Thursday, May 23, 2013

Necessary/Ultimate Beliefs and Evidence



This is a conversation I had on Dr. Enns' blog about a month ago. To me, this is one of the most significant observations that theological debates today often ignore. The thread got really disorganized, so I tried to put it in order as much as possible, but it is what it is.


Bryan Hodge John Osborna month ago
John, as someone who actually understands epistemology and how knowledge really works, I sympathize with you. But you're not going to make much progress with this crowd until you can get Dr. Enns and the others above to acknowledge that what they're hearing evangelicals say is not what evangelicals are actually saying. That's clear with the strawman arguments they present as the evangelical positions, as well as the proposed solutions (i.e., we'll just look at evidence).
The problem is that when evangelical philosophers speak of presuppositions they're not talking about biases, which is what Dr. Enns and these others are hearing. They're talking about ulimate/necessary beliefs that determine the boundaries for what conclusions can and cannot be made of the evidence. So, yes, one is able to challenge the consensus within certain boundaries, but anything beyond that violates the necessary beliefs that are assumed as absolute. Hence, anyone going outside that box is seen as dishonest with the evidence, just trying to save his faith position (which, of course, he is like--just everyone else), etc. That's why you don't get university positions if you hold to certain views that run counter to those presuppositions, even if you can work out the evidence to favor that position. It's just plain seen as absurd, not because of data (data says nothing), but because of the ultimate beliefs that control what one is capable of arguing with that data, and the subsequent consensus that reliance upon such necessary presuppositions brings.
I don't know a single evangelical scholar who doesn't work out the data consistently with their presupps. But their conclusions are not consistent with the ultimate beliefs that govern the methodologies of inquiry within the secular academy. Until we realize that this is a conflict of beliefs, we're not going to get anywhere. And we're going to continue to fight over who is the biggest group of idiots because they just don't accept the clear "evidence" in front of them 'til the world's ending.
And just to add a little log to the fire, perhaps the reason why the consensus within the academy is so different on some issues than the consensus among the populace is not simply due to the uneducated superstition of the populace, but to the fact that they have not been conditioned by the same culture/subculture. Hence, their presuppositions are often completely different than those adopted by the academy (and a lot of that has to do with the religious nature of the larger culture).
And while I;m at it, let me just add to the possibly interesting discussion that was brewing, but too soon dismissed, above concerning Romans 1. The reason why a scientist whose science has implications concerning the Creator is more affected by what Romans 1 would say to him is due to the fact that the passage deals with suppressing truths that would make him, as a sinner, accountable to God in judgment for his sin. A guy working on the electric car or a rocket isn't dealing with that type of analysis of creation. Hence, if there is going to be any suppression of the truth about God as evidenced in creation, it would be here more than anywhere else, save the area of biblical scholarship. Now, it could be that there is no suppression going on at all in our culture, and those areas are right as rain, but how exactly would you go about proving that? Or is it merely up to what presuppositions you hold about the subject?
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Stephen • a month ago
Bryan,
Thanks for your feedback, though your rhetorical framing is a bit off-putting; i.e., “as someone who actually understand epistemology and how knowledge really works.” Talk about an attempt at the outset to stack the relevance deck in your favor!
Several points:
(1) You may want to keep in mind that Enns was part of the “presuppositional” apologetics and epistemology seminary par excellence for, what, 20-25 years? I guess it’s possible that he has forgotten what evangelicals who talk in terms of presuppositions mean, or that he never understood in the first place, but…well, you get the point.
(2) You’re presuming an (what is rapidly becoming) outdated view of epistemology, knowledge, and how the brain works. Folks are moving away from the idea of overarching determinative “worldviews,” “presuppositions,” “ultimate/necessary beliefs” that “determine the boundaries for what conclusions can and cannot be made of the evidence” as an accurate description of how the human brain works.
In short, this model tends to presume a singular and unitary model of the brain, as though it’s one big supercomputer with one central control center. In fact, the “modular” (or similar; e.g., “dual processing” and other) view of the brain is becoming much more prevalent, wherein our brains are made up of thousands (zillions?) of little computers, most of which operate independently of the others and most of which operate without the parts of our brain that we tend to term our “consciousness” being aware of what they’re doing.
The upshot here is, for example, that many of these modules are for the most part universals among people. That’s why the non-malfunctioning person has the same intuitive/folk physics, biology, and psychology (i.e., “Theory of Mind”) as everyone else.
Though there are parts of our brain that hold the kinds of beliefs and commitments you’re talking about, those parts of the brain do not necessarily control, override, or even communicate with (astonishingly) all the other parts of our brain that control things like our intuitive physics, Theory of Mind, and other ways that we (by default) interact with the world around us. While these parts of our brain that do hold the beliefs you’re talking about do have profound effects on how we behave and (at least parts of us) think, their beliefs simply do not exercise “worldview” level of unitary and determinative control over the other parts of our cognition.
BTW, these modular kinds of approaches to the brain have proven incredibly useful for psychologists, sociologists, and others who study ubiquitous but seemingly bizarre human phenomena, like why is it the case that people everywhere seem to be “hypocrites”? This approach allows us to go further than simply saying that it’s because people are sinners. Instead, for example, it becomes relevant if the parts of our brain that hold certain “moral” beliefs or engage in “moralizing” (i.e., holding and propagating beliefs about how people should behave) are different from the parts of our brain that most directly influence how we actually behave. At this point it also becomes quite interesting to study the possible extents of interaction between these different parts of our brain.
So, before moving on to the next point, could you spell out for us the actual cognitive and psychological mechanics of your determinative “worldviews”?
(3) There are cognitive scientists, psychologists, epistemologists, sociologists, and anthropologists who work within the above kind of framework to study the kinds of beliefs you are talking about. For example (and please forgive use of the term “bias”), it is widely held that properly cognitively functioning people have what’s called “the Confirmation Bias,” whereby certain modules of our brain work together (especially with the parts of our brain that we tend to consider our “conscious” and “reasoning” parts of the brain) to prefer evidence that conforms to positions we (or a group with which we self-identify) hold and to discount evidence and arguments that militate against a certain subset of our beliefs.
Related to the Confirmation Bias is the sociological phenomenon that when you put a bunch of people who already agree with each other together in some kind of (insular) network or group, they tend (if anything) to adopt more extreme versions of the views they already hold, and they certainly do not tend to be self-critical.
FWIW, in my experience this tends to be the closest that cognitive science has come to explaining what certain kinds of philosophers and epistemologists (and Evangelical Apologists!) mean when they talk about overarching and unifying determinative presuppositions and “ultimate/necessary” beliefs that predetermine what can and can’t count as evidence, etc. In fact, there have been numerous detailed studies that bring these psychological and cognitive science findings to bear on phenomena parallel to what we are discussing here about Evangelicals on science, faith, evolution, the Bible, their disagreements, and how different “sides” seem to have determinative presuppositions that control how they treat potential “evidence.” To pick from among accessible books written by big names in these cog-sci and psychology fields of research, see Jonathan Haidt’s recent book, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religions (2012). Also relevant, see Robert Kurzban’s recent, Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind (2010).
Of course, much work has been done on the social and cognitive conditions that (on average) counteract the Confirmation Bias and its “groupthink” manifestations. E.g., you tend to need non-insular settings, networks, or groups in which not everyone already agrees and in which one’s views are up for (acknowledged) peer-criticism by those who disagree.
(4) Ironically, the epistemological positions with which you operate are most closely paralleled in the broader academy (i.e., outside of certain philosophy departments and then outside of the Evangelical apologetics world) by people that I assume you would consider the “radical relativists” in the Humanities of the University. As someone who works in the humanities, I most often encounter ideas of determinative ultimate/necessary beliefs and worldviews that color all other cognition (especially weighing of evidence, arguments, and “values”) among those we would categorize as thoroughgoing “post-modernists” who talk constantly of extreme cultural diversity and incommensurability. It’s among these types that you find the most eager and energetic analyses of “science” along the lines of yours: i.e., what really matters are the assumptions and presuppositions, not “evidence,” despite the (na├»ve) pretentions of scientists to be engaged in empirical study, etc. etc. etc.
(5) Finally, just for fun, how in your model do you explain and account for people who change their minds about matters relating to such “ultimate/necessary” beliefs, worldviews, and presuppositions? I assume that you consider this possible. How does it happen?
Sorry for the long comment.


Bryan Hodge Stephena month ago
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Thanks Stephen. Let me clarify a few things that I think were misunderstood, and continue to be, precisely due to word confusion when we speak of bias, presupposition, ultimate/necessary beliefs, and presuppositionalism.
1. Dr. Enns was actually a professor of mine at Westminster, which, as you say, is the center for presuppositional apologetics, which is related, but not identical, to the idea I'm discussing here . That a school is well known for a particular position also doesn't mean that everyone who teaches there has a good grasp of it. I read Dr. Enns' blog almost every day, and from things he says, it indicates to me that he is confusing bias with presuppositinal ultimate beliefs. If he wasn't then he wouldn't be able to say that he can adjust them over time or be self critical of them to accord with the evidence. It also seems clear to me that you may be doing the same by what you say in your comments (but I'll address that below). If, however, I've misunderstood what he, or any of you, were saying, I do apologize and am fully ready to receive any correction. But having said that, I don't know how the statements made are reconciled to the fact that necessary beliefs can't be changed using logical argumentation and data without assuming another ultimate belief that governs both.
2. There is a lot of confusion in what you're saying between how the brain functions and how we come to beliefs versus our critical analysis and building our arguments to support our beliefs. The former is irrelevant to the latter, as it is often either not conscious of why we hold particular ideas or it is not critical and seeks to build an argument using logic, which must be based in ultimate beliefs. There is no theory that can negate such a thing without proving its validity.
3. Again, here, by bringing up confirmation bias, it really does tell me we are speaking past one another. Confirmation bias is what I would consider bias, not presuppositions rooted in ultimate beliefs. The nature of reality must first be settled in one's assumptions, whether he even is aware of those assumptions in his argument, before an argument based upon those assumptions can be made. I think you would agree that this is obvious, but this is precisely the problem when evaluating data.
4. Actually, it's not that ironic, since I consider myself a postmodern theist. I am radically skeptical, and an outright unbeliever, in the concept that one can build a view of reality that is analogically accurate to the objective existence of reality without revelation and the aid to understand it. What that means is that I don't believe sufficient knowledge is possible without assuming a particular view of reality that is sufficiently descriptive of that objective reality. Hence, if you have a wrong ultimate belief, you have an insufficient and distorted view of the meaning of everything, not just some things.
5. That's a great question, and what I was arguing for above. People don't change their minds between ultimate beliefs based on reasoned arguments or evidence. If they did, they wouldn't be ultimate beliefs. They change them by shifting their faith in one to the other. That happens for a variety of reasons, some of which you mention above; but as I said, it doesn't come from pure argumentation or evidence, because such is impossible. If a person believes otherwise, it is likely he is thinking of biases, which can be changed with reason and evidence (although those are still difficult to change, it does happen often), and not necessary beliefs that rule logical argument and the interpretation of data.
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Stephen Bryan Hodgea month ago
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Oops, posted my reply below and not in this thread.
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peteenns Bryan Hodgea month ago
Bryan, just to make sure I get what you are saying---presuppositions are not open to reasonable critique, but change for more subtle reasons? Do you feel that presuppositions are open to critique, i.e., that presuppositions can be unwarranted? Do you deny that presuppositions are largely a function of our own limited experiences, and therefore are intimately and invariably tied to psychology, sociology? I ask that last question because,in retrospect, what WTS calls "presuppositions" are, frankly, quite open to logical critique.


Bryan Hodge • a month ago
Hi Dr. Enns. Great to speak to you again. To answer you questions:
1. "presuppositions are not open to reasonable critique, but change for more subtle reasons?"
If by "presuppositions" you mean "necessary beliefs" and by "reasonable critique" you mean "critical analysis that judges whether it is true," then, yes, by virtue of the belief being necessary, it cannot be proved or disproved (otherwise, it isn't necessary/ultimate). One can only believe or disbelieve it and then move on in one's argumentation from there. Hence, we may move in and out of them for a complexity of reasons, but if we think one of those reasons is because they are proved or disproved, then we're mistaken.
2. "Do you feel that presuppositions are open to critique, i.e., that presuppositions can be unwarranted?"
Again, this really depends on what is meant by "presupposition." I think what I was trying to say above is that a lot of the problem is in the nomenclature. Ultimate beliefs cannot be warranted, and hence, they cannot be unwarranted by anything else other than the conflicting ultimate beliefs of others. They themselves warrant other beliefs. So you can critique an ultimate belief using another ultimate belief, but that takes us out of the realm of empirical certainty and into the realm of faith.
3. "Do you deny that presuppositions are largely a function of our own limited experiences, and therefore are intimately and invariably tied to psychology, sociology?"
No, I wouldn't deny that completely, although I would exclude the idea that their existence is sourced in us, as I believe the Spirit gives faith and therefore conditions an individual believer to hold certain ultimate beliefs. So I would agree that they are rooted in the self for the whole world, but would save the medium for how a Christian worldview is obtained to the Spirit's work--although one could say that such is through the social and psychological influences of the individual believer as well. But I'm not sure why the last question is as relevant to what I'm arguing, simply because the way one comes to an ultimate belief and the fact that ultimate beliefs are not capable of being critiqued are two different arguments. I think you can point out why you think someone has come to a particular ultimate belief; and I think you're fine in critiquing people who think they can tear down the ultimate beliefs of you or others by using their own necessary beliefs to interpret the data instead (since all they are doing is arguing with you over beliefs that cannot be proved or disproved); but that's as far as the analysis should really go. To say, on top of that, that their ultimate beliefs make them dishonest with the evidence and whatnot is confusing bias with ultimate belief. Their bias may be making them dishonest, but their necessary beliefs are simply interpreting reality for them, and their as honest in that as anyone else is. But from what I see as the critique of evangelical philosophers concerning the conclusions of the academy on various topics (e.g., Darwinian evolution, higher critical biblical scholarship, etc.) it is not concerning bias, but necessary beliefs. The problem, as they see it, is found in the assumptions that govern the methodology of inquiry itself, not in the personal biases of the individual scholar or scientist.
Now, when it comes to the presuppositions to which "WTS" is referring, can you give me an example of that? I'm not sure which ones we're talking about, as I've heard this same confusion among students and professors even at WTS. Now, part of that might be that the current professors there may have a different view of presuppositions than I, as a postmodern skeptic, do. My introduction to epistemology was at TEDS before I came to WTS. I think I read something by a certain professor there that wanted to argue for a presuppositionalism that still included some form of warrant obtained via evidentialism. I would reject that when we're talking about presuppositions as ultimate beliefs. By the very definition, that is an impossibility.
So, in the end, it may be the nomenclature that is the problem here. But that still means that after throwing off the objection of bias, the objection dealing with necessary beliefs that then influences all of these other arguments concerning academic consensus and whatnot remain unanswered.
Beau Quilter Bryan Hodgea month ago
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"Ultimate beliefs cannot be warranted, and hence, they cannot be unwarranted by anything else other than the conflicting ultimate beliefs of others. They themselves warrant other beliefs. So you can critique an ultimate belief using another ultimate belief, but that takes us out of the realm of empirical certainty and into the realm of faith."
If by "ultimate beliefs" you mean beliefs in God; then I accept your assessment that they cannot be warranted. However, your second clause contradicts your first. How can an "ultimate belief" be "unwarranted" if it cannot be "warranted" in the first place.
The premise that only an "ultimate belief" can "unwarrant" an "ultimate belief" is, quite simply, false. When an "ultimate belief" makes predictions that are testable, the "ultimate belief" becomes falsifiable, like any scientific theory, regardless of the beliefs (or lack thereof) of the scientist. How do we know that the Greek panoply of Gods are unwarranted? We've seen the top of Mount Olympus; there's nobody there.


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Bryan Hodge Beau Quiltera month ago
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Beau,
I find the self evident concept that I'm seeking to convey here to be hardest for contemporary atheists who are continually told how solid their beliefs are based in empirical verificationism, as your example relates. The problem, of course, as most philosophers point out, is that empirical verificationism has metaphysical presuppositions that cannot be verified empirically. Hence, if one can only rely upon that which is empirically verifiable, then one cannot rely upon empirical verificationism, and it thus becomes self refuting.
Second to this, my point concerning ultimate beliefs being neither warranted or unwarrented was taking Dr. Enns' use of the word "unwarranted" to mean "without evidential support," so I think that you have a little word confusion going on there. What I was saying in response to that was that an ultimate belief can neither be established upon evidential support or disestablished by lack of evidential support due to the fact that such would require the interpretation of data with a higher ultimate belief in order to criticize and establish/disestablish the lower ultimate belief. But then it isn't an ultimate belief. Hence, there is no contradiction in my statement, nor does your example do anything but prove my point concerning your ultimate beliefs.
However, after saying that, your example is not an example of an ultimate belief. You don't seem to be grasping the concept. If something is verifiable, one must ask, "By what is it verifiable?" If it turns out to be a reliable source and it is viewed by those same people holding the ultimate belief as an accurate interpretation of the data, then those people will simply figure that their secondary beliefs that stemmed from the ultimate belief were wrong and adjust them to the ultimate belief. Everyone does this. If one jumps ship and moves to another ultimate belief because of the above, it is only because it was always his real ultimate belief by which he criticizes his only supposed ultimate belief.
I would take some time to ponder these points before attempting to shoot them down because you don't like them, as they seem very new to you.
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Beau Quilter Bryan Hodgea month ago
Bryan
Are you assuming here, that everyone has an "ultimate belief"? And rather than defining warranted, perhaps you should define an "ultimate belief"?
A very interesting discussion, and out of my area of expertise for much comment. I do think there is some category mixing here however. It seems the main subject morphed from presuppositions (fallible) to necessary/ultimate beliefs (infallible?) without warrant. Unless indeed we do have a mere definition problem.
But what to do with this statement? "......their necessary beliefs are simply interpreting reality for them, and their (sic) as honest in that as anyone else is." I agree with the honest part, but is it possible that their necessary belief is wrong, not for them, of course, but ontologically? Because if two people hold differing necessary beliefs, they both cannot be correct, even if they both apply their necessary beliefs honestly. Christians do seem to hear the Spirit in different ways. Maybe, just maybe, the fruits of the Spirit, which are directly observable, even by non-believers, are at least a partially reliable test for the validity (utility) of various necessary beliefs. Or maybe this is just how a biologist, thinking like a critical realist of course, would be expected to approach the problem.



·  Bryan Hodge • a month ago
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Bev,
That's a great question. I'm not arguing that because we all hold ultimate beliefs that cannot be proved or disproved that this means that all of our ultimate beliefs equally, or even remotely, describe reality (analogically speaking).
But what I am saying is that, since ultimate beliefs are not something you can prove or disprove, we must argue for them via faith. People don't adjust to data and logical argumentation when presented before them. They adjust to fit their ultimate beliefs. So if we want them to believe X through what we say, we need them to move from a faith position that does not produce a belief in X to one that does. What this means, for Christians, is that I think we need to get back to just speaking the Word of God, and reasoning from it, and let the Spirit make faith adjustments with His people as He sees fit through that, as I think that is the only time a faith shift occurring is very meaningful in the long run.
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peteenns Stephena month ago
Bryan, I hope you find this comment on this increasingly confused thread! Anyway, I appreciate your thoughts on all this. To help me see where this goes, can you bring this back to what I think began your engagement--something about not being able to convince evangelicals about evolution because of their presuppositions? Is that right? If I am right, I would say that the #1 road block for evangelicals is inerrancy, which I would think does not qualify as a presupposition according to your definition. Inerrancy is an articulated and defended (I would argue) social/theological construct. Comment as you get a chance.
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Stephen • a month ago
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Bryan,
Thanks for your continued interaction. I guess we may to some extent be talking past each other, but I think it's more that we just disagree (not that this must be a conversation-stopping disagreement). I do understand what you mean by ultimate beliefs and presuppositions. My point is that you're operating out of a (certain kind of) philosopher's paradigm for how they construct the mind as working, and I do not think it's accurate.
Let's try to get at this in a more concrete way: can you give us a few examples of "ultimate beliefs" and then spell out how they influence evaluations of evidence and arguments? This will let us work through some issues in relation to specifics.
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Bryan Hodge Stephena month ago
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Stephen, don't make me apply my ivory tower theories to real life. ;-) I think our missing one another may still be that we're addressing two different questions. What you're talking about is how we believe to be true. I'm discussing how we support what we believe to be true. The theories that you're talking about deal with how we come to beliefs. But I'm not discussing that. I'm specifically discussing what ultimate beliefs and assumptions govern those beliefs, regardless of how we come to them. It's simply impossible for my theory to be outdated, as I would argue it is an easily demonstrated, self-evident description of what we do when we attempt to obtain knowledge through reason.
But I think Dr. Enns has given us one example below with the issue of inerrancy, so see my comments there.
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Bryan Hodge • a month ago
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"something about not being able to convince evangelicals about evolution because of their presuppositions? Is that right?"
Yes, this works for everyone. The specific conservative evangelicals who will not be convinced of evolution have certain ultimate beliefs about the Bible that governs their view of all other things. So I actually think that inerrancy is something that cannot be tested, since it directly derives from certain ultimate beliefs that cannot be tested. You can get people to change their minds over it, and I think the Spirit Himself changes peoples minds over it as they study the Bible more; but while people hold a certain belief about the Bible, any contradictions will be viewed as limitations of knowledge on our part. When forced to see the Bible differently by external factors, there are a host of options that an evangelical might choose in order to keep his ultimate beliefs in tact. But the problem is that if the ultimate belief is true, then what he has concluded is true. If the utlimate belief is false, then what he has concluded is false. But there is no way to test whether the ultimate belief is true. It's just something you believe or or disbelief, and a lot of that has to do with the issue of what you believe about reality and the ability to know reality through a particular means. For most evangelicals, reality most reliably known through the Scripture. It, therefore, has the highest place of authority in the evangelical's life. So when confronted with something like evolution, if the evangelical thinks it contradicts what the Bible says, he's not going to give it the time of day. The course one needs to take to convince him would be to show (a) his ultimate belief about the Bible is not true (something that cannot be proved or disproved, but rather needs to come to him with a faith shift), (b) evolution is not really in conflict with what the Bible teaches (which is a matter of hermeneutics which would change the way he reads the Bible), and/or (c) evolution is knowledge that can be known through a reliable source.
All three of these is a monumental undertaking, and they each require a faith shift, since they all assume something about knowledge and what reliable sources of that knowledge might be.
Now, of course, it's easy to speak of the presuppositions of others, but let's draw this closer to home to the group here. In order to convince everyone here that evolution is not true, an evangelical would have to (a) argue that neither the methods nor the people using them to demonstrate that evolution is true are adequate sources of knowledge, (b) that evolution conflicts with what is known to be true from what is an adequate source of knowledge, and (c) demonstrate that the interpretation of that adequate source of knowledge is correct.
Each of these intersects just as equally with ultimate beliefs that cannot be proved or disproved. But this is why conservative evangelicals who see the Bible as the most reliable and adequate source of knowledge, and believe that the correct interpretation of the Bible contradicts the findings of what they view as an inadequate source of knowledge, find it just as easy to dismiss the findings of that inadequate source as most on this thread find it to dismiss the findings of conservative evangelicals using what people here would find to be an inadequate source of knowledge.
By "inadequate source of knowledge," of course, I mean "knowledge in the specific area we're discussing." Most here would find the Bible to be adequate in relating spiritual truths, and most conservative evangelicals would find contemporary natural methods adequate to discover knowledge in the areas that they have no reason to see as incorrect.
So I really do think that this whole battle is one over ultimate beliefs concerning the nature of reality and what is considered the most reliable or adequate source to interpret reality given those assumptions. I can look at a Hindu and say, "It's obvious that evil exists in the world, You Fool." And he will simply look at me and say, "It's obvious how deeply delusional you are in thinking that this world and what you perceive as evil is real, You Fool," But we're both just arguing our faiths with one another.

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Bryan Hodge Bryan Hodgea month ago
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btw, I just want to say, that when I speak about "inerrancy," I'm assuming we're talking about details inerrancy. I personally believe in a type of inerrancy that most would call "infallibility," which, of course, is not something that can be proved or disproved either (but I do think it describes what the Bible is doing better than detailed inerrancy does).

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"detailed inerrancy." I need an edit button. ;-)

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