In the latter half of the
twentieth century, James Barr, influenced by various linguistic observations
made earlier, heavily critiqued the diachronic methodologies employed by
everyone from scholars to laity in the area of lexicography.
One of the major arguments put
forth is described as the etymological fallacy. I want to point out two aspects
of this fallacy when it came to lexicography that is relevant for what I am
going to say about source theories (whether we are talking about the original
source theories of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries or the various
expressions of higher criticism that evolved into the twentieth centuries such
as form criticism) that have now been assumed as a given within the academy.
The first etymological fallacy
in lexicography has to do with the fact that what a word means in either an
earlier period cannot be assumed to be the meaning, or have any relevance
whatsoever in determining the meaning, in the current context one is
analyzing.
Likewise, in extension of this
fallacy, which is mainly an illegitimate referential transference, one cannot
assume the meaning, i.e., referents, in even a contemporary context without
identical referents.
These observations are in
accordance with the logic of language that create rules of communication that, if violated, create the
inability for language to function coherently. These rules are assumed by
speakers and authors and the defense of them is simply in attempting to have a
conversation using the reverse logic and to note the inability of such a
practice to function as a successful form of communication.
The second observation is that a
word, although possibly made up of two constituent parts (e.g., butterfly,
understand, confidence, etc.) does not necessarily retain any meaning from
either word. Although there are many words that may retain some meaning in
terms of their individual referents (e.g., handwörterbuch, toothbrush, etc.),
this can only be established by the referents given in the particular contexts
in which the words are used.
Thus, the contextual referents
decide the meaning in each of these cases of the etymological fallacy, and therefore,
are not determined by either the history of usage, past or present, or the
particular words used to make up the new word even when other words are used.
Here now is my claim. Source
theories are nothing more than etymological fallacies applied to larger units
of language than an individual word. They simply attempt to find meaning for
the particular text under study by analyzing either the history of meaning of a
source, the nature of the source in some other context, or the different
sources that may be used to make up a new text.
Like the individual words used in
new context, the new context must determine meaning and is not determined by
the previous or foreign referent found in another text or cultural context.
Ergo, all forms of higher criticism that assume these fallacies are illegitimate
methodologies of inquiry that do not belong in academic study.
Now, this would be true even if
the sources were actually in our material possession. In some cases, they are
when we are referring to various ancient Near Eastern texts that are parallel
to various Old Testament texts or various Second Temple texts that are parallel
to New Testament texts. However, even in these cases, they can only function in
comparison and contrast with what the authors of the new text might be doing
with them. They can in no way be legitimately used as determinative when
assessing the meaning/referents of the new text.
However, in the vast majority of
cases where source theories are applied, whether JEDP and its variations and
evolutions or Q theories in its various forms, or the theorized redactors in
both the study of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, are not material sources
that we possess. They are conjectured and expanded through speculation. In
other words, they are simply guesses based upon the fact that sources may be
used in various texts.
Whatever the case, whether legitimate
sources were ever used or not is completely irrelevant. The point is that one
cannot make even sources we have as determinative in meaning, and thus,
speculative sources that are simply assumed, along with their cultural
referents that again are assumed from anthropological commonalities in cultures
should not be a part of academic study of a text, much less referred to as
being exegetical in nature.
Instead, the speculative sources
are often flights of fancy and are even more worthless to even aiding in
understanding a text exegetically simply because they provide no ability to
even contrast or compare definitive referents, as they are simply made up and
cannot function in that capacity.
The textual sources we do have
can aid in study because they provide at least a comparison and contrast of
definitive referents that everyone can see even without an imaginative scholar manufacturing
them for his audience in much the same way a cult leader provides his members
with the real context of the text that only he and those convinced by him can
see with his Holy Spirit glasses.
The modern liberal scholar believes
he is on greater ground than this cult leader because he is using natural
sources to get his glasses (e.g., anthropology, archaeology, and psychology),
but as argued here, he is simply in no better place to determine the meaning
and referents of any given text than every other person who can analyze the
text exegetically.
And that is what I wish to end
with, Source theories are eisegetical not exegetical. They attempt to insert referents
of meaning into the text rather than extrapolate meaning from the contextual
referents provided by the texts as they exist. This is simply arguing that
butterflies really are flies made of butter and that the boy down the street
who has a boyfriend and says he’s gay really just means he’s cheerful. In the end,
such assertions when corrected are dogma, not scholarship, and hence, have no
place in the academy anymore (and should delegitimize any commentary that relies on them in order to determine referential meanings), and those who continue to use them in the above ways will prove themselves as religiously committed to a need to reinterpret the Bible for various reasons rather than those are who legitimately studying it.
