B.C., do you buy into that sort of argument? The author appears to be claiming that a Christian is rationally justified in asserting the truth of Christianity regardless of the arguments and evidence - in short, that Christianity (at least of the sort believed by the author) is unfalsifiable.
I don't know how Rian managed to draw that inference from my post.
i) To begin with, there's a fundamental distinction between evidence and argument. Ideally, an arguments is based on evidence. But by the same token, evidence is often prior to argument. We have evidence for many things we don't argue for. Every day we subconscious form hundreds of beliefs based on things we see and hear. I believe it's daytime because I can see sunlight. I just gave you an argument for why I believe it's daytime, but only because I'm using that as an example. I formed my initial belief that it's daytime apart from argument. Sunlight was the evidence, and that triggered a subliminal belief-formation process.
By analogy, Christians can be justified in believing Christianity is true (indeed, Christians can know that Christianity is true) without having to argue for their belief. There's such a thing as tacit knowledge.
ii) Whether Christianity is falsifiable is equivocal. In a trivial sense, what is false is falsifiable; what is true is unfalsifiable.
There's a hypothetical sense in which Christianity is falsifiable. It makes truth-claims which, if false, would falsify it. But, of course, that doesn't mean it's actually falsifiable.
iii) In addition, falsification requires criteria. Criteria are value-laden. In that respect, falsification is worldview dependent.
If the God of Christian theism exists, then his existence is a necessary precondition for anything to be falsifiable. In that event, his existence is unfalsifiable.
I took your first point to be advocating for some sort of confidence that Christianity is true (one of your commenters refers to the "inner testimony of the holy spirit") being sufficient for justification in the absence of supporting arguments and evidence, and in fact in the face of arguments and evidence which might otherwise be taken to undermine the truth of Christianity.
From there it seems that it might be a simple matter to rationalise away any and all objections to your faith which might be encountered.
I'm not saying that you (or Christians generally) are necessarily doing this, but rather that the points in your post could certainly be used to provide cover for clinging to a set of beliefs even after one ought to "reconsider our original commitment" as you say.
i) I'm referring to Christian belief in particular, not beliefs generally.
ii) Even with respect to beliefs generally, our belief-structure would be quite unstable if we ditched a belief the moment we encountered some prima facie evidence to the contrary.
iii) The same belief can sometimes have both supporting evidence and prima facie counterevidence. For instance, that's commonplace in scientific theories.
iv) Quine compared our belief-structure to a spider's web. A spider's web has a certain amount of redundancy. Some strands are more peripheral while others are more central. You can skip some strands, and the web will remain intact. Other strands are crucial to the structural integrity of the web.
Our beliefs have degrees of certainty. And some of our beliefs ground other beliefs.
v) Doubting Christianity presumes a standard of comparison. But that, in term, raises the question of how you justify your standard of comparison. Are criteria infinitely regressive?
vi) I don't think there's a viable alternative to the Christian worldview. There's nothing to fall back on. And there are radical atheists who unwittingly illustrate that fact (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Alex Rosenberg).
ii) True. but what if you found too many inconsistencies?
v) What exactly do you mean?
vi) The Christian worldview is not a viable alternative. It can't even leave the floor. Therefore, if there was nothing "viable" (there is, but it does not matter because your "logic" is flawed) it would not matter. People could just keep looking rather than accept something as retrograde and nonsensical as Christianity.
Nagel is an imbecile. I don't know Alex, and I don't care.
Thanks for demonstrating that you have nothing intelligent to contribute to this discussion. I appreciate your unwitting illustration of what atheism amounts to. Keep up the good work.
Not a problem Steve. Always happy to be of help. Seems like you had a hard time with (v). But I'm not surprised. Seems also that if we discuss (vi) using your exact style it bothers you. Not really odd. Rather to be expected. What did you want? Some deep respect for your empty and nonsensical assertions?
The "Christian worldview" as per presuppositionalism is but a ridiculous set of tricks for the unwary. It sells a nonsensical set of charged questions only to be answered via an imaginary being. Oh, what a "viable" alternative! Doubt the reality you are living, then "solve" the "problem" by involving an imaginary being and thus accept that reality you were already living. Truly "smart" and "viable." Sure thing.
Although I thought your first comment sufficiently illustrated the intellectual vacuity of the village atheist, it's nice to see that you have vacuity to spare.
"Although I thought your first comment sufficiently illustrated the intellectual vacuity of the village atheist, it's nice to see that you have vacuity to spare."
Chuckling heartily. Hence, the appropriate moniker of "PhotoStupidity" is attached to this intellectually vacuous village atheist.
Close enough for your comment to start looking like an intelligent one this time. Here. Another lollipop. Don't worry. I'm patient. If you keep trying maybe you will be able to have a conversation later. Be careful not to break your brain though. One step at a time will do for you.
i) Understood. I think my point still stands - the claim that some internal confidence of feeling of the truth of Christianity leads you to know that Christianity is true seems to be rather fraught to me.
v) I would try something more basic. Taking "Christianity" to be your grounding seems to be far too expansive a foundation, and it leads, as you seem to be alluding to hear, to being unable to question that truth.
vi) If, as you seem to be saying, you ground your other beliefs in the truth of Christianity - Christianity is foundational to your worldview - then how are you able to compare alternatives? You say yourself that in point (v) that you'd need to presume a standard of comparison, and if that standard takes the truth of Christianity to be foundational, then aren't you doing something akin to begging the question in claiming that you don't see any alternative to Christianity?
"i) Understood. I think my point still stands - the claim that some internal confidence of feeling of the truth of Christianity leads you to know that Christianity is true seems to be rather fraught to me."
Since that's not what I argued for, your point misses the mark.
"v) I would try something more basic. Taking 'Christianity' to be your grounding seems to be far too expansive a foundation, and it leads, as you seem to be alluding to hear [sic], to being unable to question that truth."
If the foundation is too basic or narrow, it can't support the superstructure.
"vi) If, as you seem to be saying, you ground your other beliefs in the truth of Christianity - Christianity is foundational to your worldview - then how are you able to compare alternatives?"
By using Christianity as the benchmark.
"You say yourself that in point (v) that you'd need to presume a standard of comparison, and if that standard takes the truth of Christianity to be foundational, then aren't you doing something akin to begging the question in claiming that you don't see any alternative to Christianity?"
i) You can only question a truth-claim by reference to something else you hold to be true. You're comparing (or contrasting) what you already take to be true with a truth-claim. Is the truth-claim consistent with what you already hold true? Is the truth-claim entailed by what you already hold true?
You can't question the truth of everything, for you can only measure a truth-claim by something true. So how does Rian avoid begging the question?
ii) We can automatically discount positions that undermine rationality. Since naturalism undermines rationality–as even some naturalists grudgingly concede (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Crispin Wright, Daniel Dennett, the Churchlands), we can take that off the table at the outset. Only theistic worldviews with sufficient metaphysical resources would even be in the running. That's a very exclusive club, which–by process of elimination–can be reduced to Christianity.
(I won't go into all that right now. Better not to discuss too many things at once.)
By using Christianity as the benchmark. How did you arrive at Christianity as the benchmark, or was it something that was assumed?
You can't question the truth of everything, for you can only measure a truth-claim by something true. So how does Rian avoid begging the question? By taking most everything I "know" as provisional and subject to revision, apart from things which don't seem to be deniable (such as the raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog). Such a simple starting point doesn't seem to me to assume or deny the truth of Christianty, Islam, Naturalism, etc.
Since naturalism undermines rationality–as even some naturalists grudgingly concede (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Crispin Wright, Daniel Dennett, the Churchlands), we can take that off the table at the outset. Not sure what you mean here by undermining rationality. I've read some Dennett and Churchland, and they don't seem to deny rationality be claiming naturalism undermines rationality.
Only theistic worldviews with sufficient metaphysical resources would even be in the running. I see that only being the case if you demand certain things from a worldview. Like the common theistic claim that non-theism can't support morality - the theist invariably assumes morality requires a "god-like", theistic foundation.
That's a very exclusive club, which–by process of elimination–can be reduced to Christianity. I guess when your standard is Christianity, nothing else stacks up :-)
He, he, see what he said? A very exclusive club? As if humans just invented religions a few days ago. As if there was only one Christianity. Steve lives in fantasyland big time.
"How did you arrive at Christianity as the benchmark, or was it something that was assumed?"
There's a common difference between knowing something's true and showing something's true. By regeneration, a Christian enjoys a tacit recognition of Christian truth. He can experience Christian truth in Scripture, miracle, creation, and providence. Humans can, and often do, register evidence at a subliminal level. I gave an illustration at the outset.
Conversely, the explanatory power of the Christian worldview can serve as both a benchmark and a proof. That would involve showing, over and above knowing.
"By taking most everything I 'know' as provisional and subject to revision…"
Using one doubtful belief to evaluate another doubtful belief doesn't get you anywhere. You're moving in a continuous circle of dubiety. How does your method break out of that vicious circle of skepticism?
"...apart from things which don't seem to be deniable (such as the raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog)."
The only thing that's strictly undeniable about that experience is the impression that you're being appeared to (as Roderick Chisolm would put it) by a computer. But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer.
"Such a simple starting point doesn't seem to me to assume or deny the truth of Christianty, Islam, Naturalism, etc."
Well, that's philosophically gauche. Trusting the general reliability of sense knowledge is very value-laden and worldview dependent. It involves you in theories of perception, viz. direct perception, indirect perception, phenomenalism, &c. To what extent does the proximal stimulus correspond to the distal stimulus?
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process.
So your "simple starting-point" is deceptively simple. It suffers from many unstated presuppositions.
"Not sure what you mean here by undermining rationality. I've read some Dennett and Churchland, and they don't seem to deny rationality be claiming naturalism undermines rationality."
The Churchlands deny the existence of mental states. You could hardly have a more radical denial of rationality. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett contends that what we take to be intelligence is reducible to unintelligent steps.
That's like a pointillist painting, but with a crucial difference. In a pointillist painting, the depiction is composed of individually meaningless specks of color. However, they form a meaningful pattern because the mind of the painter arranged these specks of color to be representational. The individually insignificant specks can be collectively significant because a mind assigns them an ends-means relation. That's a topdown process. By contrast, Dennett is proposing a bottom-up process where reason is not the cause, but the effect of an unreasoning process. But if intelligence can be broken down into meaningless bits, then the end-result is like accidental art.
"I see that only being the case if you demand certain things from a worldview. Like the common theistic claim that non-theism can't support morality - the theist invariably assumes morality requires a 'god-like', theistic foundation." Actually, many atheists admit that naturalism can't support objective moral norms, viz. Richard Joyce, Joel Marks, Michael Ruse, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, Massimo Pigliucci, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Paul Pardi, Steven Pinker.
"But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer. "
But involving an imaginary being is not questionable at all, of course. ALl you need is call it "God" and there's no problem.
Well, God is seemingly compatible with anything and it's opposite - it's the universal hypothesis. Which makes it absolutely useless and an actual explanation :-)
By regeneration, a Christian enjoys a tacit recognition of Christian truth. Which assumes the truth of Christianity - this can only be the case if Christianity WERE true, and surely can't be used to claim knowledge THAT Christianity IS true. Also, if something like Christianity were true, there would be any number of ways you could falsely acquire this feeling of the truth of Christianity - after all, it would surely be a simple matter for Satan to implant that confidence in you in order to confuse the truth, would it not?
Conversely, the explanatory power of the Christian worldview can serve as both a benchmark and a proof. The explanatory power of the Christian worldview is usually over estimated by those who are convinced of it's truth, in my experience.
Using one doubtful belief to evaluate another doubtful belief doesn't get you anywhere. You're moving in a continuous circle of dubiety. It doesn't get you to certainty, but rather to provisional knowledge.
How does your method break out of that vicious circle of skepticism? I see no vicious cycle. I see things which I can be more of less confident are more or less correct, and which can shift when new information becomes available.
But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer. True on both accounts, which is why the experience is the more or less undeniable part rather than the reality. From there we can build up what is more likely to be the case, always with the understanding that even if it were the case that I were hooked up to a VR program, or whatever, I have to carry on AS IF that were not the case. And of course, there seems to be no good evidence to believe I am actually hooked up in that fashion - the simpler and more probable explanation is that I am having the experience of sitting in front of a computer because I am in fact sitting in front of a computer.
Trusting the general reliability of sense knowledge is very value-laden and worldview dependent. I'm not trusting with certainty the reliability of sense knowledge - as I explained, the having of the experience seems undeniable. Everything else about reality can be built provisionally from there.
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process. Our senses can be fooled, so if there were a designer he did a sub-optimal job. Also, I find evolutionary processes are often misunderstood by theists. Your point here seems reminiscent of Plantinga's terrible "Evolutionary Argument". Evolution may be blind and directionless, but it does tend to optimise survival, which would be enhanced by reasonably reliable senses. Under theism there is no reason to trust our senses at all (it could all be demons, after all).
It suffers from many unstated presuppositions. It probably does, but I don't think they're fatal, and I don't see that as making this foundation LESS reasonable than the extravagant foundation you seem to be claiming.
The Churchlands deny the existence of mental states. As separate from brain states - on their view, as I understand it the mind is what the brain does/is.
You could hardly have a more radical denial of rationality. If you require "rationality" to be divorced from brain states, then you're correct. I don't see the justification for this requirement however.
In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett contends that what we take to be intelligence is reducible to unintelligent steps. I'd have to reread the book to be sure, but I believe Dennett accepts that the mind and intelligence arise from the brain, and these unintelligent steps you're referring to would be the operation of the various brain components. You're claim is obviously true if you assume the mind must be more than the brain in some way (which you appear to be doing).
But if intelligence can be broken down into meaningless bits, then the end-result is like accidental art. And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes.
Actually, many atheists admit that naturalism can't support objective moral norms, viz. Richard Joyce, Joel Marks, Michael Ruse, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, Massimo Pigliucci, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Paul Pardi, Steven Pinker. Which means what exactly? If you demand morality is in objective in some sense, and this sense cannot be accounted for by Naturalism. For example, if you demand your "objective morality" derive from the nature of some transcendental or non-material person, then of course naturalism will fall short, as will any non-theistic morality (of which there exist some which are not naturalistic).
You seem to have made, as your starting point, the truth of Christianity. You seem to demand that any alternative explanation be, basically, Christian, or otherwise it is found wanting. That's a fairly serious case of begging the question, is it not?
In fact, if Naturalism were true, you could easily acquire the same sort of "a tacit recognition of Christian truth".
It seems to me that this tacit recognition as we actually find it, is just as likely on Naturalism, or on something similar to your Christianity, or on various other types of Supernaturalism, as it would be on Christianity, and so doesn't seem like it can be evidence THAT Christianity is true, even to the person who feels it. There are certainly other ways this feeling could have presented, that would increase the probability that Christianity of a certain sort were true (only Christians who believe in the right way, or believe in the right things having it, or EVERYONE having the same feeling concerning Christianity, regardless of their prior beliefs, and so on).
"Well, God is seemingly compatible with anything and it's opposite - it's the universal hypothesis."
Is God compatible with theism and atheism alike?
"Which assumes the truth of Christianity - this can only be the case if Christianity WERE true, and surely can't be used to claim knowledge THAT Christianity IS true."
i) If it's true, it can be used to claim knowledge–and if it's false, it can't. So your denial is arbitrarily one-sided.
ii) One of your confusions may be failure to distinguish between what the subject of experience is justified in believing (or knowing), and whether that's sufficient evidence for an outsider, who only has a second-hand report. If an individual had a veridical experience, that's sufficient warrant for him, even if it might be insufficient for a second party who wasn't privy to that experience. And that goes back to my distinction between knowing and showing.
For instance, I have memories of things I did with my late grandmother. I can't prove it to you, but it's sufficient for me. I was there, you weren't.
"Also, if something like Christianity were true, there would be any number of ways you could falsely acquire this feeling of the truth of Christianity - after all, it would surely be a simple matter for Satan to implant that confidence in you in order to confuse the truth, would it not?"
If Christianity is true, then Satan isn't controlling the minds of Christians.
"The explanatory power of the Christian worldview is usually over estimated by those who are convinced of it's truth, in my experience."
An unargued assertion.
"It doesn't get you to certainty, but rather to provisional knowledge."
If it's knowledge, it's not provisional. If it's provisional, it's not knowledge.
"I see no vicious cycle. I see things which I can be more of less confident are more or less correct, and which can shift when new information becomes available."
If "most everything" you think you know is provisional and subject to revision, then you're just rearranging doubtful opinions. You have no anchor.
"From there we can build up what is more likely to be the case, always with the understanding that even if it were the case that I were hooked up to a VR program, or whatever, I have to carry on AS IF that were not the case."
What is "more likely" presupposes a standard of comparison.
"And of course, there seems to be no good evidence to believe I am actually hooked up in that fashion - the simpler and more probable explanation is that I am having the experience of sitting in front of a computer because I am in fact sitting in front of a computer."
Idealism is simple. Solipcism is simple. Zenonian timelessness is simple.
"I'm not trusting with certainty the reliability of sense knowledge - as I explained, the having of the experience seems undeniable. Everything else about reality can be built provisionally from there."
Your Cartesian methodology won't get you much beyond solipsism. Maybe idealism in a pinch.
"Our senses can be fooled, so if there were a designer he did a sub-optimal job."
You're confusing sensation with perception. Try again.
Cont. "Also, I find evolutionary processes are often misunderstood by theists."
As if you're the expert.
"Your point here seems reminiscent of Plantinga's terrible 'Evolutionary Argument.'"
Calling it "terrible" is not a refutation.
"Evolution may be blind and directionless, but it does tend to optimise survival."
Is that why Darwinians say about 98% of species are extinct? Evolution seems to optimize extinction rather than survival.
"Under theism there is no reason to trust our senses at all (it could all be demons, after all)."
In Christian theism, demons didn't create our senses. Try again.
"As separate from brain states - on their view, as I understand it the mind is what the brain does/is."
They deny the existence of mental states like beliefs. According to them, brain states don't generate beliefs. In that event, there are no true or false beliefs. Well, that's a pretty wholesale denial of rationality.
"If you require 'rationality' to be divorced from brain states, then you're correct. I don't see the justification for this requirement however."
What about rationality divorced from beliefs, period?
"I'd have to reread the book to be sure, but I believe Dennett accepts that the mind and intelligence arise from the brain."
"Intelligence" which amounts to nothing over and above its unintelligent constituents. Collective unintelligence.
"You're claim is obviously true if you assume the mind must be more than the brain in some way (which you appear to be doing)."
That wasn't my argument, but if you want to go there, what makes a physical state true or false?
"And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes."
Even many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible.
"Which means what exactly?"
It means you can't insinuate that Christians are caricaturing atheism when Christians point out that atheism leads to moral relativism or nihilism. For many atheists admit that amoral consequence.
"That's a fairly serious case of begging the question, is it not?"
You have a problem following the argument. I didn't use Christianity as the standard of comparison in that respect. Rather, I pointed out that many prominent atheists concede the amorality of an atheist worldview. Try again.
"It seems to me that this tacit recognition as we actually find it, is just as likely on Naturalism"
What features of naturalism are tacitly recognizable?
"There are certainly other ways this feeling could have presented…"
Is God compatible with theism and atheism alike? No, but the gosd hypothesis is free of any empirical consequences, meaning that regardless of what the universe tells us, "God did it" can be made compatible with the claim. Something that explains everything like that actual fails to explain anything.
i) If it's true, it can be used to claim knowledge–and if it's false, it can't. So your denial is arbitrarily one-sided. It can only be used to claim knowledge if it is true, and yet that knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth. It's viciously circular. P1. If Christianity were true I would feel confident that Christianity were true. P2. I feel confident that Christianity is true. C. Therefore Christianity is true.
If an individual had a veridical experience, that's sufficient warrant for him, But only if the subject is able to establish the veridical nature of the experience. Since the experience we're talking about could have a seemingly infinite number of explanations, only 1 of which would render it veridical, the probabilities don't appear to be in your favour.
If Christianity is true, then Satan isn't controlling the minds of Christians. And if something like, but not the same as, Christianity were true, the Satan analogue could indeed be controlling the minds of Christians.
If it's knowledge, it's not provisional. If it's provisional, it's not knowledge. So you're one of the folk who demands absolute confidence in anything in order to call it knowledge. Good luck with that.
You have no anchor. Untrue - I have the certainty that I am having sense experiences.
What is "more likely" presupposes a standard of comparison. It requires probability.
Idealism is simple. Solipcism is simple. Zenonian timelessness is simple. Simplicity is not the only criteria. There are good reasons to think Idealism and Solipsism are not probable.
Your Cartesian methodology won't get you much beyond solipsism. Maybe idealism in a pinch. If you say so. It's more an empirical, since the empirical is about all I can know with certainty.
As if you're the expert. No, but I do try to follow and understand the experts.
Calling it "terrible" is not a refutation. It hardly needs one, given the gross misunderstandings present.
Is that why Darwinians say about 98% of species are extinct? Evolution seems to optimize extinction rather than survival. There you go proving me right about theists and their misunderstanding evolution.
In Christian theism, demons didn't create our senses. Try again. They could certainly mess with our senses/perception. It must be difficult living in a demon haunted world, unable to know whether a demon is feeding you a delusion.
According to them, brain states don't generate beliefs. That seems like a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of their work.
That wasn't my argument, but if you want to go there, what makes a physical state true or false? The degree to which the physical state models or represents whatever it is you're comparing it to.
Even many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible. Good for them, and it may very well be.
It means you can't insinuate that Christians are caricaturing atheism when Christians point out that atheism leads to moral relativism or nihilism. Since athsism doesn't necessarily lead to moral relatavism or nihilism, I can indeed continue to state that truth.
Rather, I pointed out that many prominent atheists concede the amorality of an atheist worldview. And many atheists do not.
What features of naturalism are tacitly recognizable? Naturalism for me is a conclusion I've arrived at, not something I've settled on prior to investigation, and as such (and like my other beliefs) is provisional in nature and open to revision.
Tacit knowledge is not a "feeling." Ok. What you claim as tacit knowledge of Christianity could have presented in many different ways, many of which would have provided more reason to think that Christianity is true. As it stands, what you're claiming as tacit knowledge is pretty much what we could expect if naturalism were true.
"No, but the gosd hypothesis is free of any empirical consequences, meaning that regardless of what the universe tells us, 'God did it' can be made compatible with the claim."
So by your own admission, there's no empirical evidence for atheism, inasmuch as whatever happens is consistent with "God did it."
"Something that explains everything like that actual fails to explain anything."
Christians don't use "God did it" to explain everything. Christian theism doesn't entail occasionalism. The Bible has a doctrine of ordinary providence. Many things happen by natural causes. God doesn't do everything himself. He created personal agents and natural agencies that do many things. Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology? Is that your problem?
"It can only be used to claim knowledge if it is true, and yet that knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth. It's viciously circular."
By that logic, your own claim about "raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog" is viciously circular. You are using your impression of sitting in front of a computer to claim empirical knowledge. According to you, that can only be used to claim empirical knowledge if it's true, and yet that putative knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth. So your example is viciously circular.
"If Christianity were true I would feel confident that Christianity were true."
I never appealed to a confident feeling. Try again.
"But only if the subject is able to establish the veridical nature of the experience."
The subject doesn't have to establish the veridicality of his experience to have a veridical experience. You're confusing the order of being with the order of knowing. Having the veridical experience is the primary datum. Demonstration is secondary. You can't demonstrate it unless you have it, in which case you can have it apart from demonstration. You keep confounding what's necessary for the subject to be justified with what's necessary for the subject to justify his experience to a second-party. Try to master that elementary distinction.
"Since the experience we're talking about could have a seemingly infinite number of explanations, only 1 of which would render it veridical, the probabilities don't appear to be in your favour."
You mean...like your impression of sitting in front of a computer could be a dream, or a hallucination, or the result of an alien abduction, or a psychic implanting that illusion in your mind, or recollection of a past life, or…
"And if something like, but not the same as, Christianity were true, the Satan analogue could indeed be controlling the minds of Christians."
The Satan analogue could also be controlling the minds of atheists. If your hypothetical undercuts Christian theism, it simultaneously undercuts atheism.
"So you're one of the folk who demands absolute confidence in anything in order to call it knowledge. Good luck with that."
You're the one who keeps confusing knowledge with confidence. For instance, it's possible to forget something I know. The memory is buried in my subconscious. A random association may trigger the memory. I knew it all along.
"Untrue - I have the certainty that I am having sense experiences."
No, you only have the certainty of being appeared to, which you construe as sensory experience. But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c.
"And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes."
Even many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible.
A grotesque fallacy of equivocation. In philosophy consciousness can be described as an irreducible primary in the sense that it is required before any philosophy can be done. That does not mean that the phenomenon of consciousness is "irreducible" in the sense of not being explainable in terms of biophysical/biochemical/etc processes.
But that's what apologists are all about. Rhetoric and avoidance of understanding if such understanding works in favour of their opponents.
Along those lines, I'd be interested in what is left for the immaterial mind to do, given what we now understand the brain to be responsible for (memory, personality, emotions, and so on). It seems it's been reduced to, at most, an "I" that is responsible for little or nothing else.
No, you only have the certainty of being appeared to, which you construe as sensory experience. But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c.
While imaginary beings called "God," or "Christian God" are not consistent with "a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c." Obviously.
God isn't imaginary because Steve had an experience that God was real, which Steve believes really really strongly was veridical, therefore Steve knows with certainty that God exists, and your claims of God existing only in Steve's mind is unfounded (even though there's no reason to think there's an actual external referent for Steve's experience, and it all happened only in his mind).
I'm surprised you don't accept that Photo - it sounds perfectly reasonable to me :-P
Which presupposes a standard of comparison. Probable in relation to what?
"Simplicity is not the only criteria. There are good reasons to think Idealism and Solipsism are not probable."
Actually, given your Cartesian starting-point, anything beyond idealism is underdetermined by the evidence.
"It's more an empirical, since the empirical is about all I can know with certainty."
Given your own minimalistic example (the impression of sitting in front of a computer), you have no certainty about the empirical realm. For your impressions are consistent with simulations or hallucinations rather than external stimuli.
And even if we grant external stimuli, how do you know that your impressions resemble the stimuli?
"It hardly needs one, given the gross misunderstandings present."
A tendentious assertion.
"There you go proving me right about theists and their misunderstanding evolution."
Another tendentious assertion.
"They could certainly mess with our senses/perception. It must be difficult living in a demon haunted world, unable to know whether a demon is feeding you a delusion."
You mean…like your impression that you're sitting in front of a computer?
"That seems like a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of their work."
Yet another tendentious assertion. You ran out of gas miles back. Now you're pushing your car uphill.
Contemporary eliminative materialists regard folk psychological terms (e.g. beliefs) as empty. They don't correspond to brain states.
"The degree to which the physical state models or represents whatever it is you're comparing it to."
Physical states are not intrinsically representational. Rather, an external agent must assign or arrange them to be referential. Say, arranging rocks on a beach to spell out S.O.S.
By itself, that could be a random pattern. It's code language which means nothing apart from agents who confer extrinsic significance on that physical state.
"Since athsism doesn't necessarily lead to moral relatavism or nihilism, I can indeed continue to state that truth."
Have you studied the arguments of atheists who deny moral realism?
"Naturalism for me is a conclusion I've arrived at, not something I've settled on prior to investigation"
So you're now retracting your prior claim that it's tacitly recognizable.
"As it stands, what you're claiming as tacit knowledge is pretty much what we could expect if naturalism were true."
Since you stated at the outset that "God did it" is empirically consistent with everything we observe, there is no evidence for naturalism.
So by your own admission, there's no empirical evidence for atheism, inasmuch as whatever happens is consistent with "God did it." No. Naturalism is falsifiable, as is atheism - evidence for things not natural, or evidence for a god or gods, would falsify them. The problem is that theists like yourself, presumably, are not committed to ANY empirical evidence for or against your god hypothesis - it's flexible enough to explain everything. YEC and the like at least derive some empirical consequences from their God hypothesis (and subsequently, that hypothesis is falsified by reality).
Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology? Is that your problem? No. My point is that God hypothesis are generally made to be immune to any possible refutation. The universe being old or young can be made consistent with God. Evolutionary biology or special creation, or occasional manipulation are all compatible with God. Regardless of what we discover about reality, Theism generally, and Christian theism specifically, can be made compatible with it. Some theists are arguing that a multiverse is just what we;d expect from God, while others continue to claim a singular universe is what we expect from God.
You are using your impression of sitting in front of a computer to claim empirical knowledge. My impression of sitting in front of a computer IS empirical knowledge. It's undeniable that I'm having this experience. It is possible that the experience is completely hallucinatory, or the result of demons, or whatever. The experience however is all I'm claiming. There's no circularity there.
According to you, that can only be used to claim empirical knowledge if it's true, Steve, please explain how it can be false that I am having a sense experience?
I never appealed to a confident feeling. Try again. You appealed to a claim of tacit knowledge concerning the the truth of Christianity, and stated that if Christianity were true you would expect such to be experienced. And then used such as a claim to knowledge that Christianity is in fact true. The circularity seems rather evidence to me.
Having the veridical experience is the primary datum. Having the experience is the primary datum.
You keep confounding what's necessary for the subject to be justified with what's necessary for the subject to justify his experience to a second-party. You don't seem to understand that the same experience you're claiming is not necessarily veridical.
Try to master that elementary distinction. If we followed your distinction, it seems to me that anyone could claim just about anything as veridical - including things mutually incompatible with the claimed veridical experiences of others. I'm interested in what is actually true (or at least, what is likely to be true) not what I can convince myself is true.
You mean...like your impression of sitting in front of a computer could be a dream, or a hallucination, or the result of an alien abduction, or a psychic implanting that illusion in your mind, or recollection of a past life, or… I'm not claiming my experience as necessarily veridical. I'm simply stating that I can't deny the experience itself. You seem to be claiming your experience as veridical, rather than the having of the experience as being veridical (which I think is closer to my position).
The Satan analogue could also be controlling the minds of atheists. If your hypothetical undercuts Christian theism, it simultaneously undercuts atheism. Since, unlike you, I'm not aiming for 100% certainty, I'm ok with that - the probabilities seem, to me at least, to make that option rather less probable than naturalism. However, the mere fact that this is a possible explanation for your supposedly veridical experience, seems to undercut your claim to it's veridical nature.
You're the one who keeps confusing knowledge with confidence. Not at all. Perhaps I just have a different approach to epistemology than you.
A random association may trigger the memory. I knew it all along. That doesn't seem to be a particularly enlightening example. Care to try again.
But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, I'm not claiming it isn't.
Which presupposes a standard of comparison. Probable in relation to what? Whatever other explanations are being proposed, using other things I have provisional knowledge of to inform the probabilities - in short, a bayesian approach to epistemology.
Actually, given your Cartesian starting-point, anything beyond idealism is underdetermined by the evidence. Every option is underdetermined by the evidence - that's why it's to be provisional. If the evidence overdetermined the options, then I doubt we'd be having this discussion.
you have no certainty about the empirical realm. For your impressions are consistent with simulations or hallucinations rather than external stimuli. I've admitted as much. Did you have a point?
how do you know that your impressions resemble the stimuli? I don't "know" in the sense that you aspire to.
A tendentious assertion. Simply taking the obvious fact that beliefs that resemble reality more closely would be a far simpler set with far more generality and applicability to unfamiliar situations seems enough to point out a problem. There are many more, and if you're interested I could probably help you track more down.
Another tendentious assertion. Not really, since extinction is expected when the environment is changed quicker than a population is able to adapt. ALL extant species are derived from species that are now extinct.
You mean…like your impression that you're sitting in front of a computer? Exactly. I embrace that fact, and do the best I can from there. You seem to be simply assert the veridical nature of some experience or other.
Have you studied the arguments of atheists who deny moral realism? Some of them. I've also studies the arguments of some of the atheists who argue FOR moral realism.
So you're now retracting your prior claim that it's tacitly recognizable. Where did I claim that?
Since you stated at the outset that "God did it" is empirically consistent with everything we observe, there is no evidence for naturalism. This statement seems to be based on a misunderstanding of my point, and I've tried to clarify further up.
iii) The same belief can sometimes have both supporting evidence and prima facie counterevidence. For instance, that's commonplace in scientific theories.
In scientific theories, one piece of counterevidence should cause either a tweaking of the the theory or its complete demise.
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process.
It seems to me that reliable sense perception would provide the individual with an survival advantage and an advantage in reproductive success. Hardly aimless.
It seems to me that reliable sense perception would provide the individual with an survival advantage and an advantage in reproductive success. Hardly aimless. I'm continually surprised that anyone takes the EAAN seriously.
Let's not forget that Plantinga criticized Dawkins for messing with philosophy without being an philosopher, only to have Plantinga then turn around and offer this argument that relies on the most ignorantly deformed versions of the most basic of biology in general, and of evolution in particular. Plantinga should have followed his own advice and not make that ridiculous display of ignorance.
Many things happen by natural causes. God doesn't do everything himself. He created personal agents and natural agencies that do many things. Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology?
Christians believe in "natural agencies" that cause events independent of God? I thought that Christians believed that all the processes of nature are at His direction. My bad.
So the difference between Naturalists and Christians is a matter of degree.
Calvinists in particular don't believe in free will. All is "God's" "plan" unfolding. Lots of creations going to hell is just part of the big "plan." Therefore nature doing its course would also be "God's" plan. Steve, of course, does not notice the contradictions within and without the doctrines. But this should not be a surprise.
Calvinism also has several subdivisions, by the way, which means that many if not all of them would be worshiping an idol of their own making rather than "God," and since most of these versions of their god are deceivers, or just happy to leave you to be deceived (according to some Christian there's a "difference"), going to hell for worshiping an idol is something you would not know to be the case, but also part of the plan. Isn't Christianity (Christianities!) nice and logical?
Steve, of course, does not notice the contradictions within and without the doctrines. But this should not be a surprise. It's my experience that it is assumed, without good reason, that there are no such contradictions, and so they're all simply rationalised away - after all, there must be some solution to them because the bible doesn't have contradictions!
B.C., do you buy into that sort of argument?
ReplyDeleteThe author appears to be claiming that a Christian is rationally justified in asserting the truth of Christianity regardless of the arguments and evidence - in short, that Christianity (at least of the sort believed by the author) is unfalsifiable.
I don't know how Rian managed to draw that inference from my post.
ReplyDeletei) To begin with, there's a fundamental distinction between evidence and argument. Ideally, an arguments is based on evidence. But by the same token, evidence is often prior to argument. We have evidence for many things we don't argue for. Every day we subconscious form hundreds of beliefs based on things we see and hear. I believe it's daytime because I can see sunlight. I just gave you an argument for why I believe it's daytime, but only because I'm using that as an example. I formed my initial belief that it's daytime apart from argument. Sunlight was the evidence, and that triggered a subliminal belief-formation process.
By analogy, Christians can be justified in believing Christianity is true (indeed, Christians can know that Christianity is true) without having to argue for their belief. There's such a thing as tacit knowledge.
ii) Whether Christianity is falsifiable is equivocal. In a trivial sense, what is false is falsifiable; what is true is unfalsifiable.
There's a hypothetical sense in which Christianity is falsifiable. It makes truth-claims which, if false, would falsify it. But, of course, that doesn't mean it's actually falsifiable.
iii) In addition, falsification requires criteria. Criteria are value-laden. In that respect, falsification is worldview dependent.
If the God of Christian theism exists, then his existence is a necessary precondition for anything to be falsifiable. In that event, his existence is unfalsifiable.
Hi Steve. Thanks for your response.
ReplyDeleteI took your first point to be advocating for some sort of confidence that Christianity is true (one of your commenters refers to the "inner testimony of the holy spirit") being sufficient for justification in the absence of supporting arguments and evidence, and in fact in the face of arguments and evidence which might otherwise be taken to undermine the truth of Christianity.
From there it seems that it might be a simple matter to rationalise away any and all objections to your faith which might be encountered.
I'm not saying that you (or Christians generally) are necessarily doing this, but rather that the points in your post could certainly be used to provide cover for clinging to a set of beliefs even after one ought to "reconsider our original commitment" as you say.
i) I'm referring to Christian belief in particular, not beliefs generally.
ReplyDeleteii) Even with respect to beliefs generally, our belief-structure would be quite unstable if we ditched a belief the moment we encountered some prima facie evidence to the contrary.
iii) The same belief can sometimes have both supporting evidence and prima facie counterevidence. For instance, that's commonplace in scientific theories.
iv) Quine compared our belief-structure to a spider's web. A spider's web has a certain amount of redundancy. Some strands are more peripheral while others are more central. You can skip some strands, and the web will remain intact. Other strands are crucial to the structural integrity of the web.
Our beliefs have degrees of certainty. And some of our beliefs ground other beliefs.
v) Doubting Christianity presumes a standard of comparison. But that, in term, raises the question of how you justify your standard of comparison. Are criteria infinitely regressive?
vi) I don't think there's a viable alternative to the Christian worldview. There's nothing to fall back on. And there are radical atheists who unwittingly illustrate that fact (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Alex Rosenberg).
ii) True. but what if you found too many inconsistencies?
Deletev) What exactly do you mean?
vi) The Christian worldview is not a viable alternative. It can't even leave the floor. Therefore, if there was nothing "viable" (there is, but it does not matter because your "logic" is flawed) it would not matter. People could just keep looking rather than accept something as retrograde and nonsensical as Christianity.
Nagel is an imbecile. I don't know Alex, and I don't care.
Thanks for demonstrating that you have nothing intelligent to contribute to this discussion. I appreciate your unwitting illustration of what atheism amounts to. Keep up the good work.
DeleteNot a problem Steve. Always happy to be of help. Seems like you had a hard time with (v). But I'm not surprised. Seems also that if we discuss (vi) using your exact style it bothers you. Not really odd. Rather to be expected. What did you want? Some deep respect for your empty and nonsensical assertions?
DeleteThe "Christian worldview" as per presuppositionalism is but a ridiculous set of tricks for the unwary. It sells a nonsensical set of charged questions only to be answered via an imaginary being. Oh, what a "viable" alternative! Doubt the reality you are living, then "solve" the "problem" by involving an imaginary being and thus accept that reality you were already living. Truly "smart" and "viable." Sure thing.
Although I thought your first comment sufficiently illustrated the intellectual vacuity of the village atheist, it's nice to see that you have vacuity to spare.
DeleteI told you, Steve, that I was happy to be of help.
Delete"Although I thought your first comment sufficiently illustrated the intellectual vacuity of the village atheist, it's nice to see that you have vacuity to spare."
DeleteChuckling heartily. Hence, the appropriate moniker of "PhotoStupidity" is attached to this intellectually vacuous village atheist.
Or is it "Negative IQ"? LOL!
TU and D,
DeleteClose enough for your comment to start looking like an intelligent one this time. Here. Another lollipop. Don't worry. I'm patient. If you keep trying maybe you will be able to have a conversation later. Be careful not to break your brain though. One step at a time will do for you.
i) Understood. I think my point still stands - the claim that some internal confidence of feeling of the truth of Christianity leads you to know that Christianity is true seems to be rather fraught to me.
ReplyDeletev) I would try something more basic. Taking "Christianity" to be your grounding seems to be far too expansive a foundation, and it leads, as you seem to be alluding to hear, to being unable to question that truth.
vi) If, as you seem to be saying, you ground your other beliefs in the truth of Christianity - Christianity is foundational to your worldview - then how are you able to compare alternatives? You say yourself that in point (v) that you'd need to presume a standard of comparison, and if that standard takes the truth of Christianity to be foundational, then aren't you doing something akin to begging the question in claiming that you don't see any alternative to Christianity?
Rian
Delete"i) Understood. I think my point still stands - the claim that some internal confidence of feeling of the truth of Christianity leads you to know that Christianity is true seems to be rather fraught to me."
Since that's not what I argued for, your point misses the mark.
"v) I would try something more basic. Taking 'Christianity' to be your grounding seems to be far too expansive a foundation, and it leads, as you seem to be alluding to hear [sic], to being unable to question that truth."
If the foundation is too basic or narrow, it can't support the superstructure.
"vi) If, as you seem to be saying, you ground your other beliefs in the truth of Christianity - Christianity is foundational to your worldview - then how are you able to compare alternatives?"
By using Christianity as the benchmark.
"You say yourself that in point (v) that you'd need to presume a standard of comparison, and if that standard takes the truth of Christianity to be foundational, then aren't you doing something akin to begging the question in claiming that you don't see any alternative to Christianity?"
i) You can only question a truth-claim by reference to something else you hold to be true. You're comparing (or contrasting) what you already take to be true with a truth-claim. Is the truth-claim consistent with what you already hold true? Is the truth-claim entailed by what you already hold true?
You can't question the truth of everything, for you can only measure a truth-claim by something true. So how does Rian avoid begging the question?
ii) We can automatically discount positions that undermine rationality. Since naturalism undermines rationality–as even some naturalists grudgingly concede (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Crispin Wright, Daniel Dennett, the Churchlands), we can take that off the table at the outset. Only theistic worldviews with sufficient metaphysical resources would even be in the running. That's a very exclusive club, which–by process of elimination–can be reduced to Christianity.
(I won't go into all that right now. Better not to discuss too many things at once.)
By using Christianity as the benchmark.
ReplyDeleteHow did you arrive at Christianity as the benchmark, or was it something that was assumed?
You can't question the truth of everything, for you can only measure a truth-claim by something true. So how does Rian avoid begging the question?
By taking most everything I "know" as provisional and subject to revision, apart from things which don't seem to be deniable (such as the raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog).
Such a simple starting point doesn't seem to me to assume or deny the truth of Christianty, Islam, Naturalism, etc.
Since naturalism undermines rationality–as even some naturalists grudgingly concede (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Crispin Wright, Daniel Dennett, the Churchlands), we can take that off the table at the outset.
Not sure what you mean here by undermining rationality. I've read some Dennett and Churchland, and they don't seem to deny rationality be claiming naturalism undermines rationality.
Only theistic worldviews with sufficient metaphysical resources would even be in the running.
I see that only being the case if you demand certain things from a worldview. Like the common theistic claim that non-theism can't support morality - the theist invariably assumes morality requires a "god-like", theistic foundation.
That's a very exclusive club, which–by process of elimination–can be reduced to Christianity.
I guess when your standard is Christianity, nothing else stacks up :-)
He, he, see what he said? A very exclusive club? As if humans just invented religions a few days ago. As if there was only one Christianity. Steve lives in fantasyland big time.
DeleteRian
Delete"How did you arrive at Christianity as the benchmark, or was it something that was assumed?"
There's a common difference between knowing something's true and showing something's true. By regeneration, a Christian enjoys a tacit recognition of Christian truth. He can experience Christian truth in Scripture, miracle, creation, and providence. Humans can, and often do, register evidence at a subliminal level. I gave an illustration at the outset.
Conversely, the explanatory power of the Christian worldview can serve as both a benchmark and a proof. That would involve showing, over and above knowing.
"By taking most everything I 'know' as provisional and subject to revision…"
Using one doubtful belief to evaluate another doubtful belief doesn't get you anywhere. You're moving in a continuous circle of dubiety. How does your method break out of that vicious circle of skepticism?
"...apart from things which don't seem to be deniable (such as the raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog)."
The only thing that's strictly undeniable about that experience is the impression that you're being appeared to (as Roderick Chisolm would put it) by a computer. But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer.
"Such a simple starting point doesn't seem to me to assume or deny the truth of Christianty, Islam, Naturalism, etc."
Well, that's philosophically gauche. Trusting the general reliability of sense knowledge is very value-laden and worldview dependent. It involves you in theories of perception, viz. direct perception, indirect perception, phenomenalism, &c. To what extent does the proximal stimulus correspond to the distal stimulus?
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process.
So your "simple starting-point" is deceptively simple. It suffers from many unstated presuppositions.
"Not sure what you mean here by undermining rationality. I've read some Dennett and Churchland, and they don't seem to deny rationality be claiming naturalism undermines rationality."
The Churchlands deny the existence of mental states. You could hardly have a more radical denial of rationality.
In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett contends that what we take to be intelligence is reducible to unintelligent steps.
That's like a pointillist painting, but with a crucial difference. In a pointillist painting, the depiction is composed of individually meaningless specks of color. However, they form a meaningful pattern because the mind of the painter arranged these specks of color to be representational. The individually insignificant specks can be collectively significant because a mind assigns them an ends-means relation. That's a topdown process.
By contrast, Dennett is proposing a bottom-up process where reason is not the cause, but the effect of an unreasoning process. But if intelligence can be broken down into meaningless bits, then the end-result is like accidental art.
"I see that only being the case if you demand certain things from a worldview. Like the common theistic claim that non-theism can't support morality - the theist invariably assumes morality requires a 'god-like', theistic foundation."
Actually, many atheists admit that naturalism can't support objective moral norms, viz. Richard Joyce, Joel Marks, Michael Ruse, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, Massimo Pigliucci, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Paul Pardi, Steven Pinker.
"But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer. "
DeleteBut involving an imaginary being is not questionable at all, of course. ALl you need is call it "God" and there's no problem.
Well, God is seemingly compatible with anything and it's opposite - it's the universal hypothesis.
DeleteWhich makes it absolutely useless and an actual explanation :-)
By regeneration, a Christian enjoys a tacit recognition of Christian truth.
ReplyDeleteWhich assumes the truth of Christianity - this can only be the case if Christianity WERE true, and surely can't be used to claim knowledge THAT Christianity IS true.
Also, if something like Christianity were true, there would be any number of ways you could falsely acquire this feeling of the truth of Christianity - after all, it would surely be a simple matter for Satan to implant that confidence in you in order to confuse the truth, would it not?
Conversely, the explanatory power of the Christian worldview can serve as both a benchmark and a proof.
The explanatory power of the Christian worldview is usually over estimated by those who are convinced of it's truth, in my experience.
Using one doubtful belief to evaluate another doubtful belief doesn't get you anywhere. You're moving in a continuous circle of dubiety.
It doesn't get you to certainty, but rather to provisional knowledge.
How does your method break out of that vicious circle of skepticism?
I see no vicious cycle. I see things which I can be more of less confident are more or less correct, and which can shift when new information becomes available.
But that's consistent with a hallucination. Consistent with you're having been sedated and hooked on to a VR program–where input from your neurointerface simulates sitting in front of a computer.
True on both accounts, which is why the experience is the more or less undeniable part rather than the reality.
From there we can build up what is more likely to be the case, always with the understanding that even if it were the case that I were hooked up to a VR program, or whatever, I have to carry on AS IF that were not the case. And of course, there seems to be no good evidence to believe I am actually hooked up in that fashion - the simpler and more probable explanation is that I am having the experience of sitting in front of a computer because I am in fact sitting in front of a computer.
Trusting the general reliability of sense knowledge is very value-laden and worldview dependent.
I'm not trusting with certainty the reliability of sense knowledge - as I explained, the having of the experience seems undeniable. Everything else about reality can be built provisionally from there.
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process.
Our senses can be fooled, so if there were a designer he did a sub-optimal job.
Also, I find evolutionary processes are often misunderstood by theists. Your point here seems reminiscent of Plantinga's terrible "Evolutionary Argument". Evolution may be blind and directionless, but it does tend to optimise survival, which would be enhanced by reasonably reliable senses. Under theism there is no reason to trust our senses at all (it could all be demons, after all).
It suffers from many unstated presuppositions.
It probably does, but I don't think they're fatal, and I don't see that as making this foundation LESS reasonable than the extravagant foundation you seem to be claiming.
The Churchlands deny the existence of mental states.
DeleteAs separate from brain states - on their view, as I understand it the mind is what the brain does/is.
You could hardly have a more radical denial of rationality.
If you require "rationality" to be divorced from brain states, then you're correct. I don't see the justification for this requirement however.
In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett contends that what we take to be intelligence is reducible to unintelligent steps.
I'd have to reread the book to be sure, but I believe Dennett accepts that the mind and intelligence arise from the brain, and these unintelligent steps you're referring to would be the operation of the various brain components.
You're claim is obviously true if you assume the mind must be more than the brain in some way (which you appear to be doing).
But if intelligence can be broken down into meaningless bits, then the end-result is like accidental art.
And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes.
Actually, many atheists admit that naturalism can't support objective moral norms, viz. Richard Joyce, Joel Marks, Michael Ruse, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, Massimo Pigliucci, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Paul Pardi, Steven Pinker.
Which means what exactly?
If you demand morality is in objective in some sense, and this sense cannot be accounted for by Naturalism. For example, if you demand your "objective morality" derive from the nature of some transcendental or non-material person, then of course naturalism will fall short, as will any non-theistic morality (of which there exist some which are not naturalistic).
You seem to have made, as your starting point, the truth of Christianity. You seem to demand that any alternative explanation be, basically, Christian, or otherwise it is found wanting.
That's a fairly serious case of begging the question, is it not?
In fact, if Naturalism were true, you could easily acquire the same sort of "a tacit recognition of Christian truth".
DeleteIt seems to me that this tacit recognition as we actually find it, is just as likely on Naturalism, or on something similar to your Christianity, or on various other types of Supernaturalism, as it would be on Christianity, and so doesn't seem like it can be evidence THAT Christianity is true, even to the person who feels it.
There are certainly other ways this feeling could have presented, that would increase the probability that Christianity of a certain sort were true (only Christians who believe in the right way, or believe in the right things having it, or EVERYONE having the same feeling concerning Christianity, regardless of their prior beliefs, and so on).
Rian
Delete"Well, God is seemingly compatible with anything and it's opposite - it's the universal hypothesis."
Is God compatible with theism and atheism alike?
"Which assumes the truth of Christianity - this can only be the case if Christianity WERE true, and surely can't be used to claim knowledge THAT Christianity IS true."
i) If it's true, it can be used to claim knowledge–and if it's false, it can't. So your denial is arbitrarily one-sided.
ii) One of your confusions may be failure to distinguish between what the subject of experience is justified in believing (or knowing), and whether that's sufficient evidence for an outsider, who only has a second-hand report. If an individual had a veridical experience, that's sufficient warrant for him, even if it might be insufficient for a second party who wasn't privy to that experience. And that goes back to my distinction between knowing and showing.
For instance, I have memories of things I did with my late grandmother. I can't prove it to you, but it's sufficient for me. I was there, you weren't.
"Also, if something like Christianity were true, there would be any number of ways you could falsely acquire this feeling of the truth of Christianity - after all, it would surely be a simple matter for Satan to implant that confidence in you in order to confuse the truth, would it not?"
If Christianity is true, then Satan isn't controlling the minds of Christians.
"The explanatory power of the Christian worldview is usually over estimated by those who are convinced of it's truth, in my experience."
An unargued assertion.
"It doesn't get you to certainty, but rather to provisional knowledge."
If it's knowledge, it's not provisional. If it's provisional, it's not knowledge.
"I see no vicious cycle. I see things which I can be more of less confident are more or less correct, and which can shift when new information becomes available."
If "most everything" you think you know is provisional and subject to revision, then you're just rearranging doubtful opinions. You have no anchor.
"From there we can build up what is more likely to be the case, always with the understanding that even if it were the case that I were hooked up to a VR program, or whatever, I have to carry on AS IF that were not the case."
What is "more likely" presupposes a standard of comparison.
"And of course, there seems to be no good evidence to believe I am actually hooked up in that fashion - the simpler and more probable explanation is that I am having the experience of sitting in front of a computer because I am in fact sitting in front of a computer."
Idealism is simple. Solipcism is simple. Zenonian timelessness is simple.
"I'm not trusting with certainty the reliability of sense knowledge - as I explained, the having of the experience seems undeniable. Everything else about reality can be built provisionally from there."
Your Cartesian methodology won't get you much beyond solipsism. Maybe idealism in a pinch.
"Our senses can be fooled, so if there were a designer he did a sub-optimal job."
You're confusing sensation with perception. Try again.
Cont. "Also, I find evolutionary processes are often misunderstood by theists."
ReplyDeleteAs if you're the expert.
"Your point here seems reminiscent of Plantinga's terrible 'Evolutionary Argument.'"
Calling it "terrible" is not a refutation.
"Evolution may be blind and directionless, but it does tend to optimise survival."
Is that why Darwinians say about 98% of species are extinct? Evolution seems to optimize extinction rather than survival.
"Under theism there is no reason to trust our senses at all (it could all be demons, after all)."
In Christian theism, demons didn't create our senses. Try again.
"As separate from brain states - on their view, as I understand it the mind is what the brain does/is."
They deny the existence of mental states like beliefs. According to them, brain states don't generate beliefs.
In that event, there are no true or false beliefs. Well, that's a pretty wholesale denial of rationality.
"If you require 'rationality' to be divorced from brain states, then you're correct. I don't see the justification for this requirement however."
What about rationality divorced from beliefs, period?
"I'd have to reread the book to be sure, but I believe Dennett accepts that the mind and intelligence arise from the brain."
"Intelligence" which amounts to nothing over and above its unintelligent constituents. Collective unintelligence.
"You're claim is obviously true if you assume the mind must be more than the brain in some way (which you appear to be doing)."
That wasn't my argument, but if you want to go there, what makes a physical state true or false?
"And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes."
Even many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible.
"Which means what exactly?"
It means you can't insinuate that Christians are caricaturing atheism when Christians point out that atheism leads to moral relativism or nihilism. For many atheists admit that amoral consequence.
"That's a fairly serious case of begging the question, is it not?"
You have a problem following the argument. I didn't use Christianity as the standard of comparison in that respect. Rather, I pointed out that many prominent atheists concede the amorality of an atheist worldview. Try again.
"It seems to me that this tacit recognition as we actually find it, is just as likely on Naturalism"
What features of naturalism are tacitly recognizable?
"There are certainly other ways this feeling could have presented…"
Tacit knowledge is not a "feeling."
Is God compatible with theism and atheism alike?
DeleteNo, but the gosd hypothesis is free of any empirical consequences, meaning that regardless of what the universe tells us, "God did it" can be made compatible with the claim. Something that explains everything like that actual fails to explain anything.
i) If it's true, it can be used to claim knowledge–and if it's false, it can't. So your denial is arbitrarily one-sided.
It can only be used to claim knowledge if it is true, and yet that knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth.
It's viciously circular.
P1. If Christianity were true I would feel confident that Christianity were true.
P2. I feel confident that Christianity is true.
C. Therefore Christianity is true.
If an individual had a veridical experience, that's sufficient warrant for him,
But only if the subject is able to establish the veridical nature of the experience.
Since the experience we're talking about could have a seemingly infinite number of explanations, only 1 of which would render it veridical, the probabilities don't appear to be in your favour.
If Christianity is true, then Satan isn't controlling the minds of Christians.
And if something like, but not the same as, Christianity were true, the Satan analogue could indeed be controlling the minds of Christians.
If it's knowledge, it's not provisional. If it's provisional, it's not knowledge.
So you're one of the folk who demands absolute confidence in anything in order to call it knowledge. Good luck with that.
You have no anchor.
Untrue - I have the certainty that I am having sense experiences.
What is "more likely" presupposes a standard of comparison.
It requires probability.
Idealism is simple. Solipcism is simple. Zenonian timelessness is simple.
Simplicity is not the only criteria. There are good reasons to think Idealism and Solipsism are not probable.
Your Cartesian methodology won't get you much beyond solipsism. Maybe idealism in a pinch.
If you say so. It's more an empirical, since the empirical is about all I can know with certainty.
As if you're the expert.
DeleteNo, but I do try to follow and understand the experts.
Calling it "terrible" is not a refutation.
It hardly needs one, given the gross misunderstandings present.
Is that why Darwinians say about 98% of species are extinct? Evolution seems to optimize extinction rather than survival.
There you go proving me right about theists and their misunderstanding evolution.
In Christian theism, demons didn't create our senses. Try again.
They could certainly mess with our senses/perception. It must be difficult living in a demon haunted world, unable to know whether a demon is feeding you a delusion.
According to them, brain states don't generate beliefs.
That seems like a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of their work.
That wasn't my argument, but if you want to go there, what makes a physical state true or false?
The degree to which the physical state models or represents whatever it is you're comparing it to.
Even many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible.
Good for them, and it may very well be.
It means you can't insinuate that Christians are caricaturing atheism when Christians point out that atheism leads to moral relativism or nihilism.
Since athsism doesn't necessarily lead to moral relatavism or nihilism, I can indeed continue to state that truth.
Rather, I pointed out that many prominent atheists concede the amorality of an atheist worldview.
And many atheists do not.
What features of naturalism are tacitly recognizable?
Naturalism for me is a conclusion I've arrived at, not something I've settled on prior to investigation, and as such (and like my other beliefs) is provisional in nature and open to revision.
Tacit knowledge is not a "feeling."
Ok. What you claim as tacit knowledge of Christianity could have presented in many different ways, many of which would have provided more reason to think that Christianity is true. As it stands, what you're claiming as tacit knowledge is pretty much what we could expect if naturalism were true.
Rian
Delete"No, but the gosd hypothesis is free of any empirical consequences, meaning that regardless of what the universe tells us, 'God did it' can be made compatible with the claim."
So by your own admission, there's no empirical evidence for atheism, inasmuch as whatever happens is consistent with "God did it."
"Something that explains everything like that actual fails to explain anything."
Christians don't use "God did it" to explain everything. Christian theism doesn't entail occasionalism. The Bible has a doctrine of ordinary providence. Many things happen by natural causes. God doesn't do everything himself. He created personal agents and natural agencies that do many things. Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology? Is that your problem?
"It can only be used to claim knowledge if it is true, and yet that knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth. It's viciously circular."
By that logic, your own claim about "raw empirical experiences, such as the experience of sitting in front of a computer writting a comment on a blog" is viciously circular. You are using your impression of sitting in front of a computer to claim empirical knowledge. According to you, that can only be used to claim empirical knowledge if it's true, and yet that putative knowledge is used as the basis for claiming it's truth. So your example is viciously circular.
"If Christianity were true I would feel confident that Christianity were true."
I never appealed to a confident feeling. Try again.
"But only if the subject is able to establish the veridical nature of the experience."
The subject doesn't have to establish the veridicality of his experience to have a veridical experience. You're confusing the order of being with the order of knowing. Having the veridical experience is the primary datum. Demonstration is secondary. You can't demonstrate it unless you have it, in which case you can have it apart from demonstration.
You keep confounding what's necessary for the subject to be justified with what's necessary for the subject to justify his experience to a second-party. Try to master that elementary distinction.
"Since the experience we're talking about could have a seemingly infinite number of explanations, only 1 of which would render it veridical, the probabilities don't appear to be in your favour."
You mean...like your impression of sitting in front of a computer could be a dream, or a hallucination, or the result of an alien abduction, or a psychic implanting that illusion in your mind, or recollection of a past life, or…
"And if something like, but not the same as, Christianity were true, the Satan analogue could indeed be controlling the minds of Christians."
The Satan analogue could also be controlling the minds of atheists. If your hypothetical undercuts Christian theism, it simultaneously undercuts atheism.
"So you're one of the folk who demands absolute confidence in anything in order to call it knowledge. Good luck with that."
You're the one who keeps confusing knowledge with confidence. For instance, it's possible to forget something I know. The memory is buried in my subconscious. A random association may trigger the memory. I knew it all along.
"Untrue - I have the certainty that I am having sense experiences."
No, you only have the certainty of being appeared to, which you construe as sensory experience. But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c.
"And yet the evidence from investigation into the brain indicates quite strongly IMO that the mind is what the brain does, and so intelligence is indeed a result of unintelligent processes."
DeleteEven many secular philosophers of mind regard consciousness as irreducible.
A grotesque fallacy of equivocation. In philosophy consciousness can be described as an irreducible primary in the sense that it is required before any philosophy can be done. That does not mean that the phenomenon of consciousness is "irreducible" in the sense of not being explainable in terms of biophysical/biochemical/etc processes.
But that's what apologists are all about. Rhetoric and avoidance of understanding if such understanding works in favour of their opponents.
Along those lines, I'd be interested in what is left for the immaterial mind to do, given what we now understand the brain to be responsible for (memory, personality, emotions, and so on). It seems it's been reduced to, at most, an "I" that is responsible for little or nothing else.
DeleteNo, you only have the certainty of being appeared to, which you construe as sensory experience. But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c.
DeleteWhile imaginary beings called "God," or "Christian God" are not consistent with "a dream, hallucination, virtual reality, &c." Obviously.
God isn't imaginary because Steve had an experience that God was real, which Steve believes really really strongly was veridical, therefore Steve knows with certainty that God exists, and your claims of God existing only in Steve's mind is unfounded (even though there's no reason to think there's an actual external referent for Steve's experience, and it all happened only in his mind).
DeleteI'm surprised you don't accept that Photo - it sounds perfectly reasonable to me :-P
Cont. "It requires probability."
ReplyDeleteWhich presupposes a standard of comparison. Probable in relation to what?
"Simplicity is not the only criteria. There are good reasons to think Idealism and Solipsism are not probable."
Actually, given your Cartesian starting-point, anything beyond idealism is underdetermined by the evidence.
"It's more an empirical, since the empirical is about all I can know with certainty."
Given your own minimalistic example (the impression of sitting in front of a computer), you have no certainty about the empirical realm. For your impressions are consistent with simulations or hallucinations rather than external stimuli.
And even if we grant external stimuli, how do you know that your impressions resemble the stimuli?
"It hardly needs one, given the gross misunderstandings present."
A tendentious assertion.
"There you go proving me right about theists and their misunderstanding evolution."
Another tendentious assertion.
"They could certainly mess with our senses/perception. It must be difficult living in a demon haunted world, unable to know whether a demon is feeding you a delusion."
You mean…like your impression that you're sitting in front of a computer?
"That seems like a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of their work."
Yet another tendentious assertion. You ran out of gas miles back. Now you're pushing your car uphill.
Contemporary eliminative materialists regard folk psychological terms (e.g. beliefs) as empty. They don't correspond to brain states.
"The degree to which the physical state models or represents whatever it is you're comparing it to."
Physical states are not intrinsically representational. Rather, an external agent must assign or arrange them to be referential. Say, arranging rocks on a beach to spell out S.O.S.
By itself, that could be a random pattern. It's code language which means nothing apart from agents who confer extrinsic significance on that physical state.
"Since athsism doesn't necessarily lead to moral relatavism or nihilism, I can indeed continue to state that truth."
Have you studied the arguments of atheists who deny moral realism?
"Naturalism for me is a conclusion I've arrived at, not something I've settled on prior to investigation"
So you're now retracting your prior claim that it's tacitly recognizable.
"As it stands, what you're claiming as tacit knowledge is pretty much what we could expect if naturalism were true."
Since you stated at the outset that "God did it" is empirically consistent with everything we observe, there is no evidence for naturalism.
So by your own admission, there's no empirical evidence for atheism, inasmuch as whatever happens is consistent with "God did it."
ReplyDeleteNo. Naturalism is falsifiable, as is atheism - evidence for things not natural, or evidence for a god or gods, would falsify them.
The problem is that theists like yourself, presumably, are not committed to ANY empirical evidence for or against your god hypothesis - it's flexible enough to explain everything.
YEC and the like at least derive some empirical consequences from their God hypothesis (and subsequently, that hypothesis is falsified by reality).
Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology? Is that your problem?
No. My point is that God hypothesis are generally made to be immune to any possible refutation.
The universe being old or young can be made consistent with God. Evolutionary biology or special creation, or occasional manipulation are all compatible with God. Regardless of what we discover about reality, Theism generally, and Christian theism specifically, can be made compatible with it. Some theists are arguing that a multiverse is just what we;d expect from God, while others continue to claim a singular universe is what we expect from God.
You are using your impression of sitting in front of a computer to claim empirical knowledge.
My impression of sitting in front of a computer IS empirical knowledge. It's undeniable that I'm having this experience. It is possible that the experience is completely hallucinatory, or the result of demons, or whatever. The experience however is all I'm claiming. There's no circularity there.
According to you, that can only be used to claim empirical knowledge if it's true,
Steve, please explain how it can be false that I am having a sense experience?
I never appealed to a confident feeling. Try again.
You appealed to a claim of tacit knowledge concerning the the truth of Christianity, and stated that if Christianity were true you would expect such to be experienced. And then used such as a claim to knowledge that Christianity is in fact true.
The circularity seems rather evidence to me.
Having the veridical experience is the primary datum.
Having the experience is the primary datum.
You keep confounding what's necessary for the subject to be justified with what's necessary for the subject to justify his experience to a second-party.
You don't seem to understand that the same experience you're claiming is not necessarily veridical.
Try to master that elementary distinction.
DeleteIf we followed your distinction, it seems to me that anyone could claim just about anything as veridical - including things mutually incompatible with the claimed veridical experiences of others.
I'm interested in what is actually true (or at least, what is likely to be true) not what I can convince myself is true.
You mean...like your impression of sitting in front of a computer could be a dream, or a hallucination, or the result of an alien abduction, or a psychic implanting that illusion in your mind, or recollection of a past life, or…
I'm not claiming my experience as necessarily veridical. I'm simply stating that I can't deny the experience itself. You seem to be claiming your experience as veridical, rather than the having of the experience as being veridical (which I think is closer to my position).
The Satan analogue could also be controlling the minds of atheists. If your hypothetical undercuts Christian theism, it simultaneously undercuts atheism.
Since, unlike you, I'm not aiming for 100% certainty, I'm ok with that - the probabilities seem, to me at least, to make that option rather less probable than naturalism.
However, the mere fact that this is a possible explanation for your supposedly veridical experience, seems to undercut your claim to it's veridical nature.
You're the one who keeps confusing knowledge with confidence.
Not at all. Perhaps I just have a different approach to epistemology than you.
A random association may trigger the memory. I knew it all along.
That doesn't seem to be a particularly enlightening example. Care to try again.
But that's consistent with a dream, hallucination, virtual reality,
I'm not claiming it isn't.
Which presupposes a standard of comparison. Probable in relation to what?
Whatever other explanations are being proposed, using other things I have provisional knowledge of to inform the probabilities - in short, a bayesian approach to epistemology.
Actually, given your Cartesian starting-point, anything beyond idealism is underdetermined by the evidence.
Every option is underdetermined by the evidence - that's why it's to be provisional. If the evidence overdetermined the options, then I doubt we'd be having this discussion.
you have no certainty about the empirical realm. For your impressions are consistent with simulations or hallucinations rather than external stimuli.
I've admitted as much. Did you have a point?
how do you know that your impressions resemble the stimuli?
I don't "know" in the sense that you aspire to.
A tendentious assertion.
ReplyDeleteSimply taking the obvious fact that beliefs that resemble reality more closely would be a far simpler set with far more generality and applicability to unfamiliar situations seems enough to point out a problem.
There are many more, and if you're interested I could probably help you track more down.
Another tendentious assertion.
Not really, since extinction is expected when the environment is changed quicker than a population is able to adapt. ALL extant species are derived from species that are now extinct.
You mean…like your impression that you're sitting in front of a computer?
Exactly. I embrace that fact, and do the best I can from there. You seem to be simply assert the veridical nature of some experience or other.
Have you studied the arguments of atheists who deny moral realism?
Some of them.
I've also studies the arguments of some of the atheists who argue FOR moral realism.
So you're now retracting your prior claim that it's tacitly recognizable.
Where did I claim that?
Since you stated at the outset that "God did it" is empirically consistent with everything we observe, there is no evidence for naturalism.
This statement seems to be based on a misunderstanding of my point, and I've tried to clarify further up.
steve:
ReplyDeleteiii) The same belief can sometimes have both supporting evidence and prima facie counterevidence. For instance, that's commonplace in scientific theories.
In scientific theories, one piece of counterevidence should cause either a tweaking of the the theory or its complete demise.
Likewise, your confidence in the senses is bolstered if the senses were engineered by a competent designer, but undercut if the senses are the byproduct of a blind, aimless process.
It seems to me that reliable sense perception would provide the individual with an survival advantage and an advantage in reproductive success. Hardly aimless.
It seems to me that reliable sense perception would provide the individual with an survival advantage and an advantage in reproductive success. Hardly aimless.
DeleteI'm continually surprised that anyone takes the EAAN seriously.
Let's not forget that Plantinga criticized Dawkins for messing with philosophy without being an philosopher, only to have Plantinga then turn around and offer this argument that relies on the most ignorantly deformed versions of the most basic of biology in general, and of evolution in particular. Plantinga should have followed his own advice and not make that ridiculous display of ignorance.
Deletesteve:
ReplyDeleteMany things happen by natural causes. God doesn't do everything himself. He created personal agents and natural agencies that do many things. Are you just ignorant of basic Christian theology?
Christians believe in "natural agencies" that cause events independent of God? I thought that Christians believed that all the processes of nature are at His direction. My bad.
So the difference between Naturalists and Christians is a matter of degree.
Calvinists in particular don't believe in free will. All is "God's" "plan" unfolding. Lots of creations going to hell is just part of the big "plan." Therefore nature doing its course would also be "God's" plan. Steve, of course, does not notice the contradictions within and without the doctrines. But this should not be a surprise.
DeleteCalvinism also has several subdivisions, by the way, which means that many if not all of them would be worshiping an idol of their own making rather than "God," and since most of these versions of their god are deceivers, or just happy to leave you to be deceived (according to some Christian there's a "difference"), going to hell for worshiping an idol is something you would not know to be the case, but also part of the plan. Isn't Christianity (Christianities!) nice and logical?
Steve, of course, does not notice the contradictions within and without the doctrines. But this should not be a surprise.
DeleteIt's my experience that it is assumed, without good reason, that there are no such contradictions, and so they're all simply rationalised away - after all, there must be some solution to them because the bible doesn't have contradictions!