Wednesday, September 30, 2015

A Lament for the Unbeliever

Unbelief is appealing, not because it is intellectually satisfying, but because it is fun. We disguise it as sophisticated with sophistry and posturing, but in the end, it is intellectually bankrupt, showing itself to be stupidity rather than stupendously coherent.

But aside from our exaltation of it, it is a pseudo-intellectualism, a deformed philosophy, that brings forth deformed creatures.

And this is the judgment of God at its beginning. Not fire from heaven, but a giving over to become less human. The more God gives one over, the more unbelief takes hold, the less a human becomes a human and the more he or she becomes some malformed creature, a creature, not meant for this world, but of chaos, of the abyss, belonging to something like the demons that are described, not even as animals, but as hybrids, distorted and dying.

We see, then, that unbelief is a journey of becoming, but not of becoming a created human, greater than the angels, but becoming something lower than a dog, feeding on whatever passions enslave it to speak and act in the moment: to kill, to bark nonsense continually, to eat itself to death, or lick itself in public. The mind becomes cruder, the mouth becomes ruder, company becomes lewder.

And only in the end will this golem of a creature be thrown into a place where it belongs, a place of chaos, a place where mutants dwell. It is a place that is made for such worthless beings, a place of fire, of darkness, outside the created order where fully formed beings dwell. Such creatures mimic the condition of their eternal destination in the here and now.

As Peter says, there is nothing left for them but to be caged and destroyed like a rabid animal.

What a sad state for this, what we can only call, "thing," both in our day and in that one. Licking up its own vomit, eternally degenerating into something it was never made to be. Enslaved forever by its mental, emotional, and spiritual retardation, a twisted mass of nothingness, it becomes an appropriate dwelling place for blind and deaf spirits, and demons seek it out like zombies feeding on brains.

A hatred for those who are truly human, and the God who creates them by ordering and giving them healthy minds that lead to life, is all that is left. These creatures feed on humans. They desire for all to be ruined as they are, and only those who bind themselves to the Creator will be truly created and escape them. Believers are given eyes to see. That's what believing God does. And they can see clearly what these sad souls cannot . . . that unbelief is anything but fun.

Monday, June 29, 2015

The One Who Denies That Jesus Is Coming in the Flesh

Important in discussing the Second Coming with JW’s and Full Preterists is whether Christ will be physically seen, or whether He will merely come again in some spiritual way. Of course, everyone acknowledges that Christ spiritually receives His kingdom through various returns throughout church history, beginning when He is delivered up in judgment before the Sanhedrin. However, the question is whether there will be a final reception of the kingdom, when the already (spiritual)-not yet (physical)has become one in the future.


One of the more helpful texts in this discussion is 2 John 7.  In the Greek, the text clearly states that it is a heresy to deny that Jesus is coming again physically:

“Because many deceivers went out into the world, those who do not confess Jesus Christ is coming in flesh. This is the deceiver and the antichrist.”

The Greek participle here is erchomenon, which seems to become an almost terminus technicus in the New Testament and early Christianity for the multiple comings of Christ, both in terms of His “not yet” and future reception of His entire kingdom (all heaven and earth) and in terms of the “already” sense of His receiving His kingdom (see ). The present participle of erchomai is the common way to express a future event or action of someone who “will come,” but Christ’s reception of His kingdom, present or future, is often described with the present participle (Matt 16:28; 24:30; 26:64; Mark 13:26; 14:62; Luke 21:27). Compare also the substantival participial forms in Revelation 1:4, 8; 4:8, and 11:17: ho erchomenos “the one who is coming” (present aspect – future referring) in contrast to the one who is (present aspect - present referring) and the one who was (imperfect aspect – past referring). 

What the text teaches is, however, widely unknown, largely due to an unfortunate misunderstanding in its translation. Many interpreters and translators simply thought that John was saying the same thing that he had said in his first epistle. Hence, they translate and interpret it according to what they think is the sense of it. One can see this confusion by looking at some of the English translations that interpret the text as John conveying the same concept that he expresses in his first epistle concerning Christ’s physical incarnation.

The NIV translates erchomenon as “has come in the flesh,”  the NRSV and NASB as “as coming in the flesh,” implying a stative (i.e., “as having come in the flesh), and the YLT attempts a various ambiguous translation, “Jesus Christ coming in flesh,” still seemingly implying a past event with the present participle.

The KJV translates it as “is come in the flesh,” which is likely the source of confusion for all of the other translations and interpretations, although it continues a tradition of early English Bibles (i.e., Wycliffe, Purvey, Tyndale, and the Geneva) that ignore the present and translate it as a perfect . The translation “is come,” in English, is a stative idea conveyed by the Perfect aspect in Greek. Hence, even though it sounds like a present to use the English word “is,” the idea of “is come” focuses on the present state of a past result. In other words, “is come” in English is  a perfect, not a present. Hence, to translate the present in Greek as a perfect obscures the actual meaning. 

We translate perfects this way all the time. For instance, “it is written” is often an English translation of the Perfect that expresses the state of what is written. It was actually written in the past, but it still exists in the text to this day.
However, the Present does not convey the same idea. The Present is an “unfolding” aspect, where the author chooses to use it to convey something in process. Contextually, then, it can be molded to refer to any time in the past, present, or future. The issue, therefore, is not one of grammar so much, but of the way that John, and to a larger extant, the New Testament, uses this particular grammar to convey a future idea in contrast to one that is in the past. When referencing the incarnation, John, in his first epistle, uses the Perfect, i.e., “has come in the flesh,” “is come in the flesh.” In 2 John, however, the formula has been purposely altered to conform to the common expression of Christ’s eschatological return, “is coming in the flesh.” 

 We do the same thing in English. If an event is future, we typically say we “are coming” (present) to refer to something we will do in the future. Hence, the present tense, often when used with the word “come,” is future-referring. This same idea holds true for the Greek. As Lieu states:

Particularly striking here, however, is that the present participle “coming” (erchomenon) replaces the perfect participle of 1 John 4:2, “having come,” while the prepositional “in flesh” instead of preceding the participle follows it, although it is a moot point whether this gives it less significance. A number of translations ignore this present tense and treat it as if it were past, “has come,” merely repeating 1 John 4:2 (NRSV); this, however, is not what the participle means, and to translate so fails to explain why the author, if dependent on the passage in 1 John, has made the change—even if he had an aversion to the perfect he could have used an aorist tense. Similarly, attempts to suggest that the present tense expresses a timeless truth or continuous reality clash both with the inherent idea of the verb and with the precision implied by “in flesh.”
It is, however, the nature of the verb that the present participle can have a future reference: “Jesus Christ (as) the one to come in flesh.” The earliest known writer to cite 2 John, Irenaeus, used a chain of Johannine passages—2 John 7; 1 John 4:1-3; John 1:14; 1 John 5:1—to make this precise point: “knowing the same Jesus Christ, to whom were opened the gates of heaven because of his enfleshed assumption, who also in the same flesh in which he suffered, will come [future] revealing the glory of the Father (Against Heresies 3.16.8). The future fleshly coming was a common concern of the period, more frequently made by an appeal to Acts 1:11 (“in the same manner”). Although rarely taken up by translations and less favored among modern commentators, a continuing line of interpretation has seen in 2 John 7 a defense of the expectation of a fleshly parousia. Such a reference cannot be excluded, and might cohere with the warning against eschatological loss of a reward in the following verse.”[1]

Lieu here alludes to a host of modern commentators, largely of the more liberal variety, that do not care to take this statement as referring to the future advent of Christ. One might assume that this is for the obvious reasons that many liberal commentators share the same assumptions about the Second Coming that the Docetic Gnostics held, i.e., that the Second Coming is a spiritual event, not a physical one where Christ literally returns in the same body with which He rose from the grave. 

For instance, Dodd goes so far as to say that the text’s plain reading to anyone who knows Greek would obviously convey the idea that the author was referring to Christ’s Second Coming.[2] He then, however, proceeds to denigrate the author of the Second Epistle by saying that he must not be versed in the subtleties of the Greek language: “We shall perhaps do best to assume that our writer is not skilled in the niceties of Greek idiom, and to understand the present passage in light of the First Epistle.”[3]

Apart from appealing to an idea that denies the meaning of the text as it is written, however, Dodd is correct to admit that the Greek is clear enough to convey the idea that the author is referencing the future coming of Christ, not His incarnation. This is because the Docetic Gnostics not only denied that Jesus had come in the flesh, but because of their denial of His physical entrance into the world, they also denied that he would return in the flesh. If Christ had not come in the flesh in the first place, it was hardly true that He would return in a physical body He never took on in the world. We, perhaps, see this same denial in Paul’s reference to the heresy of Hymanaeus and Philetus in 2 Timothy 2:17-18, where the two men are able to assert that the resurrection has already taken place simply because Christ was not returning physically and the resurrection was not a physical event.

Hence, John intentionally changes the tense of the participle from perfect, which is past-referring in the context, to the present , which is future-referring in the context, in order to combat the same heresy that denied the physical appearance of Christ, both in His incarnation, as John addresses in 1 John, and in His return, as John now addresses in his second epistle.

Hence, the text reads as follows:

“Because many deceivers went out [aorist: past-referring] into the world, those who do not confess [present substantival participle: present-referring] Jesus Christ is coming [present: future-referring] in flesh. This is [present: present-referring] the deceiver and the antichrist.”

Hence, what one can see here is that John is presenting the idea that a denial of the Jesus Christ who is coming in the flesh is a denial of the true Jesus Christ, and confuses the true Jesus Christ with the antichrist, a replacement Christ that is of a different nature and purpose. The Christ who does not physically return is not the Christ of the gospel. 
The physical Christ returns to reclaim the physical as His own in biblical theology. All creation, physical and spiritual, in heaven and earth, belongs to Him. Hence, He is the Savior of the world by redeeming both spiritual and physical aspects of it. As it has often been said in Christian theology, what He assumes, He redeems. Since Christ assumes the physical, He redeems the physical. A Christ who does not do this is not the Christ of the Bible. 

This is why John places such a heavy emphasis on affirming the truth of Christ’s physical ministry: incarnation, propitiation in His blood, and physical return.

One sees this warning in the very statements of Christ when He tells His disciples that the message of the false Christs will be that the “time is engus.” Whereas, most interpreters think that the Greek word engus means “near” in terms of “approaching,” what it actually means is “near” in terms of present access, in one’s presence, something that is here. Hence, the message of the false Christ’s is that the Second Coming is here ( i.e., He has returned already) even though Christ has not physically returned. In opposition to this, Christ tells His disciples that His coming will be a visible advent where He will be seen coming with His holy angels. 

In John’s Apocalypse, the reader is told that “every eye will see Him, even those who pierced Him.” John talks about the bodies of believers being made like His body when He becomes visible at His Second Coming in his first epistle (2:28-3:3). This is His physical appearing and return to His people, not His people’s appearing before Him, as the grammar and terminology indicate. Hence, it cannot be speaking about one’s time of death.

And, of course, this is the “not yet” portion of the “already-not yet” theology of the New Testament that can be seen in Jesus’ words in John 5:19-30 and Paul’s argument in Romans 5-8, consistent as well with Acts 1:11 and early Christian expectation.


[1] Judith M. Lieu, I, II, & III John: A Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008) 253-254.
[2] C. H. Dodd, The Johannine Epistles (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946) 149.
[3] Ibid.

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

What Leads to Divorcing God?

Originally posted July 9, 2012


Our relationship with God is often described (collectively at least) as a marriage. So many seem to enter into that marriage covenant, but end up turning away from the true God in the long run. Why is that?

One of the major reasons I think this is the case is because people often don't "fall in love" with the whole person to whom they are married. Instead, a person will latch on to certain attributes and overemphasize those attributes as encompassing the whole person. Thus, these loveable attributes overshadow other attributes that may be less charming to the specific individual. This is called the halo effect.

We see it when a young girl can't see that the guy she's dating is a complete jerk. That's because there is some charming quality, or qualities, about him that diminish the less than charming attributes and he is perceived just in terms of those charming attributes.

What happens then is that she gets married to the guy. The halo effect slowly disappears, and she ends up seeing all of him. She then thinks, "Who is this? I don't even know this person anymore." Actually, it was that she never knew him in the first place. Her love was never based on knowledge of his whole person, and so her love was never of his whole person, just of an imaginary character that her husband once played in her delusion. She then begins to look for a "better" partner (what this usually means is she looks for someone else with whom she can do the exact same thing), or no partner at all. In other words, she chooses detachment from her covenant promise by divorce/adultery. She chooses either to remain single at that point, perhaps, realizing that the guy she imagined is not out there at all, or she chooses a different guy. The point is that she never knew the person to whom she was married. She never made a commitment to him at all. She merely had a fanciful relationship with a delusion. Her spouse was never loved by her, because he was never really known by her, and once he was known, all of his attributes displayed, he was rejected by her for having said attributes.

This is the same thing that often happens with God. People love someone who loves them. People love someone who is sacrificial, merciful, compassionate, etc. But people do not love someone who demands obedience, is condemning of their wayward beliefs and deeds, and who is exclusive, rejecting those who are not in accord with his standards. Hence, when God is accepted by many individuals today, He is accepted as the "loving and gracious God," which then overshadows His other attributes of holiness and being just. He hates sin and is wrathful toward those who practice it without the fear of retribution. But all of this is not usually seen by so many. When they finally come into contact with all of who God is, they are appalled, as our rebellious and corrupt minds and hearts hate authority and a holiness that places us in a less than positive light.

When one of these individuals comes into contact with all of who God is, they want a divorce. They may become atheists, or they go off to some other religion that is "less judgmental," which is connected to the idea of God's holiness and justice, or they may simply still attend a fellowship and call themselves "Christians," but simply reject the God of the whole Bible for the God of half the Bible.

This last group is sort of like the woman who never finds out who her husband is, and instead, desires to live in a delusion. She, in all reality, hates her husband and loves someone else who is not her husband. She just thinks of her husband as that someone else.

Churches have helped in this delusion, as many pastors are equally deluded. They have a half-revealed God, because half truths allow us to distort the truth via willful ignorance. A half truth is a lie, not because it is not true in context of other truths, but because it lacks those other truths to clarify and define the whole truth. It's like saying, "If you jump out of a plane, you'll be fine," and leave out the part where such is only true in the context of one wearing a parachute. Half truths are false truths (if I can put it that way). Likewise, loving half the character of a person is not loving the person at all, as in reality, the truth of who that person really is is not known, and in fact, he would be hated if he was fully known. That person has been rejected for another within the imagination of his spouse.

This is why Jonathan Edwards once argued that one can only finally come to know that he is a Christian who has fully embraced God when he loves God's holiness as much as His other attributes. By nature, we are children of wrath, but we want to see ourselves as good and saved. God's holiness tells us otherwise, so it is something we hate. We hate God's condemning of sins of which we approve. We hate God's wrath upon the Canaanites for their sins when their sins look a lot like ours. We hate God's wrath upon sinners in hell when those sinners look a lot like us as well. We hate God's holiness because it demands of us that we must be holy as well, and we don't want a Holy God, just a gracious God who overlooks sin.

But the Christian has been transformed by God's love to see all of God as good and loveable. He is given a new heart to love what is good despite himself. He understands the gospel fully, rather than only partially, because he understands the holiness of God and what it demanded of us. And, through trial and tribulation, he seeks to become what he loves. The real Christian never divorces God, because he fell in love with all of who God is, not just a god who was glued together from different parts of the Bible outside of their context of His whole character revealed upon all of its pages.

The truth is, we have a lot of "Christians" who divorced God a long time ago. We also have a lot of atheists and other religious adherents who were supposedly once married to God as well. But the point I'm making here is that none of these people were ever married to Him, because they never knew Him, nor were they known by Him. They were always lovers of another god. Such a thing always leads to divorce in one way or another, and so it does with God as well.




For this is a rebellious people, false sons,  Sons who refuse to listen  To the instruction of the Lord; Who say to the seers, "You must not see [visions]";  And to the prophets, "You must not prophesy to us what is right,  Speak to us pleasant words,  Prophesy illusions. "Get out of the way, turn aside from the path,  Let us hear no more about the Holy One of Israel." (Isa 30:9-11)

"For your  husband  is your Maker, Whose name is the Lord of hosts; And your Redeemer is the Holy One of Israel, Who is called the God of all the earth. (Isa 54:5)

God says, "If a  husband  divorces his wife  And she goes from him  And belongs to another man, Will he still return to her? Will not that land be completely polluted?  But you are a harlot [with] many lovers;  Yet you turn to Me," declares the Lord. (Jer 3:1)

Tuesday, November 18, 2014

The Human Faces of Polemics: What Thom Stark's Book Reveals When It Gets Scholarly Methodology Wrong (And Why Liberal Scholarship Tries to Hide It)



This is a short critique of Thom Stark's The Human Faces of God: What Scripture Reveals When It Gets God Wrong (And Why Inerrancy Tries to Hide It) published by Wipf & Stock.

Apart from noting the incredibly arrogant title, the idea that "inerrancy" tries to hide something, rather than "inerrantists," may sound less confrontational, but is extremely nonsensical nonetheless. Ideas don't try to hide things. People do. But, in good humor, I've done the same above to mimic this. Now on to a more serious critique. 

 Stark's main argument, that the Bible is full of contradictory theological teachings (and therefore, sometimes "gets God wrong," is supported by a host of misinterpretations garnered from Stark’s ignorance of the historical, social, and literary context of the passages he cites. This leads him into a host of logical, factual, and linguistic errors in his overly-sensationalized attempt to show the Bible to be riddled with theological error.
1.       Stark argues that the Bible contradicts itself in terms of whether God judges children for the sins of their parents. He fails to note in the passages he cites, however, the very nuanced approach the Bible takes toward such an idea.
a.       The Bible never teaches the idea that children in the household are separate individuals from their parents. Hence, to punish a man is to punish all of his possessions, which includes all of the people (e.g., children) of a household. This is clear from the passages that Stark mentions concerning children being punished with their parents.
b.      The claim that God does not judge the sons for the sins or righteousness of the fathers is referring to sons who are no longer of the household and have made individual choices as independent entities. This is made clear by the description of what the sons might do in passages such as Ezekiel 18 (i.e., murder, commit adultery with another man’s wife, etc.). This is hardly referring to little children, and indeed, refers to an individual who has parted ways with the ways of his father.
c.       That God visits the judgment of fathers upon their sons, even to the third and fourth generation, refers to those who continue to hate God (i.e., those who do not part from the ways of the father but instead continue in their father’s rebellion, thus receiving the wrath of God, which the Bible pictures as something that is cumulative when sons do not depart from the wicked ways of their fathers.
d.      One may not like this idea, but this hardly shows the Bible to contradict itself. Instead, the contradiction is between our contemporary culture, its modern sensibilities, and the Bible; but this is hardly what Stark intends to show. Hence, his argument fails here.
2.       Stark attempts to argue that some passages argue in favor of “xenophobic” behavior, whereas others argue for more open relations with people of other nations.
a.       What Stark calls “xenophobia” is a religious concern in the passages he cites, not an ethnic one. In fact, in the same books that make such claims against taking women who worship other gods are indications that such is merely religious in nature (e.g., The Book of Numbers, which presents Moses as taking an Ethiopian woman for a wife, after having been married to a Midianite woman, and yet, presents marrying Midianite women as evil. There are nuances in the text that Stark’s approach simply misses, intentionally so, in order to make his argument. Another example might be the fact that Malachi is in the context of Ezra-Nehemiah, and vice versa. The problem is clearly marrying the daughters of foreign gods, not ethnicity. (See also the Deuteronomic passages that both forbid marriage with pagans under condemnation for idolatry and permit marriage with foreign women who are not.)
b.      Stark here, of course, commits an egregious fallacy in his argument; and as it pervades his entire discourse, we will see it time and time again. This fallacy is a linguistic one and a bit of sleight of hand by Stark, one which I am sure he does not realize he is making. This, of course, is that his argument is intending to show that the Bible contradicts itself; but he does this by critiquing individual passages that are not the Bible. Let me explain. The Bible is the entire entity of what orthodox Christians believe is the Word of God. This is what Stark is attempting to pull apart as errant. However, in order to do so, Stark must make the Bible into individual pieces that are no longer the Bible, but passages ripped out of that context and placed within alternate contexts in order to say something different than what they say in the context of the Bible as a whole. The problem is that orthodox Christians don’t believe these individual passages communicate what the Bible says as a whole. They merely contribute to the larger picture of what the whole Bible says. Hence, it is much like hearing a point made by a speaker and ignoring any qualifications and nuances that speaker makes to clarify his point. One could then take the whole discourse of that speaker and turn it against itself by ignoring these nuances, taking them out separately from one another, and then pitting them against one another, as though the speaker had contradicted himself, rather than clarified his statements with nuanced qualifications. It’s really a major fallacy of communication that refuses to participate in the communicative process with the speaker simply because one either doesn’t have the linguistic and logical ability to take things in context, or because one merely wants to prove that the speaker should not be trusted. I’m afraid Stark’s book seems to be a bit of both. If Stark wants to make his case against the Bible of evangelicals (his foil), he’s going to have to engage with their concept of the Bible, not a linguistically fallacious hybrid that seems to make up his own. Unfortunately, Stark not only does this with the Bible as a whole, but also with individual texts, as we will see.
3.       Stark attempts to argue that the Bible teaches child sacrifice. This is accomplished by taking a text out of its current context and speculating as to what the history of a word, phrase, or sentence may have been in an ancient Canaanite/Paleo-Israelite context.
a.       The problem, of course, is that this commits the fallacy above. All scholars agree that when one takes these passages in their literary biblical contexts, they do not teach child sacrifice, but rather child dedication. This etymological fallacy is well known by most scholars, and yet, such a diachronic methodology to answer a question that only a synchronic investigation can answer is absolutely needed if one is to buy into Stark’s argument here. For those of us who are linguistically trained, we’ll keep our money in our pockets.
b.      Not only is the methodology of concern, but the speculative nature of such reconstructions assumes a knowledge of the original authors of such an idea that we simply do not have. Yet, again, one absolutely needs to confirm such knowledge in order to make the claim that the original author intended to convey such and such an idea. No such confirmation is, or can be, made by those scholars who peddle this idea, as the original context (if there really was one) is lost and cannot confirm such an interpretation (and, as said before, all admit that the idea has been radically transformed in the biblical texts, so that the “Bible” of orthodox Christians does not actually teach such an idea at all).
4.       Stark also argues along the same lines that the Bible teaches polytheism as well as henotheism and monotheism.
a.       The same etymological fallacy can be pinned on this wildly popular idea. This, again, ignores that a phrase may or may not carry its implicatures depending upon whether the context repeats the contextual referents of the original context. In other words, as I’ve argued before, an implicature does not carry in a foreign context, and it certainly cannot be assumed in a context where the implicature is often contradicted, such as the idea of polytheism in the religious context of ancient Israel, and especially, within the literary context of the Bible. Instead, words and phrases that once carried a particular implicature in a foreign context often become figurative expressions that convey a specific meaning that no longer carries the implicature. For instance, the phrase, “Aphrodite is the goddess of love” in an ancient Graeco-Roman polytheistic context implies that “goddesses [literally] exist.” However, change the context to a non-polytheistic one, and a phrase such as, “Tyra is the goddess of fashion,” does not carry the implicature that goddesses exist in a literal sense at all, but rather that, in a figurative/analogical sense only, Tyra is the highest of all other fashionistas. The implicature has been lost in a monotheistic/agnostic/atheistic context.                               
Stark, as well as others who advocate this position (Mark Smith being the most prominent), fails to note this, and by doing so, begs the question as to whether a text conveys polytheism.
b.      He further commits the same fallacy along these same lines by failing to note that in its biblical context (whether within that of a book or section of books, such as Deuteronomy or the Deuteronomistic History) polytheistic phrases exist inside the context of monotheistic theology, and hence, do not carry their implicatures. Hence, his argument, yet again, has him arguing for the errancy of a fictitious Bible of his own making, not the one in which orthodox Christians believe. If Stark were to have entitled his book, “Why My Reconstructed and Dissected Bible Is Errant” one would have no problem with agreeing with him. However, Stark’s Bible is clearly meant to be conflated with the Bible in which the average evangelical believes, which makes the argument a bit of a bait and switch.
5.       Finally, in an effort to try and catch evangelicals in a pickle, Stark argues that if inerrancy is true then Jesus was errant because He predicted that the end of the world would occur within the lifetime of the apostles, and it didn’t.
a.       Of course, Jesus could have been wrong about the time of His coming, since immediately after He states this, He states that He doesn’t actually know when the time of the end will occur. In fact, this should be the first clue that there are two different things going on here, since He states with great certainty what time frame the event He is addressing will occur, and then continues to say that He has no knowledge of when it will occur.
b.      Stark seems to be unaware of the more likely interpretation of this passage, which is the partial-Preterist view that Jesus is talking about the destruction of Jerusalem in this context. Along with it, as apocalypticism almost always does, is a description of the micro-event as though it was the macro-event of the end. Again, it is likely this distinction that Christ has in mind by saying that He both knows when it (i.e., the destruction of the temple/Jerusalem) will occur and does not know when it (i.e., the end of the world/the Second Coming) will occur. This would take more than a paragraph to demonstrate, but Second Temple Jewish apocalyptic texts often mesh a micro-event with the macro-events (i.e., either the commencement of the creation of the world or the consummation of that creation) as though they were one single event. That John Collins, a Second Temple scholar, endorsed and wrote the foreword to the book   is all the more surprising, but apparently liberal apologetics wins out over genuine scholarship when evangelicals are the target. We see this often with the nonsense over at Peter Enns’s blog (another liberal Second Temple commentator that Stark thanks in his preface).
6.       There is, of course, an epistemological naïveté in the book. Stark seems to think that one does not need an inerrant source of truth in order to know truth, and this is simply rubbish to anyone who has studied the issue. If a finite being with finite knowledge does not have an inerrant source of truth that stems from a transcendent infinite being then one cannot know anything. He can only guess at everything in the dark without any knowledge of whether he is moving closer or further away from the truth and the good. What Stark is essentially arguing for, as most liberals do, is for an intuitive inerrant source, where one patches into the divine truth from one’s own nature. Much theology can be added to this ad hoc, such as the Holy Spirit guides humans into truth and whatnot, but the question will always be how one knows any of this. If liberals want to argue that they believe in their intuition in the same way that orthodox Christians believe in the Bible, that’s fine with me. I agree that they do. The problem is simply that this is not a version of Christianity. It is simply one more expression of the anti-Logos, in replace of the one who is Christ Himself revealed in words, and a completely different religion than that of orthodox Christianity which is an externally-oriented, revealed religion and not an internally-oriented revealed one, as all pagan religions and non-religions are. With liberalism, Stark carries in a host of presuppositions (not merely bias--note the difference please) concerning the nature of God, man, the Bible, etc. that cannot be critically evaluated without first assuming a different set of presuppositions by which to measure them. Hence, we are left with faith, not scholarship, and this is merely one faith telling another faith that it is wrong. But, again, this was not the claim made in the book. Stark did not set out to counter orthodox Christianity with his alternate religion, at least that is not what he claimed to be doing. Instead, if he wanted to reach the goal of his argument, he needed to accept the Bible that orthodox Christians have accepted, and show that their beliefs concerning it are internally invalid. He could not do that. Hence, we got the argument he gave, and not the one that we needed in order to see his position as a valid one.

There is a lot more I could say about his other minor arguments that also have to do with particular interpretations of passages, but I think the above should suffice in showing that this book was received well by the liberal community of scholars either because (1) they’re so bent on undermining traditions and traditional Christianity that they don’t mind supporting an M.A.R. student who is willing to use any bad argument possible to undermine it, or (2) that they simply make the same mistakes daily in their classrooms and works that they think that Stark’s scholarship is sound. I’m going to be generous and say that it’s likely a mixture of both. In either case, however, the substandard state of scholarship in terms of being critical of its own methodologies is put on display for all eyes to see if one is so inclined to see it.