrant other
beliefs. So you can critique an ultimate belief using another ultimate belief,
but that takes us out of the realm of empirical certainty and into the realm of
faith.
3. "Do you deny that
presuppositions are largely a function of our own limited experiences, and
therefore are intimately and invariably tied to psychology, sociology?"
No, I wouldn't deny that completely,
although I would exclude the idea that their existence is sourced in us, as I
believe the Spirit gives faith and therefore conditions an individual believer
to hold certain ultimate beliefs. So I would agree that they are rooted in the
self for the whole world, but would save the medium for how a Christian
worldview is obtained to the Spirit's work--although one could say that such is
through the social and psychological influences of the individual believer as
well. But I'm not sure why the last question is as relevant to what I'm
arguing, simply because the way one comes to an ultimate belief and the fact
that ultimate beliefs are not capable of being critiqued are two different
arguments. I think you can point out why you think someone has come to a
particular ultimate belief; and I think you're fine in critiquing people who
think they can tear down the ultimate beliefs of you or others by using their
own necessary beliefs to interpret the data instead (since all they are doing
is arguing with you over beliefs that cannot be proved or disproved); but
that's as far as the analysis should really go. To say, on top of that, that
their ultimate beliefs make them dishonest with the evidence and whatnot is confusing
bias with ultimate belief. Their bias may be making them dishonest, but their
necessary beliefs are simply interpreting reality for them, and their as honest
in that as anyone else is. But from what I see as the critique of evangelical
philosophers concerning the conclusions of the academy on various topics (e.g.,
Darwinian evolution, higher critical biblical scholarship, etc.) it is not
concerning bias, but necessary beliefs. The problem, as they see it, is found
in the assumptions that govern the methodology of inquiry itself, not in the
personal biases of the individual scholar or scientist.
Now, when it comes to the
presuppositions to which "WTS" is referring, can you give me an
example of that? I'm not sure which ones we're talking about, as I've heard
this same confusion among students and professors even at WTS. Now, part of
that might be that the current professors there may have a different view of
presuppositions than I, as a postmodern skeptic, do. My introduction to
epistemology was at TEDS before I came to WTS. I think I read something by a
certain professor there that wanted to argue for a presuppositionalism that
still included some form of warrant obtained via evidentialism. I would reject
that when we're talking about presuppositions as ultimate beliefs. By the very
definition, that is an impossibility.
So, in the end, it may be the
nomenclature that is the problem here. But that still means that after throwing
off the objection of bias, the objection dealing with necessary beliefs that
then influences all of these other arguments concerning academic consensus and
whatnot remain unanswered.
Beau Quilter Bryan Hodge • a month ago
"Ultimate beliefs cannot be
warranted, and hence, they cannot be unwarranted by anything else other than
the conflicting ultimate beliefs of others. They themselves warrant other
beliefs. So you can critique an ultimate belief using another ultimate belief,
but that takes us out of the realm of empirical certainty and into the realm of
faith."
If by "ultimate beliefs"
you mean beliefs in God; then I accept your assessment that they cannot be
warranted. However, your second clause contradicts your first. How can an
"ultimate belief" be "unwarranted" if it cannot be
"warranted" in the first place.
The premise that only an
"ultimate belief" can "unwarrant" an "ultimate
belief" is, quite simply, false. When an "ultimate belief" makes
predictions that are testable, the "ultimate belief" becomes
falsifiable, like any scientific theory, regardless of the beliefs (or lack
thereof) of the scientist. How do we know that the Greek panoply of Gods are
unwarranted? We've seen the top of Mount Olympus; there's nobody there.
Bryan
Hodge Beau Quilter • a month ago
Beau,
I find the
self evident concept that I'm seeking to convey here to be hardest for
contemporary atheists who are continually told how solid their beliefs are
based in empirical verificationism, as your example relates. The problem, of
course, as most philosophers point out, is that empirical verificationism has
metaphysical presuppositions that cannot be verified empirically. Hence, if one
can only rely upon that which is empirically verifiable, then one cannot rely
upon empirical verificationism, and it thus becomes self refuting.
Second to
this, my point concerning ultimate beliefs being neither warranted or
unwarrented was taking Dr. Enns' use of the word "unwarranted" to
mean "without evidential support," so I think that you have a little
word confusion going on there. What I was saying in response to that was that
an ultimate belief can neither be established upon evidential support or
disestablished by lack of evidential support due to the fact that such would
require the interpretation of data with a higher ultimate belief in order to
criticize and establish/disestablish the lower ultimate belief. But then it
isn't an ultimate belief. Hence, there is no contradiction in my statement, nor
does your example do anything but prove my point concerning your ultimate
beliefs.
However,
after saying that, your example is not an example of an ultimate belief. You
don't seem to be grasping the concept. If something is verifiable, one must
ask, "By what is it verifiable?" If it turns out to be a reliable
source and it is viewed by those same people holding the ultimate belief as an
accurate interpretation of the data, then those people will simply figure that
their secondary beliefs that stemmed from the ultimate belief were wrong and
adjust them to the ultimate belief. Everyone does this. If one jumps ship and
moves to another ultimate belief because of the above, it is only because it
was always his real ultimate belief by which he criticizes his only supposed
ultimate belief.
I would
take some time to ponder these points before attempting to shoot them down
because you don't like them, as they seem very new to you.
Beau
Quilter Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Bryan
Are you
assuming here, that everyone has an "ultimate belief"? And rather
than defining warranted, perhaps you should define an "ultimate
belief"?
A very interesting discussion, and
out of my area of expertise for much comment. I do think there is some category
mixing here however. It seems the main subject morphed from presuppositions
(fallible) to necessary/ultimate beliefs (infallible?) without warrant. Unless
indeed we do have a mere definition problem.
But what to do with this statement?
"......their necessary beliefs are simply interpreting reality for them,
and their (sic) as honest in that as anyone else is." I agree with the
honest part, but is it possible that their necessary belief is wrong, not for
them, of course, but ontologically? Because if two people hold differing
necessary beliefs, they both cannot be correct, even if they both apply their
necessary beliefs honestly. Christians do seem to hear the Spirit in different
ways. Maybe, just maybe, the fruits of the Spirit, which are directly
observable, even by non-believers, are at least a partially reliable test for
the validity (utility) of various necessary beliefs. Or maybe this is just how
a biologist, thinking like a critical realist of course, would be expected to
approach the problem.
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Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Bev,
That's a great question. I'm not
arguing that because we all hold ultimate beliefs that cannot be proved or
disproved that this means that all of our ultimate beliefs equally, or even
remotely, describe reality (analogically speaking).
But what I am saying is that, since
ultimate beliefs are not something you can prove or disprove, we must argue for
them via faith. People don't adjust to data and logical argumentation when
presented before them. They adjust to fit their ultimate beliefs. So if we want
them to believe X through what we say, we need them to move from a faith
position that does not produce a belief in X to one that does. What this means,
for Christians, is that I think we need to get back to just speaking the Word
of God, and reasoning from it, and let the Spirit make faith adjustments with
His people as He sees fit through that, as I think that is the only time a faith
shift occurring is very meaningful in the long run.
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peteenns Stephen • a month ago
Bryan, I
hope you find this comment on this increasingly confused thread! Anyway, I
appreciate your thoughts on all this. To help me see where this goes, can you
bring this back to what I think began your engagement--something about not
being able to convince evangelicals about evolution because of their
presuppositions? Is that right? If I am right, I would say that the #1 road
block for evangelicals is inerrancy, which I would think does not qualify as a
presupposition according to your definition. Inerrancy is an articulated and
defended (I would argue) social/theological construct. Comment as you get a
chance.
Stephen • a month ago
Bryan,
Thanks for your continued
interaction. I guess we may to some extent be talking past each other, but I
think it's more that we just disagree (not that this must be a
conversation-stopping disagreement). I do understand what you mean by ultimate
beliefs and presuppositions. My point is that you're operating out of a
(certain kind of) philosopher's paradigm for how they construct the mind as
working, and I do not think it's accurate.
Let's try to get at this in a more
concrete way: can you give us a few examples of "ultimate beliefs"
and then spell out how they influence evaluations of evidence and arguments?
This will let us work through some issues in relation to specifics.
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Bryan
Hodge Stephen • a month ago
Stephen,
don't make me apply my ivory tower theories to real life. ;-) I think our
missing one another may still be that we're addressing two different questions.
What you're talking about is how we believe to be true. I'm discussing how we
support what we believe to be true. The theories that you're talking about deal
with how we come to beliefs. But I'm not discussing that. I'm specifically
discussing what ultimate beliefs and assumptions govern those beliefs,
regardless of how we come to them. It's simply impossible for my theory to be
outdated, as I would argue it is an easily demonstrated, self-evident
description of what we do when we attempt to obtain knowledge through reason.
But I
think Dr. Enns has given us one example below with the issue of inerrancy, so
see my comments there.
Bryan Hodge • a month ago
"something about not being able
to convince evangelicals about evolution because of their presuppositions? Is
that right?"
Yes, this works for everyone. The
specific conservative evangelicals who will not be convinced of evolution have
certain ultimate beliefs about the Bible that governs their view of all other
things. So I actually think that inerrancy is something that cannot be tested,
since it directly derives from certain ultimate beliefs that cannot be tested.
You can get people to change their minds over it, and I think the Spirit
Himself changes peoples minds over it as they study the Bible more; but while
people hold a certain belief about the Bible, any contradictions will be viewed
as limitations of knowledge on our part. When forced to see the Bible
differently by external factors, there are a host of options that an
evangelical might choose in order to keep his ultimate beliefs in tact. But the
problem is that if the ultimate belief is true, then what he has concluded is
true. If the utlimate belief is false, then what he has concluded is false. But
there is no way to test whether the ultimate belief is true. It's just
something you believe or or disbelief, and a lot of that has to do with the
issue of what you believe about reality and the ability to know reality through
a particular means. For most evangelicals, reality most reliably known through
the Scripture. It, therefore, has the highest place of authority in the
evangelical's life. So when confronted with something like evolution, if the
evangelical thinks it contradicts what the Bible says, he's not going to give
it the time of day. The course one needs to take to convince him would be to
show (a) his ultimate belief about the Bible is not true (something that cannot
be proved or disproved, but rather needs to come to him with a faith shift),
(b) evolution is not really in conflict with what the Bible teaches (which is a
matter of hermeneutics which would change the way he reads the Bible), and/or
(c) evolution is knowledge that can be known through a reliable source.
All three of these is a monumental
undertaking, and they each require a faith shift, since they all assume
something about knowledge and what reliable sources of that knowledge might be.
Now, of course, it's easy to speak
of the presuppositions of others, but let's draw this closer to home to the
group here. In order to convince everyone here that evolution is not true, an
evangelical would have to (a) argue that neither the methods nor the people
using them to demonstrate that evolution is true are adequate sources of
knowledge, (b) that evolution conflicts with what is known to be true from what
is an adequate source of knowledge, and (c) demonstrate that the interpretation
of that adequate source of knowledge is correct.
Each of these intersects just as
equally with ultimate beliefs that cannot be proved or disproved. But this is
why conservative evangelicals who see the Bible as the most reliable and
adequate source of knowledge, and believe that the correct interpretation of
the Bible contradicts the findings of what they view as an inadequate source of
knowledge, find it just as easy to dismiss the findings of that inadequate
source as most on this thread find it to dismiss the findings of conservative
evangelicals using what people here would find to be an inadequate source of
knowledge.
By "inadequate source of
knowledge," of course, I mean "knowledge in the specific area we're
discussing." Most here would find the Bible to be adequate in relating
spiritual truths, and most conservative evangelicals would find contemporary
natural methods adequate to discover knowledge in the areas that they have no
reason to see as incorrect.
So I really do think that this whole
battle is one over ultimate beliefs concerning the nature of reality and what
is considered the most reliable or adequate source to interpret reality given
those assumptions. I can look at a Hindu and say, "It's obvious that evil
exists in the world, You Fool." And he will simply look at me and say,
"It's obvious how deeply delusional you are in thinking that this world
and what you perceive as evil is real, You Fool," But we're both just
arguing our faiths with one another.
Bryan
Hodge Bryan Hodge • a month ago
btw, I
just want to say, that when I speak about "inerrancy," I'm assuming
we're talking about details inerrancy. I personally believe in a type of
inerrancy that most would call "infallibility," which, of course, is
not something that can be proved or disproved either (but I do think it
describes what the Bible is doing better than detailed inerrancy does).
"detailed
inerrancy." I need an edit button. ;-)
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