Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Objectivism Again

I recently wrote a little blurb dealing with Objectivism a few weeks ago. By "Objectivism" I really mean the belief that we can obtain a true knowledge of reality of the whole by evaluating what we can only experience, as we can never know if we are experiencing the partial or the whole. Of course, if one is wrong in his belief of whether he is experiencing the partial or the whole is to distort the nature of reality, and therefore, the phenomena he is experiencing. Hence, he is not really experiencing the nature of reality as it exists, but merely as something distorted by his metaphysic. In order to experience reality with some sort of analogical accuracy, he must get his metaphysic right. That metaphysic cannot be confirmed and known to be right, however, through what he experiences, as that would be to beg the question of what he is experiencing when he comes into sensory contact with phenomena, whether he is accessing something partially or completely in terms of its nature. Hence, I wrote this:

That the senses give us an accurate perception of reality can only be confirmed by belief in a reality we cannot perceive with the senses. As one must know what reality is independently of himself in order to measure his perception by it and establish the idea that what he perceives is, in fact, reality. Ergo, faith in a metaphysic is a necessity in the evaluation of any claim that concerns a knowledge of reality. Hence, objectivism is false, as it is not the senses that give a knowledge of reality, since they must be measured by an a priori knowledge of reality, but the metaphysic by which knowledge is gained by faith. 

An atheist attempted to refute my claims in some comments of his blog, and then again in a post, both of which fail miserably to understand the argument and address the problem. Instead, he seems intent to merely exhaust his readers by lengthy posts that give the impression that he has actually said something relevant to what I've argued. This sort of sophistry is evident in these long posts when they attempt to nitpick everything about my argument, but the argument itself. Hey, if you're going to bluff, make sure you do it with a lot of words so it seems like you've got something to back up your claims.

In any case, I will attempt to explain my problem with his response, and then just comment on a few things.  It is highly unlikely that we will come to an agreement, as he thinks I don't get it and I don't think he gets it, and as many of you know, I just give up at certain points when people just don't seem to get an argument or want to play sophists.


But his confusion and the total failure of his argument exists when he misreads my use of the word “reality” as something that posits two realities. I said no such thing. I am discussing the essential nature of the one reality. That’s implied in my discussion of metaphysics. The problem is that he is assuming his definition of reality that is already rooted in his naturalistic worldview, but that merely begs the question that asks, “What is the essential nature of reality and how do I attempt to take hold of such knowledge?” My answer is not that it is impossible to take hold of such knowledge. My answer is that everyone already attempts to take hold of it via a faith position. If he denies the validity of arguing from an unverifiable assumption in order to come to an unverifiable conclusion via faith, then he is left with a complete nihilistic view of knowledge, where any knowledge of reality is impossible, which he seems to think is an objection to my objection when it is actually just establishing it. So, if we cannot begin with a faith position, then we are left with knowledge "no how." Since he assumes that "knowledge" must be gained through sensory perception, he is left without the ability to know reality. Of course, because we do believe that what we are experiencing is at least a part of reality, that indicates our ability to know; but I haven't moved that far ahead yet. I'm still only at the objection.

His argument that I am moving the goal post is due to his own reconfiguration of my implicit definition to fit his own assumed metaphysic. That is what is so ironic with his attempt to dismiss the objection. With every attempt, he is merely displaying the problem. Instead, moving the goal post would be if I were adding conditions to an originally stated argument that I need to make it true. I’m simply clarifying the implicit in my argument that he confounds with the context of his own assumed metaphysic, of which he is apparently unaware.



He further sets up a strawman according to his own interpretation of the term “reality,” again, based upon his assumed metaphysic in which he has faith, by attempting to refute my argument based upon our ability to know physical phenomena through our sensory experience. This has nothing to do with my argument, and again, assumes his view of reality, i.e., that it merely consists of physical objects to be observed because physical objects are all that I can observe. 

The idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality is a metaphysic that cannot be confirmed through sensory perception. Yet, he still affirms it in his definition of reality.
Hence, I am not arguing that there are “two realities,” and certainly not that there are two “opposite realities.” Opposite in reference to what? The way we take hold of it? That isn’t a distinction in the realities but in our abilities to grasp the one reality. In Christianity, God experiences all of the one reality, so they are not two realities by nature. I find his definitions to be rather sloppy and his argument lacks self awareness in terms of what it must assume in order to make the argument. Yet, as soon as he does so he proves my point.



But I can make a further argument that we have no way of knowing whether we are interpreting physical phenomena with any accuracy unless we have some outside confirmation that has a greater awareness and experience of the phenomena than we are capable.
Let’s say dogs could communicate and reason as we do, but were completely unaware, in dog world, that humans existed. Some believe that they do, and others believe that they do not. Let’s simply say that humans cannot be seen by dogs.
Those same dogs enter into a discussion, much like this one, where they all wish to comment on the color of a rose. They perceive that an object is there. That the object is there is not really the question at the moment, but rather whether their perception of the object is complete enough to understand certain questions about it.

Now, in a dog’s eyes, the rose is black and white. It has no color, as dog’s don’t see in color. Hence, the dogs come to a consensus among them that the rose is absent of color, and that, indeed, color is not even something that can be verified to exist.
I then move to make myself known to some dogs and tell them that color is very real and that the rose is actually the color red. They then go to tell the other dogs that a human, who exists outside of their sensory perception, but who has knowledge of the rose that transcends that of a dog’s knowledge, has informed them that color exists, and that the rose is actually not absent of color, but is instead a color called “red.”
Some of the dogs to which I did not speak believed that report, and others did not. Those who did not argued that to say that the rose has a color that cannot be perceived by our senses was merely to argue for something imaginary and speculative, since such a claim cannot be confirmed by us. Hence, they chose not to believe that the rose had any color to it, or that color existed at all. Hence, their disbelief brought them to believe something false about reality, since they based reality upon their senses, and what they could deduce from what they experienced, alone, and their sense and experiential reasoning was not a means capable of accessing such information. Those who chose to believe the report, however, absent of an ability to confirm the report, ended up believing something about reality that is true.
Now, imagine that dogs, who reported that a human had contacted them and told them that color existed and that the rose was red, made it up. It was, in fact, merely their imagination that thought up such a thing. In that case, color may exist, the rose may be red, but there is no way of knowing such. There is no way to access it. Hence, those dogs who relied purely on their sensory experience may or may not be right in their assessment of the rose. There is simply no way of knowing whether what is perceived about the rose is true.

Now, imagine that the situation is even worse. Imagine that the group is not a bunch of dogs, but jellyfish who are discussing the nature of a rose. Now the senses are even more limited, and the jellyfish is guessing about the rose purely through feeling one that has been dropped in the water. The object is truly there and being experienced by the observer, but the abilities of the observer will most certainly misconstrue the nature of the object.
To merely assume that one’s senses are perceiving reality as it is is to assume a faith position. There is simply no logical way around this.
Hence, the only possible way to access reality in such a conundrum is to either believe a report, that may or may not be true, that one who is transcendent has sufficiently communicated certain beliefs to us that now function as our presuppositions needed to make assessments of reality, or we must merely speculate in the dark and hope that we find the needle in an infinite haystack by assuming that our interpretation of data through sensory perception and experiential reason that is caught up in our sensory perception is accurate simply because we have nothing else to go on and it seems to “work” for us. The dog’s perceptions work for it. The jellyfish’s perceptions work for it. What works for evolution and survival has no way of producing any track record of “working” to assess reality as it is, as one would have to verify that such a view of the universe is true outside of himself, which is completely impossible if no higher beings, with a greater access to reality, exist.
It is possible to land on the right view, but my point is that such a view must first be assumed via a faith position. One cannot use an interpretation of reality gained from sensory perception when it is what is being perceived by the senses in the first place that must be interpreted by one’s view of reality in the first place. The question is not what the senses are perceiving but whether what they are perceiving is accurate. In the case of the dogs relying upon their sensory perception, we, being capable of more knowledge of the rose than they, know their assessment of reality when it comes to the rose and color in general is a false perception. Their abilities are merely given to them to sufficiently function in the world for survival purposes, not to accurately assess reality and come to the truth concerning the nature of the universe.
My only point here, then, is that sensory perception itself cannot be the vehicle through which one accesses reality. One must believe what the nature of reality is first and then argue from there. A dog must believe first whether color exists and has some affect on how we evaluate the rose in order to interpret that aspect of the rose. But that is a belief that it cannot verify through his own sensory perceptions.
Hence, when we discuss whether X, Y, or Z is true when it comes to natural phenomena, we must realized that our senses may only function for our survival, not to come to an accurate view of reality. We can hold certain axioms that we are experiencing something, and so the universe is real, but this too is really just a faith position, one not held by many people throughout the world (e.g., Hindus, Buddhists, Christian Scientists, etc.).

Hence, neither the essential nature of the universe can be known through sense perception and experiential reason, nor can lesser questions concerning the full reality of physical objects be confirmed based upon sensory perception, since all is subjectively experienced with a finite set of tools that may distort reality, since those tools are given to us for survival, not discovering truth concerning the nature of natural phenomena.
That we can, in fact, discover such regardless of the above, displays first a faith position that has been assumed and a knowledge we have been given that transcends our own abilities to achieve through the senses. Either an argument for the existence of a higher being that has communicated such information to us or blind luck must, therefore, follow.

If a higher being is argued for, the higher being must have a transcendent knowledge that experiences reality as it is, rather than analogically and subjectively as we do, otherwise we run into the same conundrum with a finite being, even if that finite being is more advanced in his sensory perception than we are (i.e., an advanced alien life-form). Hence, we are back to God or blind luck, but both are faith positions that are, by necessity, assumed in any methodology of inquiry that deals with assessing the nature of reality.

To put this simply in questions, I would merely ask an atheist, “Are there questions about the rose that cannot be answered by an evaluation made from our sensory experience, but may have to do with true components of its nature?”

If “Yes,” does that not assume that there is a reality that cannot be perceived by us, and how do you know that?
If “No,” does that not assume that there is no part of reality that exists that cannot be perceived by us, and how does one know that?

I see no possible answer to either answer but that one must first believe what the nature of reality is in order to then know what he is perceiving is actually real.

He goes on about imagination, and I just wanted to say this. If we are the product of evolution then really what needs to evolve are mechanisms that allow us to more effectively survive. What exactly is an imagination for? That we have them is admitted by all here. But why do we have them? Let me suggest that perhaps the reason why we have imaginations, ones that create a host of false views of reality, is because it is meant to be a mechanism that allows us to take hold of a truth concerning the nature of reality that is inaccessible to us through sensory perception. Yet, we need to access what can only be confirmed transcendentally. I use “imagination” differently here than my interlocutor who seems to use it negatively. Of course, to suggest that what is claimed to have been divinely revealed is imagination is merely to beg the question with one’s own imagination. In other words, if information has been divinely revealed then this is not mere imagination, but rather reception of a well-informed report. Only the agnostic and atheist is left with imagination to refute it, as there is no claim to divine revelation, and therefore, the naturalist’s metaphysic must be truly imagined.
 

I won’t bother addressing his claim that he was not making a tu quoque. I think it is obvious to anyone reading it that he admits such in his very denial. It simply does not matter, even if it were true, that my solution does not solve the problem or ends up with the same problem. The only issue is whether the problem exists within an objectivist view.

FYI, I was reading Rand when the objection came up in my mind. I found her supposed rationale against what I’ve said to be an exploration into the same type of question begging I’ve addressed above.

I also found it a bit humorous that he keeps confirming elements of my point by making them his point. I just chuckle and say to myself, “Yeah, that’s exactly what I am saying.” But he doesn’t understand what I’m arguing, so he just goes on and on down the rabbit hole of his own strawman rebuttal.

However, let me address something of his objection:

The point is that the form of our perception is just as “objective” as the object we perceive in the sense that it is not subject to our preferences, wishes, etc. It is not a matter of “faith” or “belief in a metaphysic,” that we perceive the rose one color or another. Perception is more fundamental than belief. This is what attacks on the senses like Hodge’s fail to acknowledge.  

I'm not addressing our faculties as objective. I'm addressing knowledge of our faculties accessing reality. That the reality of the object's nature is distorted by the dog's faculties is obvious. He may have faculties that perceive something, and that the object is independent of him, but he has misconstrued its nature because of the limitation of his sensory abilities.

I also take issue with the idea that I am attacking the senses. That is caricature that lends itself easily to the strawman he is making. I am arguing that the senses cannot evaluate whether they themselves have accurately come to a knowledge of reality by using themselves. That is circular. The senses cannot confirm or deny a belief concerning reality. Hence, what one perceives with his senses must be interpreted by something other than the senses themselves, including how much reality his senses are perceiving accurately.

So, for instance, I may perceive my daughter running to me, but what is the causation of her running? Are there natural causes alone or are there also supernatural causes I cannot perceive with my senses. There is no way to confirm or deny either position by using those very senses. Furthermore, what is my daughter? Is she spirit and body or just body? I have no way of knowing what it is that is running to me, i.e., the nature of the person, via my senses. There is simply no way to confirm or deny such using the senses, and as such, the idea that one is directly perceiving the reality of an object in a way that is not subjective is nonsensical.

Now, if Hodge is suggesting that there are things in reality which are by their very nature beyond the access of any of our sense modalities (sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell), he needs to argue for this. He should not special plead his case here, insisting that we need to validate the senses while giving himself a free pass from having to validate claims about some “reality we cannot perceive with the senses,” especially if he indicates no method by which we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “reality we cannot perceive with the senses” and something he may merely be imagining. 

I didn't think I had to argue for the obvious, but apparently in neo-atheism I do. In fact, this is all I was attempting to say. I was specifically addressing Rand's idea that one can access reality objectively through the senses. My point is that this is impossible, and relies completely on a presupposition concerning the nature of reality that cannot be confirmed by the senses in the first place. I wasn't attempting to say anything more about Objectivism than that.

Also, I would point out that faith and reason are not compatible. Faith rests on the primacy of consciousness metaphysics while reason requires the primacy of existence. These are not reconcilable. I’m guessing that, if Hodge does not accept this, he does not have a very good understanding of reason; he may not even understand faith very well for all we know.  

As long as one defines reason within a naturalistic system that is self defeating, then one can go on spouting this sort of nonsense, but in reality, reason must assume, via faith, all sorts of presuppositions that one cannot establish by reason without begging the question. This tells me a lot about my friend here, and why he may be incapable of reading my argument (I mean, he can't even read my name correctly afterall). The assertion that faith and reason are not compatible is just that, an assertion. You can say that they are two means of taking hold of reality, as I have, but you cannot claim them to be incompatible. If that were true, logical argument, which rests upon certain faith assumptions, could not exist. It does not matter that one call these assumptions "axioms." That is merely a convenient way of stepping over the issue and avoiding the question. Oh, but if only I understood faith and reason, I'd be an atheist, right? LOL. This is a perfect example of the blindness that comes when one is not aware of his presuppositions and how he actually knows what he thinks he knows.



What exactly is that problem? I perceive objects and formally recognize the fact “existence exists.” This recognition is all-encompassing – it encompasses everything that exists. It leaves nothing that exists out. And yet, I did this by beginning with perception and then forming concepts on the basis of direct perceptual input. Where’s the problem? Hodge has identified no problem here.


The problem is in defining “existence” as that which is perceived by the senses or reasoned to by what is perceived. Such assumes a naturalistic metaphysic that cannot be sensed or reasoned to without first assuming it and its subsequent definitions. In essence, he has stacked the deck by defining “existence” in favor of his arguments and automatically excluded an alternative view of existence that may include that which cannot be perceived by the finite human mind. Hence, what exactly is existence is precisely at the point of dispute.


The senses do not disallow the formation of concepts. The senses simply provide the initial input for concept-formation. Since concept-formation involves the process of measurement-omission, the conceptual level of cognition expands our awareness beyond that which we immediately perceive. This does not require an appeal to “a reality we cannot perceive with the senses,” but rather a process of abstraction from perceptual input. It does not require that we posit a supernatural consciousness which magically installs knowledge in our minds, a supernatural consciousness which we can only “access” by means of imagining it. Rather, it requires us to recognize the fact that what we imagine is not real, that what we perceive is real, regardless of whether we like it or not. Thus I doubt Hodge is suddenly going to adopt a warm attitude towards Objectivism (big ‘O’) in spite of his flailing errors in trying to take down objectivism (little ‘o’). 

First, I never argued that the senses disallow the formation of concepts. I feel as though this entire conversation has been held between three people: Myself addressing Bethrick and Bethrick addressing past interlocutors. He is simply arguing with someone else at this point. Is this my fault for not articulating my argument better? Perhaps. It's possible, since I have my kids jumping on me or asking me questions every two minutes, that I have not been as clear. It would not have been the first time. However, I also think that some of the blame lay with my reader as one who is attempting to cookie cutter my argument into something he thinks he can handle better. In essence, what he argues here is what I said he was arguing and nothing more: Data collected by sense perception and reason that uses sense perception to form concepts. The problem is that he seems painfully unaware that the formation of concepts are being derived from a belief about that whole process that presumes a particular metaphysic that he first needs to form concepts from the data. Hence, what is forming the concept is not the data gained from sensory perception, but the faith in a metaphysic that then uses the data to reason to his view of reality. In other words, it's all circular, but he wants to argue, along with Rand's Objectivism, that he has direct access to unmediated facts that alone make up the totality of the characteristics of reality via sense perception and concept formation based upon the data collected by it.

Second to this, his following statement is merely begging the question. He seems absolutely oblivious that his stated rules for obtaining accurate knowledge concerning reality all assume belief in a metaphysic that cannot be established without first assuming the validity of those rules and the metaphysical belief that establishes their validity for accessing the nature of reality in the first place. The fact that he is so unaware of what he and his assertions are doing displays why he thinks that I am the one who doesn't get it.
Finally, I never posited that belief in something supernatural is necessary. He doesn't get my argument. I argued that one must believe something about the nature of reality, whether there is a supernatural element OR NOT, in order to analyze what exists (i.e., reality) in the first place.

So where’s the confusion? The universe exists. The solar system exists. The solar system moves. Where’s the confusion? What is “the essential nature of the universe” if it’s not the same as all the characteristics that make it up? If the characteristics of the universe are for some reason supposed to be different in nature from “the essential nature of the universe,” how would one go about determining this? Hodge nowhere explains any of this. But it’s clearly a premise that helps drive the rest of what he wants to say.

So where’s the confusion? The universe exists. The solar system exists. The solar system moves. God exists. Demons exist. They are the first causes of natural phenomena. Where’s the confusion? What is “the essential nature of the universe” if it’s not the same as all the characteristics that make it up, including all of its supernatural elements that cannot be perceived by the senses? We can all play "let's beg the question."


If the characteristics of the universe are for some reason supposed to be different in nature from “the essential nature of the universe,” how would one go about determining this? Hodge nowhere explains any of this. But it’s clearly a premise that helps drive the rest of what he wants to say.

I never argued anything near this. No one is saying that the characteristics of the universe are different in nature from the essential nature of the universe. The problem is that he is assuming his worldview in order to argue that his definition of nature is normative. But one must know what the characteristics of the universe actually are before he argues that all of its characteristics can be naturally perceived or conceptualized from that perception. There is nothing to validate the belief, but the belief itself.

Also, if one supposes that “there is a spiritual element” to something, how does he ensure that he has not mistaken what he may merely be imagining for something real? We do not automatically have knowledge; we must discover and validate it, and we can make mistakes. This is why we need an objective method – this is why we need reason. But Hodge and other mystics treat their mystical claims as though they were immune from error, as though they were infallible in their mystical insights, when in fact it is among their mystical claims that mystics have their greatest clashes and disputes. Once one is on the turf of faith, he’s renounced reason as his method. He has no objective method to guard against error and ensure the truth of his verdicts. This is precisely why faith and reason will never be compatible.

This is what I find so problematic with these neo-atheists. They have no ability to be self critical. He's just presenting another logical fallacy, which is ironic for someone arguing in the paragraph that we must use reason to distinguish truth from error.
That we are left with the inability to reason our way to the nature of true existence is only a problem for atheists, not theists who believe they have received revelation. Perhaps they are wrong, perhaps atheists are right; but it's never something that one can confirm through reason, as reason must presuppose what the nature of reality is first in order to use sensory perceived data to make sense of that believed reality. At all times, one is merely using his reason to make his experience "fit" his hoped for reality. Whether he has landed upon the right view of reality is purely a matter of faith. There is no way to determine metaphysical claims of such a nature through physical means. But the atheist doesn't like this.My point, then, is that I am merely admitting to what everyone, including my atheist friend, does. He's just not as honest or aware of that fact as I am.
However, I have not abandoned reason, but merely argued that reason must be preceded by a faith position either way.


Notice that for Hodge, reason is not even a contender here. Either he must simply accept, on faith, reports that are claim to have come from a supernatural consciousness which he can only imagine, or he must “guess and believe, via pure speculation.” He does not even consider reason. He may think that reason just is guessing and believing via pure speculation. It’s not. But this is probably what has been taught to him and he never questioned.


I was taught that reason is pure speculation? LOL. Not quite. You can lay my argument at my feet, not at those of my professors. To give my simple definition Reason is the logical collecting, organizing, and correlating of data with one's presupposed worldview. It can never be anything other than this, lest it become self defeating. Hence, one can discern between truth and error when it comes to existence only after he has assumed a metaphysic, not before. So reason isn't "pure speculation," but it relies on something that is believed whether by speculation or by faith in a report.

Hodge writes: “Neither the object, nor my method for studying its physical nature, can tell me whether I have landed on the right metaphysical belief.”

So clearly he’s not employing reason. He tells us this right here. Whatever “method” he is using for “studying,” it’s not reason. Also, by characterizing the end goal as “landing on the right metaphysical belief” suggests that it’s all a very approximate affair of groping and, by luck, finding what he calls “the right metaphysical belief.” How he determines that whatever belief he’s accepted is “the right metaphysical belief,” he does not explain.


Actually, my argument is employing reason. The argument, however, is stating that no one is using pure reason, but rather everyone, if there is no transcendent mind giving us aid, is groping, and by luck, if at all, finding the right metaphysical belief. I don't explain how I determine right metaphysical belief because there is no method other than believing a contradictory metaphysical belief by which one can measure metaphysical beliefs.






And round and round we go, like a dog chasing its own tail.

Pot, meet kettle.

Apparently Hodge’s concern is that, if he didn’t take the faith route, reality would be limited in such a way that his theological confessions did not apply. And he wants to avoid this. But his entire approach is backwards. He approaches the matter as one who must accept an unspecified number of “presuppositions” about reality prior to investigating reality and allowing those “presuppositions” (“belief in a reality we cannot perceive with the senses,” “faith in a metaphysic,” “a report that claims to be from One who [is] transcendent,” etc.) to govern what is and what is not accepted as truth about reality.

Not really. My concern is that neo-atheists don't realize that the knowledge of reality is already limited by our finitude. I'm not arguing that we all have different ways of knowing and I want to keep mine. I'm arguing that we all know the same way, whether neo-atheists admit it or not.

Also, Hodge seems to resent the prospect of being “in the same boat” with others, even though he, like everyone else reading this, is a human being with a human consciousness and thus neither omniscient nor infallible, able to perceive and form concepts, facing a fundamental alternative between life and death, thus needing to identify what he perceives in order to make living possible, and thus in need of an objective method by which he can reliably identify what he perceives. But throughout all his efforts to refute objectivism (whether big or small ‘o’), he’s continually made statements to the effect that reason is never going to be on his side unless he makes some radical changes in his thinking.

I'm not quite sure where this even comes from. I've been arguing the whole time that we all are in the same boat.

We all start with what we perceive. It’s what we do with what we perceive that is the game-changer. If one wants to evade what he perceives in preference for something one merely imagines, religion is the more philosophically developed result. If one does not seek to evade what he perceives, then he needs an objective method by which to identify what he perceives. But seeking to refute objectivism, Hodge declares war on objectivity. This is only fitting given his devotion to his imaginary god.

Only by assuming one knows all about the object that he perceives can he argue that what he perceives is all-encompassing; but as I've said before, this is belief in a worldview that cannot be established by what is perceived in the first place. He simply doesn't realize how strong his faith is and how much it shows in such statements as these.


Hodge clearly wants to narrow the options between directly perceiving something and having “faith in a metaphysic.” Like so many other mystics, he does not understand the relationship between the conceptual and the perceptual. He probably assumes there is no relationship, and in the case of much of what he considers “knowledge,” there is no relationship. But it would not follow from this that the conceptual level of cognition has no relationship to perceptual awareness. It is more ignorance-borne speculation on the part of the theist which closes the door to reason and objective knowledge.



Now he's arguing what I "probably" believe. LOL. If only he could actually address what I say instead of what I didn't say. No one closes the door to reason, but objective knowledge depends upon subjective apprehension, and our definitions, of knowledge. Knowledge to a philosophic naturalist is what can be obtained through the senses and reason that uses the experience gained thereof. Knowledge to a theist is that which is revealed, obtained through the senses, and uses the experience gained thereof. The difference is that the theist admits that he starts with faith in something he believes to be revealed. The philosophical naturalist merely assumes the self evident nature of his metaphysic and proceeds from there. That's the problem. Who is denying reason if one must ignore the presuppositions needed to use it in the first place?


This just confirms my point above, that it’s all ignorance-borne. Perception is more fundamental than belief. But Hodge has yet to understand this.

This just confirms my point above, that it's all ignorance-borne. Perception is not more fundamental than belief when forming concepts, as the reasoned formation needs those beliefs to form it in the first place. But Bethrick has yet to understand this.

27 comments:

  1. Hello Hodge: Please accept my comment for publication on your blog.

    Daswon Bethrick at his Incinerating Presuppositionalism blog comments section quotes your above essay.

    "The idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality is a metaphysic that cannot be confirmed through sensory perception. Yet, he still affirms it in his definition of reality."

    http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2013/08/hodges-hedgings.html

    This prompted a question from me for you. Regarding the notion of "non-physical objects", regardless of Objectivism's stance, it seems to me a non-cognitive floating abstraction. What would be the primary attribute of "non-physical"? Lacking such the notion would not have justifiable secondary or relational attributes and so the term "non-physical object" would have no specific referents and would thus not represent a valid concept but would instead represent an invalid floating abstraction and therefore consequently be meaningless.

    Ideas and indeed all cognitive content are instantiated brain states and so are physical. Pointing to truth, the laws of logic, universality, math, science, morality, etc., as “immaterial” fails your purpose as these are conceptual phenomena in nature and hence are instantiated brain states. Do you, Mr. Hodge, mean to imply there can be objects without temporal spacial existence? If so, are you referring to Branes within String Theory's M-Space or regions of True Vacuum within Chaotic Eternal Inflation's False Vacuum? Since there is still space of sorts within each hypothesis and time is what is measured on a clock to gauge passage of action due to events and in both hypothesizes there occur events, then both False Vacuum and M-Space are temporal and spatial even if they lack space-time as in our cosmic domain or universe and so would contain physical objects.

    Assuming the presupposition of substance dualism in an attempt to verify the existence of "non-physical" objects is not justifiable due to the findings of modern neuroscience that consciousness is a biological function of organisms with brains and nervous systems. Without substance dualism, no case for a-priori knowledge can be successful. I think this also applies to notions of "non-physical" objects.

    ReplyDelete
  2. I think the problem, Robert, is that if you look at your argument, it begs the question by defining the nature of physical objects and non-physical objects. In other words, it assumes a naturalistic worldview at the get go and then argues from there. The claim that modern neuroscience has disproved substance dualism should be a big red flag to you that you have done this. That one can find natural mechanisms for consciousness does not answer the question as to whether those mechanisms are the primary or secondary causes of consciousness. One must assume a position first and then go on to discuss the nature of physical objects and what might be the nature of non-physical objects. Until then, you are merely asking me to concede your worldview while attempting to argue against its very premises.

    ReplyDelete
  3. B.C.:

    That the reality of the object's nature is distorted by the dog's faculties is obvious.

    The rose and its characteristics do not change from when a dog looks at it to when a human looks at it. They don't change because a bee sees the rose in ultraviolet. Does the rose change its characteristics depending on who is looking at it? What if all three are looking at the rose simultaneously?

    The only thing that changes is the brain activity known as perception. Changes in brain activity do not cause distortions of reality.

    ReplyDelete
  4. That's not what I was arguing. My point is that perception of the object, not the object itself, is distorted through limited faculties to sense all of its characteristics. Hence, reality is distorted to the observer, not in and of itself.

    ReplyDelete
  5. But, of course, I only know that the dog has distorted it because I have a higher knowledge of the object's reality than the dog does.

    ReplyDelete
  6. B.C.:

    But, of course, I only know that the dog has distorted it because I have a higher knowledge of the object's reality than the dog does.

    I'm confused. Can an "object's reality" be distorted but not the object? Where is an "object's reality" located, with the object or with the perceiver?

    ReplyDelete
  7. Mr. Hodge,

    Several points:

    1. In your blog above, you write (with me in mind): “The idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality is a metaphysic that cannot be confirmed through sensory perception. Yet, he still affirms it in his definition of reality.”

    Where have I done this? Specifically, where have I affirmed “the idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality”? Where have I presented a “definition of reality”? What exactly do you think I have affirmed as a “definition of reality”? Can you tie your characterization to something I have actually written?

    2. Can you explain precisely how Robert’s question begs the question? You say that it’s because he’s allegedly “defining the nature of physical objects and non-physical objects.” But how does merely defining one’s terms amount to begging the question? You say “it assumes a naturalistic worldview at the get go and then argues from there.” I don’t see that he’s argued anything illicitly in posing his question to you. I too would be curious to know what would be the primary attribute(s) of something said to be “non-physical.” When one calls something “non-physical,” he seems only to be indicating what it is not, not what it is. But objects which exist have positive identity; they are not merely negations floating around. So Robert’s question seems quite legitimate to me, and so far it remains unanswered. Also, I’d like to know how one can reliably distinguish a “non-physical” object from something he’s only imagining. When I imagine an invisible magic dragon in my front yard, is it physical or non-physical? It certainly does not seem that it could be physical to me. How does your position answer this? These are important questions. Charging someone with begging the question and then leaving questions unanswered is most unhelpful. It certainly does nothing to show that our position is wrong, that much is for sure.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  8. 3. Perception is a means of awareness, not a means of distortion. But throughout your entire treatment of the issue, you seem to think that perception has the ability to distort things. A dog’s awareness is not a distortion of what exists any more than our awareness is a distortion of what exists. It’s clear that you’re confusing the form of awareness with the object of awareness. The representationalists made exactly this same mistake, and Kant picked it up from them. At other times you confuse perception with identification, which are two distinct functions of consciousness (more on that later).

    NAL quotes your statement: “That the reality of the object's nature is distorted by the dog's faculties is obvious,” and then rightly points out that “the rose and its characteristics do not change from when a dog looks at it to when a human looks at it.” But it’s clear from what you write that you think the dog’s faculties distort “the reality of the object’s nature.” In fact, you say this is “obvious,” but it’s certainly not obvious to me. I don’t think the object has changed at all. Objects exist and are what they are independent of the means by which a subject has awareness of them. A rose does not change its nature when I look at it any more than it changes its nature when I wish that it become a pile of hundred dollar bills. It remains what it is regardless of anyone’s conscious activity.

    When NAL points this out to you, however, you retort saying “That’s not what I was arguing.” You said it’s “obvious”! You then restate your view to mean: “My point is that perception of the object, not the object itself, is distorted through limited faculties to sense all of the characteristics.” This is fundamentally different from what you say in your piece (and what NAL quoted), and yet you do not provide any argument for this, either. There’s no distorting going on. There’s awareness of objects through a causal process. You then say that “reality is distorted to the observer, not in and of itself,” but you provide no basis for supposing this, either, nor do you validate the distinction here (“reality… to the observer” vs. “reality… in and of itself”). You’re assuming throughout that perception is a form of distortion as opposed to what it really is, a means of awareness, and then arguing from there – completely frontloading in a most question-begging manner the very point you’re trying to seal.

    Then you say, “But, of course, I only know that the dog has distorted it because I have a higher knowledge of the object’s reality than the dog does.” But even on your own terms, you do not have any basis to affirm this. On your own premises, one might just as easily suppose that your perception of the rose distorts “the reality of the object’s nature,” and that the dog’s perception of it is much closer to “reality as it really is.” How would you know? Simply assuming a “belief in a metaphysic” is no answer to this. Affirming your position on faith is simply an attempt to give yourself a shortcut to knowledge which, on your own premises, you could not have any legitimate basis to claim. These are not the Objectivist’s problems – they’re yours.

    4. I have replied to a small portion of your new blog entry here. It appears that the perspective taken by Objectivism is new to you. I suggest you do a little more research and also that you put greater care into expressing your position. On several occasions now you seem to be backtracking from plain readings of your own statements.

    Regards,
    Dawson

    ReplyDelete
  9. Thanks Dawson. Let me suggest to you that you have not understood my argument, yet again. The reason why I say this is that you seem completely unaware that the definitions offered to me, both by you and your ilk, all beg your naturalistic worldview. If I define existence to include non-perceivable attributes, that consciousness includes a supernatural mind, etc., I'd like to see you work into your conclusions with those assumptions. It's stacking the deck. Of course, you would argue that one can't use my assumptions and the definitions gained from them because they already preclude any conclusions of naturalism and your views concerning O/objectivism (spell it as your prefer). I appreciate the recommendation to read more, and I am certainly not a philosopher, but rather a biblical scholar; but my field discusses these issues quite a bit when it comes to data, and the fallacies often committed therein are also identifiable within what I have read thus far of Rand's Objectivism. It simply cannot function without first assuming definitions of existence, identity, perception, etc. that all accord with an a priori stance of philosophic naturalism. You cannot win an argument merely by defining things in such a way. As I said, it only begs the question and then argues that Christians are wrong because they don't let you define the terms according to your worldview.

    ReplyDelete
  10. NAL, and apparently you as well, have misconstrued what I was saying. I, at no time, have argued that reality within itself shifts into a distortion because it is not perceived correctly by an observer. I am not arguing that what is perceived is not real. I am arguing that perception itself is limited and therefore can distort the observer's view of what is real. Hence, reality is distorted for him, not ontologically. It is his view of reality that is off. The dog perceives that no color exists. Are you actually making the argument that what the dog perceives is real and that the object really has no color, but when I look at it, it suddenly gains color? Obviously, you think that I am somehow saying this, but it's the exact opposite of what I am saying. The object is real. It is being perceived, but we do not have the ability to know whether we are capable of perceiving all of its attributes or only some of them. To make a judgment, i.e., an identification, of the object is to assume a sufficient amount of knowledge about the object to do so. But there is no way of knowing this. Identity, then, can only be for conventional purposes of distinguishing objects AS WE PERCEIVE THEM, but not as they are. Hence, our perception of objects and the true identity of objects themselves may have little to no correlation between them, as they do not with the dog concluding that the object is colorless.

    ReplyDelete
  11. I would also shy away from arguing from technicalities in definitions in the sense that my definitions are not usually what your group means when you use them. Communication is facilitated by cooperation in allowing one to define his own terms. Maybe I'm using perception and I mean what perception does in identifying an object. Maybe I, as someone not trained in philosophy, am using the terms differently than their technical use. That's very possible. The easy thing to do if one wants to win an argument through posturing is to assume that one can win by proving a different use of terms. But this never addresses the argument made, and instead leaves it untouched, all the while one's opponent believes he has some victory over the actual argument via the accuracy of his definitions. I likely am using terms differently than Rand, but then I also would since her definitions are not based upon my worldview but hers. But none of that is essential to what I was arguing. To focus on such things is to evidence a desire to obscure the argument, rather than illumine it in order that one might make it clear and refute it. Your answers to me evidence nothing but a desire to win an argument, absent of any intent to consider the argument made. Indeed, to consider it would cost too much to the neo-atheist, as he wants to continually paint himself as the intellectual superior to his religious counterparts. Yet, as I have argued, and I think anyone with common sense would admit, one must begin his arguments by stating his beliefs and then work out from there. Anything else is academic dishonesty.

    ReplyDelete
  12. That said, my statement concerning your argument, that "“the idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality is a metaphysic that cannot be confirmed through sensory perception (yet, he still affirms it in his definition of reality)" uses imprecise language. I should have said, rather, that your view assumes that there is only a naturalistic component to reality that can either be perceived through the human senses or reasoned to using what is perceived by the human senses." Your argument, as well as all of your definitions, beg this assumption. It is my fault, however, for using less precise language, so I apologize for that.

    Now, you want me to show you how your terms beg the questions? I think you can prove it to yourself if you just do the opposite of what you, and Robert, have done with me. Assume my definitions that assume my worldview and then argue from there. Assume consciousness is primarily rooted in a soul and that the brain is secondary mechanism used to function through a physical body in a world which has a physical component to it. Assume that existence includes things that cannot be perceived by the human, as though the human's perceptions and identifications had anything to do with the nature of existence itself. You'll find your arguments to fall flat as they assume what my definitions and ultimate beliefs do not assume. That was my original, and total, objection to Rand's argument. It assumes a worldview in order to get her definitions that then supposedly prove her worldview, but that worldview cannot be substantiated by what we perceive without first assuming it. Hence, only the concepts that are valid are valid because they are gained from our sensory perception, then the nature of reality, that she merely assumes in her worldview, cannot be valid. It ends up refuting itself. I don't know how many ways to say it. You can go on and on about how you think I need to study the view more (which in my view is simply posturing), or that you think I'm confusing perception with identity (they are linked--you cannot have a right view of identity without rightly perceiving an object), etc. But in the end, this is all just semantics that don't address my initial claim at all. You're still begging the question, and I'm still getting exhausted trying to explain that to you and those who are so entrenched in perceiving their worldview as normative that they cannot see how self defeating their arguments really are.

    On a final note (because I'm not going to go continually back and forth on this--I've done that too much in my life already): This is a good example of what I'm talking about.

    "When one calls something “non-physical,” he seems only to be indicating what it is not, not what it is. But objects which exist have positive identity; they are not merely negations floating around."

    Because we think analogically, so I can only use what I have experienced in order to explain what I have not. Hence, I use the physical to merely given an analogy as the antithesis of the non-physical. But I can assign positive attributes to it. I just have to use analogy in order to do it. Thus is the nature of finite beings in a box. Only the objects perceived inside the box can be used to define objects outside of it. To say there are no objects outside of it because of that, or to argue that such makes speaking about them meaningless, depends upon whether you believe one from outside the box has communicated to those inside the box, using their analogical thinking, to convey important elements of existence to them. Do you think that describing "dark matter" is also something that indicates dark matter is meaningless and should be either described without analogy or discarded as a concept? It is my very worldview that believes that such analogies should be made. It is your very worldview that believes there is no need to do so since nothing outside the box exists.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Just to clarify my point, however:

    Perception is only an awareness of what can be perceived through the senses of the observer. Hence, when it comes to the dog, the limitations of that perception becomes a lack of awareness toward certain attributes the rose has, e.g., color. To conclude that the rose is without color because no color is perceived through the observer's senses is to distort the reality of the object being observed IN ONE'S VIEW and IDENTIFICATION of what the object is. Hence, existence is distorted for the observer. He is not perceiving the object as it is. We know that he is not because we can perceive the object's color, at least the color our sense allow us to see. Maybe it's made up of a million different colors that we cannot. My point is that there is no way for the finite observer to know by using sensory perception.

    ReplyDelete
  14. B.C.:

    What exactly is an imagination for?

    To conceive weapons, hunting strategies, and tools that allow us to more effectively survive.

    Of course, to suggest that what is claimed to have been divinely revealed is imagination is merely to beg the question with one’s own imagination.

    Straw man argument -- such was never claimed. You may have imagined such a claim from Dawson's request for a method by which we can reliably distinguish between a “non-physical” object from something only imagined. What was your method?


    ReplyDelete
  15. NAL,

    Your equivocating with your use of "imagination" now.

    "Straw man argument -- such was never claimed."

    What is "such" that was never claimed. Dawson did claim that my view asserted imagination over reason and sensory perception. I simply point out here that what I believe to be a report of reliable information gained through direct experience of the source is not imagination. One must first assume that my belief is false with his own belief, but that then makes his claim purely one of imagination and nothing more, since in the atheist's view there is no one who has experienced the totality of reality directly. He is left with his imagination alone concerning the matter.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Hodge,

    You wrote: “Let me suggest to you that you have not understood my argument, yet again.”

    Then tell you what. Why not lay your argument out in a clear and succinct manner. Number your premises, and make it unmistakably clear what your intended conclusion is.

    You wrote: “The reason why I say this is that you seem completely unaware that the definitions offered to me, both by you and your ilk, all beg your naturalistic worldview.”

    I don’t know what you mean by “beg your naturalistic worldview.” I do have definitions, that’s true. But don’t we all? Perhaps when you lay out your argument succinctly, you can provide definitions for your argument’s key terms.

    You wrote: “If I define existence to include non-perceivable attributes, that consciousness includes a supernatural mind, etc., I'd like to see you work into your conclusions with those assumptions.”

    For one thing, I do not define the concept ‘existence’ in terms of prior or more fundamental concepts. That’s because the concept ‘existence’ is axiomatic: there are no more fundamental concepts. To what would any supposed prior concepts refer if not to something that exists? If they don’t refer to things which exist, what use would they be?

    If I discover that something exists, I’m happy to integrate it into the concept ‘existence’, the widest of all concepts. But if there’s no evidence for something actually existing, then I do not integrate it into the concept ‘existence’. Do you think there’s something wrong with this policy? If so, what exactly do you think problem is?

    You wrote: “It's stacking the deck.”

    I might agree if the definitions were arbitrary or formed expressly for some illicit purpose. But that is not the case with my definitions. So I don’t think there’s any “stacking the deck” on my part.

    You wrote: “Of course, you would argue that one can't use my assumptions and the definitions gained from them because they already preclude any conclusions of naturalism and your views concerning O/objectivism (spell it as your prefer).”

    If your definitions (whatever they may be – I don’t think I’ve seen any yet) assume the primacy of consciousness, then they are to be rejected given their commitment of the fallacy of the stolen concept.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  17. You wrote: “I appreciate the recommendation to read more, and I am certainly not a philosopher, but rather a biblical scholar; but my field discusses these issues quite a bit when it comes to data, and the fallacies often committed therein are also identifiable within what I have read thus far of Rand's Objectivism. It simply cannot function without first assuming definitions of existence, identity, perception, etc. that all accord with an a priori stance of philosophic naturalism.”

    If you think this is what Objectivism does, you clearly don’t know anything about it. Objectivism does not rest on a priori assumptions.

    You wrote: “You cannot win an argument merely by defining things in such a way.”

    Who’s concerned about winning arguments?

    You wrote: “As I said, it only begs the question and then argues that Christians are wrong because they don't let you define the terms according to your worldview.”

    That is not why I think Christians are wrong.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  18. You wrote: “NAL, and apparently you as well, have misconstrued what I was saying. I, at no time, have argued that reality within itself shifts into a distortion because it is not perceived correctly by an observer.”

    Hodge, here is what you wrote: “That the reality of the object's nature is distorted by the dog's faculties is obvious.”

    How do you expect this statement to be understood?

    You wrote: “I am not arguing that what is perceived is not real. I am arguing that perception itself is limited and therefore can distort the observer's view of what is real.”

    Then let’s see your argument for this. So far it appears to me that you’ve simply been asserting that this is the case. Give me an example of a perception which “distort[s] the observer’s view of what is real.” How do you know that a distortion is even involved?

    You wrote: “Hence, reality is distorted for him, not ontologically.”

    I don’t know what this means.

    You wrote: “It is his view of reality that is off.”

    This is why I think you’re confusing perception and identification. When we perceive, we’re merely aware of objects as distinct entities. This is an automatic process of our biology. There’s no distorting going on at this point. Beyond this we need to *choose* to identify things what we perceive, and this is a volitional process which involves the formation of concepts to identify and integrate objects into mental units. Thus we can use the concept ‘man’ for instance to denote *all men* who exist now, who have ever existed and who will exist in the future, and anywhere where they might exist (since time and place are omitted measurements).

    But when you talk about a person’s “view of reality,” it appears that you have in mind an entire network of positions on various matters about reality which are only possible after one has begun forming concepts – i.e., identifying and integrating what one has perceived. Objectivism holds that we should indeed build a view of reality, but that we should do so in a manner that is wholly consistent with the principle of the primacy of existence – i.e., existence exists independent of conscious activity. This would mean, among other things, that perceiving an object does not alter or “distort” an object, that consciousness does not have the ability to distort or alter reality, that one’s faculty of awareness cannot distort “the reality of [an] object’s nature.”

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  19. You wrote: “The dog perceives that no color exists.”

    This would at best be overstating the case. I would say rather that the dog perceives things according to the nature of its perceptual faculties given the make-up of its sensory organs and the way perceptual signals are processed by its nervous system. It does not perceive “no colors exist.” It perceives how it perceives because of its nature and the nature of the objects it perceives. It’s an interactive process.

    You wrote: “Are you actually making the argument that what the dog perceives is real and that the object really has no color, but when I look at it, it suddenly gains color?”

    This is two questions packaged into one. If a dog perceives something, what it perceives is in fact real. It could not perceive something that does not exist. So in answer to the first question, I am affirming that what the dog perceives is real. If it perceives a rose, the rose must be real in order for anything to perceive it.

    The second question ignores the fact that color is part of the form in which an organism perceives something visually. The concept ‘color’ presupposes not only an object which appears a certain color, but also a perceiver which perceives the object in a certain form. For example, an object exists, and when light hits it, it reflects light. That reflected light travels at different wavelengths, and depending on the type of receptor cells in the perceiving organism’s eyes, that light is perceived in the form of one color or another, or in a monochromatic or non-color form (e.g., shades of grey). This is a phenomenon called perceptual relativity. You won’t learn about it by studying the bible. But you can learn about it from David Kelley, for instance, who discusses it in his book The Evidence of the Senses.

    My point is that when you compare how a dog perceives a rose with how a human being perceives a rose, simply because one species perceives without color variation while the other does, it does not mean that either the dog’s or the human being’s perceptual faculties are “distorting” the rose. Such a conclusion is drawn in haste typically because one fails to take into account the nature of perception in general and perceptual relatively in particular. The result is an instance of the fallacy of the stolen concept: it affirms a concept (in this case ‘distort’) while ignoring or denying its genetic roots. Ask yourself: What exactly is allegedly being “distorted” here? Earlier you affirmed that “the reality of the object's nature is distorted by the dog's faculties.” Then when you are challenged on this, you say that “reality is distorted for him, not ontologically”; and then you say “It is his view of reality that is off.” It changes every time you try to state your position.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  20. You wrote: “Obviously, you think that I am somehow saying this, but it's the exact opposite of what I am saying. The object is real. It is being perceived, but we do not have the ability to know whether we are capable of perceiving all of its attributes or only some of them.”

    Actually we do have the ability to discover that we have not perceived all of an object’s attributes. For instance, when my wife brings home a sandwich from the supermarket and I look at it from the outside, I see bread and a little bit of meat and cheese poking out the edges. Then when I bite into it, I discover that there are other ingredients in the sandwich that I did not initially perceive, such as mayo sauce and a tomato. As we explore things, we are definitely in a vantage to discover new attributes about the objects we perceive. So I don’t accept what you say here at all.

    You wrote: “To make a judgment, i.e., an identification, of the object is to assume a sufficient amount of knowledge about the object to do so. But there is no way of knowing this.”

    I don’t think this is necessarily true either. We can make tentative identifications based on what we do in fact observe directly, all the while recognizing that there is more that we can learn about an object. Identification does not require omniscience; indeed, omniscience would make the task of identifying completely redundant. Reason is the means by which we discover the nature of objects – and continue discovering the nature of things we have already perceived and identified. What’s more, reason enables us to detect and correct errors. But generally speaking, this process – identifying what we have perceived – is only possible after we have perceived something.

    You wrote: “Identity, then, can only be for conventional purposes of distinguishing objects AS WE PERCEIVE THEM, but not as they are.”

    This is like saying one can only experience San Francisco as approached by I-80 or Highway 1, etc., but never as it “really is.” Since perception is perception of an object(s), perception gives us direct awareness of objects. Thus we are aware of objects directly. We are not perceiving something other than the object we are perceiving. But that is what the view you state here requires us to suppose. But there’s no good reason for supposing this.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  21. You wrote: “Hence, our perception of objects and the true identity of objects themselves may have little to no correlation between them, as they do not with the dog concluding that the object is colorless.”

    Two points here:

    First, the notion that “our perception of objects the true identity of objects themselves may have little to no correlation between” can and should be dismissed. That’s because perception is causal, and involved in the causality of perception is the object being perceived. The nature of the object contributes to the perceptual process, such as an object’s ability to reflect certain wavelengths and intensities of light. So to say that there may be “little to no correlation between” an object and one’s perception of it, is to ignore the interactive nature of perception.

    Second, when you say that the dog concluded “that the object is colorless,” you’ve moved well beyond perception and into the realm of inference, which is a conceptual process. So already you’re losing sight of the original issue.

    You wrote: “I would also shy away from arguing from technicalities in definitions in the sense that my definitions are not usually what your group means when you use them.”

    Definitions are certainly important. But what are your definitions? And, importantly, where do you get your definitions? I would think that, since the Christian bible is supposed to be, well, your bible, you would have biblical definitions. But the issues that have come up in this discussion are nowhere addressed in the bible. It’s as though its authors were completely unaware of them. And given what poor thinkers they clearly were, I would strongly recommend not being so eager to put stock in much of what is found in the bible. But I realize you want to take what the bible affirms as truth, so my caution will likely fall on deaf ears in your case.

    You wrote: “Communication is facilitated by cooperation in allowing one to define his own terms.”

    I’m all for all parties to communication making their definitions clear, and being willing to defend them if they’re challenged, or to revise them if they are found defective. I would also emphasize that definition is a crucial step in concept-formation, and thus a theory of definition would come under the heading of a theory of concepts proper. But where would you as a Christian get a theory of concepts? There is no theory of concepts to be found in the bible. And given that Christianity has been splintered into quarreling factions since even the days of the apostle Paul, even if one were to point to some theory of concepts and call it distinctively Christian (and I’ve never encountered one), there would likely be multitudes of Christian adherents who rejected it.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  22. You wrote: “Maybe I'm using perception and I mean what perception does in identifying an object.”

    Just as you recognize the need to be clear in our definitions, we also need to be very clear in what is meant by ‘perception’ here. In philosophy, perception proper is not equated with “understanding” or “judgment” or “intuitive grasp,” but rather the process by which sensory qualities are automatically integrated into percepts which give us awareness of objects as distinct entities.

    “A ‘perception’ is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things.” (Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 19)

    Perception is automatic, direct awareness of an object as a distinct entity. It is not the same thing as identification. Identification is a conceptual process, undertaken volitionally; we do not automatically identify things. We choose to identify things. When we identify an object, are are singling it out, isolating it from all the other things we are perceiving. Thus there are many things that we perceive which we do not and possibly never will identify. A good demonstration of this is when you’re driving down a street you’ve never been on before. You focus on identifying only those things which you judge to be relevant to your task of safely and successfully driving yourself to your destination; you will perceive many things in your visual field, but most of them you’ll just pass by without ever identifying. But you did perceive them, even if only for a brief instant. So there’s a fundamental distinction here to keep in mind.

    You wrote: “Maybe I, as someone not trained in philosophy, am using the terms differently than their technical use. That’s very possible.”

    It’s not so much as a matter of technicality, but clarity and consistency. We should have a clear understanding of what we mean by the terms we use, and we should use them consistently. Again, I don’t think you’ll learn about these things by reading the bible.

    You wrote: “The easy thing to do if one wants to win an argument through posturing is to assume that one can win by proving a different use of terms.”

    I’ll leave such concerns to those who are more concerned with winning arguments than with discovering and validating truth. To be sure, you are dealing with someone who does not think that the purpose of definitions is to win debates.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  23. You wrote: “I likely am using terms differently than Rand, but then I also would since her definitions are not based upon my worldview but hers.”

    So what then is the specifically Christian definition of ‘perception’? Where do you get this definition? How do you know it accurately isolates the essentials denoted by the concept ‘perception’? Or, do you think definitions have a different task? If so, what do you think that task is, and where do you learn about these things?

    Also, if you have a different definition for ‘perception’, do you have a different concept to denote what Objectivism means by ‘perception’? Clearly we perceive objects as distinct entities. Objectivism has identified this form of awareness. If you have a different understanding of ‘perception’, what concept do you use to identify the form of awareness which Objectivism denotes as perception?

    You wrote: “But none of that is essential to what I was arguing. To focus on such things is to evidence a desire to obscure the argument, rather than illumine it in order that one might make it clear and refute it.”

    Why not simply lay out your argument in a clear and succinct manner, make it clear what your premises are and what conclusion you think they support, state your definitions, and stop worrying about such trivialities? One of the relevant issues that I’ve detected on several occasions so far is that (a) you make statements that seem quite inordinate, and (b) when readers inquire on those statements you accuse them of misconstruing what you’ve stated and then state something that is different from what you previously stated. So there seems to be some shape-shifting going on, in which case it makes it pretty much impossible to know what exactly you’re trying to argue and how exactly you’re trying to argue it.

    You wrote: “Your answers to me evidence nothing but a desire to win an argument, absent of any intent to consider the argument made.”

    I don’t think that’s true at all. I’ve tried my best to correct what I think are major philosophical errors in what you’ve presented so far. It’s not motivated by a desire to win an argument, but to enlighten readers who might otherwise be misled.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  24. You wrote: “Indeed, to consider it would cost too much to the neo-atheist, as he wants to continually paint himself as the intellectual superior to his religious counterparts. Yet, as I have argued, and I think anyone with common sense would admit, one must begin his arguments by stating his beliefs and then work out from there. Anything else is academic dishonesty.”

    Or, do as I suggested in my first blog entry dealing with your writings: identify your starting point and the means by which you’re (supposedly) aware of what you take your starting point to be.

    You wrote: “That said, my statement concerning your argument, that ‘the idea that physical objects make up the sum total of reality is a metaphysic that cannot be confirmed through sensory perception (yet, he still affirms it in his definition of reality)’ uses imprecise language. I should have said, rather, that your view assumes that there is only a naturalistic component to reality that can either be perceived through the human senses or reasoned to using what is perceived by the human senses’."

    Actually, my view does not make this assumption. Specifically, I do not begin with some a priori commitment to the view you attribute to me and then use that to guide my assessments and conclusions. Rather, I start the only place I can start: by looking outward, with perceptual awareness of objects that come into contact with my senses. It is on this basis – on the basis of direct perceptual input – that I begin the task of identifying the most basic facts, beginning with the fact that existence exists. I.e., there is a reality. This is fundamental, it is conceptually irreducible, it is directly perceived, and it is implicit in all awareness, even conceptual awareness. So I am not beginning with some “assumption” that “there is only a naturalistic component to reality.” One of the discoveries I’ve made and factor into my worldview is the fact that there is a distinction between the objects I perceive and the conscious activity by which I perceive them, and also that the objects of awareness exist and are what they are independent of consciousness. In other words, existence holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness: existence does not conform to the contents of consciousness, but rather consciousness, in order to identify the objects of awareness on their own terms – i.e., in accordance to their nature, must conform to the objects of awareness. This implies yet a further fact, of which I am wholly aware, namely the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. So while I am fully capable of imagining invisible magic beings, I recognize that I am in fact merely imagining, and also that what I am imagining is not real. Hence my question to you: how can I reliably distinguish between what you might call a “non-physical” object and something you may merely be imagining? If what you call a “non-physical” object is in fact a mind-independent entity, then you should be able to articulate a reliable method by which I can do this. But so far you haven’t done this. But surely it seems you should agree that, given the fundamental distinction between reality and imagination, this is an important matter for those who affirm the existence of “non-physical” objects – indeed, “supernatural beings” – to contemplate and address.

    You wrote: “Your argument, as well as all of your definitions, beg this assumption.”

    But as should be clear now, I don’t even make this assumption in the first place. So you are speaking in haste here, on the basis of your own assumptions rather than on the basis of knowing the method which my worldview actually applies.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  25. You wrote: “Now, you want me to show you how your terms beg the questions? I think you can prove it to yourself if you just do the opposite of what you, and Robert, have done with me. Assume my definitions that assume my worldview and then argue from there. Assume consciousness is primarily rooted in a soul and that the brain is secondary mechanism used to function through a physical body in a world which has a physical component to it. Assume that existence includes things that cannot be perceived by the human, as though the human's perceptions and identifications had anything to do with the nature of existence itself. You'll find your arguments to fall flat as they assume what my definitions and ultimate beliefs do not assume.”

    But to do this, we would have to jettison facts that we have already discovered and validated. So why should we deny what we know to be true? That’s not begging the question. That’s simply being consistent with the facts that we have discovered. Consciousness is biological. All examples of objectively verifiable consciousness that we have discovered in reality are faculties of biological organisms, whether they are human beings, dogs, fish, snails, etc. We know what physiological structures are responsible for sensation and we know that consciousness develops with the maturity of an organism just as do its other biological functions. There’s no *objective* basis to suppose that consciousness has its source in some supernatural realm which is available to us exclusively by means of imagination. I can imagine invisible conscious beings which float around and have magical powers, for example, but I already know that there’s a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. Integrating these facts, which I know to be true, is not an instance of begging the question or circular reasoning. If you think it is, you need to revisit your logic texts and recognize that logic requires content, and the only content suitable for knowledge of reality is content that is objective in nature. A person might feel comforted by imagining supernatural spirits and hoping that they’re real, but such a process is not a means of identifying reality. Robert and I recognize this. As one pastor once said, “You know too much.” In essence, he was right: I’m aware of too many facts which vie entirely against the mysticism of god-belief, whether Christian or otherwise.

    You wrote: “That was my original, and total, objection to Rand's argument.”

    But where have you interacted with any of Rand’s arguments? I haven’t seen it.

    You wrote: “It assumes a worldview in order to get her definitions that then supposedly prove her worldview, but that worldview cannot be substantiated by what we perceive without first assuming it.”

    I don’t know what you’ve read, but I already know that this is not Rand’s methodology. I’m supposing that you read something in the Objectivist literature, perhaps by Rand herself, bristled in emotional reaction to it, and then supposed that this must be what she’s doing, probably given the fact, known to you at the time, that Rand was an atheist and that her worldview is incompatible with your god-belief. But without knowing the specifics (which you have not presented), I can only suppose that this is what happened (as I’ve seen it many, many times with other Christians).

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  26. You wrote: “Hence, only the concepts that are valid are valid because they are gained from our sensory perception, then the nature of reality, that she merely assumes in her worldview, cannot be valid.”

    I’d like to know where Rand states this. Rather, her view is that the only concepts that are valid are those which are formed on the basis of objective input and by means of an objective process. Rand wrote a book about this, so her method is available for anyone to examine.

    I had written: “When one calls something ‘non-physical’, he seems only to be indicating what it is not, not what it is. But objects which exist have positive identity; they are not merely negations floating around."

    You wrote: “Because we think analogically, so I can only use what I have experienced in order to explain what I have not. Hence, I use the physical to merely given an analogy as the antithesis of the non-physical.”

    So are you saying that you have not experienced a “non-physical” object?

    You wrote: “But I can assign positive attributes to it.”

    But if you haven’t experienced a “non-physical” object, on what basis do you do this? If you’re aware of positive attributes that what you call a “non-physical” object is supposed to have, why not denote it according to these rather than denoting it by negation? How do you discover what “positive attributes” a “non-physical” object has? How do you determine that it is “non-physical” in the first place? What steps can I perform to come to the same knowledge of these things that you claim to possess? Is it simply accepting some report as true without any independent means available of validating that report? Or, did you perform some objective process by which you discovered the existence of a “non-physical” object (without experiencing it), reliably determined that it is in fact “non-physical,” and reliably distinguish it from something you may merely be imagining?

    You wrote: “I just have to use analogy in order to do it.”

    What exactly does that mean? Is this because you simply don’t know how else to assign attributes to something you call “non-physical”? What are these positive attributes any way? And how do you know that they belong to what you call “non-physical” objects? Do you just make them up? Or is there some objective method that you use? If it’s the latter, can you spell out the steps you take to make these determinations?

    You wrote: “Thus is the nature of finite beings in a box.”

    It sounds like you want to claim knowledge but at the same time are saying that it’s knowledge that no one could acquire, that we’re trapped in some way and thus can do nothing to come to the knowledge you claim, albeit analogically, to have. I don’t know how else to integrate what you’re saying at this point.

    [continued…]

    ReplyDelete
  27. You wrote: “Only the objects perceived inside the box can be used to define objects outside of it.”

    So what you call “non-physical” objects are outside your box? Then how do you identify them? How could you even have awareness of them? How do you know that you’re not making a mistake when you identify them as one thing as opposed to another, or have one set of attributes as opposed to another? What method do you have to guard against error????

    You wrote: “To say there are no objects outside of it because of that, or to argue that such makes speaking about them meaningless, depends upon whether you believe one from outside the box has communicated to those inside the box, using their analogical thinking, to convey important elements of existence to them.”

    Well, I can always imagine that there’s “one from outside the box” as it were that has “communicated” to me. But I am already aware of what it means to imagine something, and I’m also aware of the fact that there’s a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. If I cannot reliably distinguish this “one from outside the box” which has allegedly “communicated” to whomever from what may merely be a figment of someone’s imagination, then I have no objective basis to accept such claims as legitimate knowledge of reality. Do you think I should ignore this and believe anyway? If so, why? My mind and is content are extremely important to me. I don’t “just believe” everything people tell me. Again, “you know too much,” so I’ve been told.

    You wrote: “Do you think that describing ‘dark matter’ is also something that indicates dark matter is meaningless and should be either described without analogy or discarded as a concept?”

    I don’t think I’ve ever seen a description of ‘dark matter’, so I couldn’t say. But I’m willing to grant that there may be descriptions of ‘dark matter’ that are meaningless. I do know that in my life, I have never found the need for such a concept.

    You wrote: “It is my very worldview that believes that such analogies should be made. It is your very worldview that believes there is no need to do so since nothing outside the box exists.”

    It depends what “the box” is intended to represent. We hold that existence exists and only existence exists. If something exists, it exists and is part of existence. The non-existent does not exist. Also, my worldview holds that there’s a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. Most people implicitly recognize this distinction, but not everyone consistently acknowledges it in all their thinking. We think people should. Do you think that’s wrong?

    Regards,
    Dawson

    ReplyDelete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.