Murray's argument contends that Jesus changed the law from requiring death for adultery to requiring divorce. Hence, if one is divorced, he is no longer bound by the one flesh union of his previous marriage. There are a few major problems with this view.
1. Paul states that the woman is bound as long as her husband lives in both texts that he mentions divorce and remarriage. This makes no sense if Jesus changed the penalty from death to divorce. He would have clearly said that a woman is bound until she is legally divorced or her husband divorces her and marries another.
2. If the penalty of adultery is no longer death, then what does this mean for single people who commit adultery with married men and women? No penalty?
3. The idea that Jesus changed the law is contrary to the entire argument in Matthew, where Jesus upholds not only the original moral law, but all of its implications as well. In fact, this is why He is arguing that divorce and remarriage are adultery (i.e., He is expanding the law of adultery, not limiting it like the Pharisees are). To read it as though He is contradicting Moses, rather than tracking with him, is a departure from covenantal hermeneutics. Hence, in 5:
4. The word is porneia, not moicheia. This does not mean that it cannot refer to adultery. It's just extremely odd and unusual to do so in a book (and the immediate context) where they have been distinguished.
5. The narrative is made incoherent by this interpretation. Jesus' statement is that since the two become one flesh, no one is to separate what God has joined together, i.e., no one is to divorce. This is made clear by the reaction of all parties in the conversation. The Pharisees counter Jesus' statement, not by arguing about the reason for divorce, but by arguing that Moses gave them a commandment that permitted it in the first place. If Jesus had just argued that one can get a divorce in the case of adultery, their countering that by saying Moses allowed for divorce in a particular situation makes no sense. Jesus could have just said, "Yes, I agree. Moses allowed you because of adultery." That's not what He says. He then responds by saying, Moses allowed you to get a divorce because of your stubborness, but it is not the will of God for it to be done. He then tells the disciples that te reason it is not the will of God is because one is committing adultery due the one flesh union if he or she divorces and marries another. That means porneia cannot refer to anything that would sever a legitimate marriage, since the narrative responses of the individuals involved clearly show that there is no legitimate dissolution of a legitmate marriage.
6. This means that porneia must refer to something other than a legitimate union, and therefore, refers either to the dissolution of the betrothment due to the bride's whoring or the dissolution of a marriage founded on an illegitimate sexual union (such as Herod's with Herodias). I would argue the latter, since if it is the former, Jesus would have had to change the law from death to divorce, as Murray argues with adultery.
7. If Murray were right, and the penalty for adultery is divorce, which frees the individual to marry again, then why is one who marries a divorced woman committing adultery? And why does John refer to Herodias as the wife of Philip even after she has divorced him and married Herod? She took the self penalty of divorcing him and so her new marriage should be the only one she has.
8. If the penalty for adultery has changed from death to divorce, then any adulterer can just leave his or her spouse as a self-inflicted penalty (one I'm sure they're really broken up about), and go on committing adultery with his or her lover, whether married or not. After all, the penalty has already been paid. No death for adultery anymore, and he or she is already divorced. Murray wants to make it only permissable for the innocent party, but if divorce is death that ends the covenant then neither is still bound. He can't have it both ways.
9. Murray's idea essentially argues that there is no more earthly penalty for adultery except divorce. This is good news for everyone engaged in premarital adultery, as they are not yet bound in their future covenant. It is great news for everyone who has already paid the price in divorce for their adulteries. They can continue to commit adultery until the cows come home now.
10. The New Testament parallel to the death in the law is not a lesser punishment, but a greater one. It means that the adulterer is damned spiritually as well as possibly receiving the civil punishment of death. Murray has made it less than rather than more.
11. If there is any exception to the rule that only death separates the union, then Paul's analogy in Romans 7 is incoherent and false. Only death frees one from the law in the same way that only death frees one from the marriage union. If something else can break that covenant union, then death is not the only thing and the analogy is false.
12. As a final note, Murray's position isn't the Church's position on the subject, including the historic Reformed position. The Reformed position admitted what the earlier church had concluded (no remarriage while the spouse lives even if divorced), but that the spouse should technically be dead if the government was faithful in executing God's civil laws. If the spouse was still alive, it was the magistrate's fault for not doing his job. Hence, one is free to remarry because the spouse should be dead, even though he or she isn't. Yes, it is a dumb argument, but at least it shows that they too saw the clear teaching that while a spouse lives, remarriage is not permitted. That has been the clear understanding of these passages for 2000 years.
Saturday, September 21, 2019
A Critique of John Murray's Argument for Divorce and Remarriage, Part II
John Murray argues in his book, Divorce, that porneia in the Matthean exception clause refers to adultery. The problem with this, however, is that the penalty for adultery in the law is death, not divorce.
In order to get around this, Murray simply argues that Jesus changed the law. The penalty that was once death is now divorce. The problem with this imaginative interpretation is that it ignores the context of Matthew is arguing about Jesus’ teaching concerning the moral law.
In Matthew 5:17-20, we read the following.
“Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets. I have not come to abolish these things but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth pass away not the smallest letter or stroke of a letter will pass from the law until everything takes place. Therefore, whosoever loosens one of the least of these commands and teaches others to do the same will be an outcast in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever obeys them and teaches others to do so will be highly honored in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you, unless your righteousness goes beyond that of the experts in the law and the Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven!
This is an important passage in showing that Jesus did not come to do away with law by changing it either. Notice, not one yȏd or tittle will pass away from the law is parallel to what Jesus means by “abolish.” It is clear in the rest of the sermon (and Matthew in general) that He is referring to the moral obligations of the law and their penalties. He expands both what is required and the punishment thereof, rather than lessening them. This means the penalties are expanded from death to hell.
It should further be understood that the expansion does not negate the original punishment, which still remains. It is additional to it, as the expansions of the laws do not negate what is required by the original laws, but instead extends them. The law against murder is expanded into even degrading speech toward one’s brother, but that in no way somehow changes the law so that the physical act of murdering one’s brother is now morally acceptable. In other words, the expansion does not replace the original command. Hence, disobedience to laws that require death if broken are not somehow abolished or changed into laws that require something lesser than the original punishment. They still require death as their punishment. They just are extended now into requiring eternal death in hell as well.
The fact that Jesus is not changing the moral law, or its penalties, is so strongly stated that anyone who loosens (lusē), i.e., lessens the force of the original command, will be considered an outcast, which is explained by the statement that this is what the Pharisees are doing and are to be identified as those who will not enter the kingdom of God at all. In other words, the phrase “considered least” means to be “considered nothing,” “an outcast from the group,” “a person of dishonor,” and in this context, likely means “damned.” It’s a severe warning that foreshadows the judgment of the “lawless” or “negators of the law” at the end of the sermon.
Hence, Murray’s argument fails to understand the context of Matthew. This means that porneia cannot refer to adultery or even any sexual act that would require death in the OT. This means that the common interpretation that this refers to a bride who is discovered on her wedding night to have slept with another man before her wedding night cannot be the correct interpretation of porneia either, since the penalty for that premarital adultery is death as well.
The only consistent understanding of the word is to take it as a Second Temple Jewish reader often would, i.e., to refer to illegitimate sexual acts (incest, homosexuality, etc.).
A Critique of John Murray's Argument for Divorce and Remarriage, Part I
I wanted to entitle this post, "God's Ulimate Moral Will and It's Many Accommodations to What Evangelicals Would Rather Do," but since it begins my critique of Murray's book, Divorce, I'll simply entitle it as above.
Reading John Murray's book on divorce and remarriage has reminded me of a common theme that has been repeated throughout the evangelical era.
In the book, Murray asserts time and again that God's ultimate design for marriage is one man and one woman for one lifetime. This is God's ultimate will and ideal for marriage. However, in some circumstances (adultery or abandonment) it is morally acceptable to do otherwise.
Now, I hear this argument used about quite a many things. It's essentially saying that God's will is the ideal, but because of circumstances in the fallen world, that ideal can be set aside, and God is fine with that. It may not be the best but He'll settle for the rest.
Here is the problem. Any moral practice that is not in accordance with the revealed will of God is corrupt, as God's ultimate will is the standard to which He calls His people. He does this because His will is not just works He wants them to perform, but people He wants them to become. If it is the will of God to do A and one does B, even if B is tolerated, it is not the will of God, and therefore, it is of a different ultimate will and nature than God's.
The idea that God has an ideal that He reveals and can then be dismissed because He may allow for lesser practices assumes that morality is not connected to His nature and will but by what He tolerates. The problem is that He tolerates a lot of things that are lesser than His nature and will, but He calls His people to be holy as He is holy. They are called to become as He is, not something other than what He is.
That means He calls them to His ultimate will and the best, most upright, most in accordance with His will, thing they can do. Anything lesser than this is a corrupted practice rooted in a corrupted character, not God's character. In essence, to practice anything else is being conformed to what is corrupted, not to God; and anything of this nature is unholy. Any knowledge that one is doing this, and yet still does it, is sin.
Hence, Murray lost the debate at the get go by admitting that God's ultimate will did not include divorce and remarriage. The debate is over. That's it. Everytihng else is the wrangling about of words in looking for an exception as he twists the ambiguous statements to muddy the clear in an effort to argue for what might be tolerable to God, rather than what is in accordance with His best, ultimate good will.
This argument is continually employed for numerous ethical issues, and has been for some time. It is how contraception was introduced into the church at the Lambeth Conference. It is how people argue for homosexual unions today in the church. You can essentially use it for anything. It's not God's ultimate will that elders punch you in the face, but sometimes, in some circunstances, because we're fallen, God understands in His grace and mercy that elders just need to punch you in the face, and that's OK.
This is the reasoning of the heretics in 2 Peter 1. People are fallen and can't do God's will because it's set too high. Peter responds by arguing that we have everyting we need for life and godliness, and that we are not merely fallen beings anymore, but those who now partake of the very divine nature.
This is all a separate issue than whether or not God tolerates other practices that are of a more corrupt nature. It has to do with what the people of God should be obeying, the revealed ultimate will or the toleration of corruption.
It seems the toleration of corruption is what many argue for. I hear things like, "God always hates divorce" and "it's always a tragedy, but . . . " If God always hates it, why would you ever do it? Are you arguing that sometimes it's acceptable to do what God hates? Sometimes it's OK to cause a tragedy that injects more chaos into the world that doesn't have to be? Abortion is always a tragedy and God hates it, but He understands that sometimes we just can't work it out and we have to murder babies. Don't worry though folks. Ulimately, I believe that God wants us to have our children. It's just that in some specific cases, even though it's not God's ultimate moral will, He tolerates us doing it. Ergo, anything He tolerates can't be sin.
Now, I've argued before that God does NOT tolerate divorce and remarriage anymore (Jesus now declares it once and for all as adultery), but my point is that I don't even need to prove that to someone arguing this way simply because they've already admitted that their position is contrary to the revealed, ultimate moral will of God, and therefore, that it is sin. So I simply have to say to Murray, "Thanks for conceding. Enjoy the rest of the show where I rip your view apart piece by piece." Stay tuned for it.
Reading John Murray's book on divorce and remarriage has reminded me of a common theme that has been repeated throughout the evangelical era.
In the book, Murray asserts time and again that God's ultimate design for marriage is one man and one woman for one lifetime. This is God's ultimate will and ideal for marriage. However, in some circumstances (adultery or abandonment) it is morally acceptable to do otherwise.
Now, I hear this argument used about quite a many things. It's essentially saying that God's will is the ideal, but because of circumstances in the fallen world, that ideal can be set aside, and God is fine with that. It may not be the best but He'll settle for the rest.
Here is the problem. Any moral practice that is not in accordance with the revealed will of God is corrupt, as God's ultimate will is the standard to which He calls His people. He does this because His will is not just works He wants them to perform, but people He wants them to become. If it is the will of God to do A and one does B, even if B is tolerated, it is not the will of God, and therefore, it is of a different ultimate will and nature than God's.
The idea that God has an ideal that He reveals and can then be dismissed because He may allow for lesser practices assumes that morality is not connected to His nature and will but by what He tolerates. The problem is that He tolerates a lot of things that are lesser than His nature and will, but He calls His people to be holy as He is holy. They are called to become as He is, not something other than what He is.
That means He calls them to His ultimate will and the best, most upright, most in accordance with His will, thing they can do. Anything lesser than this is a corrupted practice rooted in a corrupted character, not God's character. In essence, to practice anything else is being conformed to what is corrupted, not to God; and anything of this nature is unholy. Any knowledge that one is doing this, and yet still does it, is sin.
Hence, Murray lost the debate at the get go by admitting that God's ultimate will did not include divorce and remarriage. The debate is over. That's it. Everytihng else is the wrangling about of words in looking for an exception as he twists the ambiguous statements to muddy the clear in an effort to argue for what might be tolerable to God, rather than what is in accordance with His best, ultimate good will.
This argument is continually employed for numerous ethical issues, and has been for some time. It is how contraception was introduced into the church at the Lambeth Conference. It is how people argue for homosexual unions today in the church. You can essentially use it for anything. It's not God's ultimate will that elders punch you in the face, but sometimes, in some circunstances, because we're fallen, God understands in His grace and mercy that elders just need to punch you in the face, and that's OK.
This is the reasoning of the heretics in 2 Peter 1. People are fallen and can't do God's will because it's set too high. Peter responds by arguing that we have everyting we need for life and godliness, and that we are not merely fallen beings anymore, but those who now partake of the very divine nature.
This is all a separate issue than whether or not God tolerates other practices that are of a more corrupt nature. It has to do with what the people of God should be obeying, the revealed ultimate will or the toleration of corruption.
It seems the toleration of corruption is what many argue for. I hear things like, "God always hates divorce" and "it's always a tragedy, but . . . " If God always hates it, why would you ever do it? Are you arguing that sometimes it's acceptable to do what God hates? Sometimes it's OK to cause a tragedy that injects more chaos into the world that doesn't have to be? Abortion is always a tragedy and God hates it, but He understands that sometimes we just can't work it out and we have to murder babies. Don't worry though folks. Ulimately, I believe that God wants us to have our children. It's just that in some specific cases, even though it's not God's ultimate moral will, He tolerates us doing it. Ergo, anything He tolerates can't be sin.
Now, I've argued before that God does NOT tolerate divorce and remarriage anymore (Jesus now declares it once and for all as adultery), but my point is that I don't even need to prove that to someone arguing this way simply because they've already admitted that their position is contrary to the revealed, ultimate moral will of God, and therefore, that it is sin. So I simply have to say to Murray, "Thanks for conceding. Enjoy the rest of the show where I rip your view apart piece by piece." Stay tuned for it.
Friday, September 20, 2019
The Methodology of Muddying the Clear with the Ambiguous in the Divorce and Remarriage Debate
I've previously laid out what I think is the appropriate methodology for dealing with the many divorce and remarriage texts in the New Testament if one wants to come to a clear answer concerning the issue. The problem is that I'm not so sure the majority of people want a clear answer. Ambiguity allows for more freedom in their minds. The less we understand, the less we're held to on judgment day. I'm not so sure this is true, especially when it comes to a willful ignorance, but either way, it isn't a faithful pursuit of truth and righteousness.
I've said before that a bad interpretive methodology isn't just something that doesn't yield the truth, it's unethical. The best you can treat another person's speech is to listen carefully to it and be honest with it. How much more should we treat God's speech in this way?
What I'm going to argue here, then, is that this whole debate exists because of an unethical methodology that forces the clear teaching about divorce and remarriage in the New Testament to fit into the ambiguous teaching. It uses the ambiguous to muddy the clear, and so reinterprets what is clear in light of what is ambiguous.
We are told that one of the first rules of hermeneutics should be that we interpret the ambiguous in light of the clear. Indeed, this treats language, and its speaker, respectfully. It also ensures that we understand the speaker even in light of the fact that all speech contains ambiguities that may seem inconsistent with what is clear. We don't distort the clear by them, however, but rather interpret them within the framework of what is clear.
The clear teaching of the New Testament about divorce and remarriage is as follows:
No one disputes that, if read by itself, the texts in Mark, Luke, and Romans would be understood as absolute by the reader.
Mark 10:2-10:
Then some Pharisees came, and to test him they asked, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?” He answered them, “What did Moses command you?”They said, “Moses permitted a man to write a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her.” But Jesus said to them, “He wrote this commandment for you because of your hard hearts. But from the beginning of creation he made them male and female. For this reason a man will leave his father and mother, and the two will become one flesh. So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.”
“Everyone who divorces his wife and marries someone else commits adultery, and the one who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.
To the married I give this command—not I, but the Lord—a wife is not to divorce a husband (but if she does, she is to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband), and a husband is not to divorce his wife. (vv. 10-11)
I've said before that a bad interpretive methodology isn't just something that doesn't yield the truth, it's unethical. The best you can treat another person's speech is to listen carefully to it and be honest with it. How much more should we treat God's speech in this way?
What I'm going to argue here, then, is that this whole debate exists because of an unethical methodology that forces the clear teaching about divorce and remarriage in the New Testament to fit into the ambiguous teaching. It uses the ambiguous to muddy the clear, and so reinterprets what is clear in light of what is ambiguous.
We are told that one of the first rules of hermeneutics should be that we interpret the ambiguous in light of the clear. Indeed, this treats language, and its speaker, respectfully. It also ensures that we understand the speaker even in light of the fact that all speech contains ambiguities that may seem inconsistent with what is clear. We don't distort the clear by them, however, but rather interpret them within the framework of what is clear.
The clear teaching of the New Testament about divorce and remarriage is as follows:
No one disputes that, if read by itself, the texts in Mark, Luke, and Romans would be understood as absolute by the reader.
Mark 10:2-10:
Then some Pharisees came, and to test him they asked, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?” He answered them, “What did Moses command you?”They said, “Moses permitted a man to write a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her.” But Jesus said to them, “He wrote this commandment for you because of your hard hearts. But from the beginning of creation he made them male and female. For this reason a man will leave his father and mother, and the two will become one flesh. So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.”
In the house once again, the disciples asked him about this. So he told them, “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery.”
The clear teaching here is that the command was given from Moses because of the rebellion of the Jews, not because it is in accordance with God's moral will to divorce. Instead, Jesus quotes that they are joined by God into one flesh and then commands that no one is to separate what God has joined together as one, i.e., the answer is, "No, it is not lawful for a man to divorce his wife." To further the clarity of the statement, the disciples ask Him in the house, and He clearly states anyone who divorces his or her spouse and marries another commits adultery, period.
Hence, no one is to divorce a spouse and no one is to remarry if they do, period. That's clear.
But what about one who is divorced, but was not the one who divorced?
Luke 16:18 clarifies by starting out with the same statement, but then adds another to it.
“Everyone who divorces his wife and marries someone else commits adultery, and the one who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.
The participial phrase ὁ ἀπολελυμένην is a passive, meaning that this woman has been divorced from her husband by her husband's doing. Does this free her up to remarry? No. Not only would she be committing adultery, any man who marries her will be commiting adultery according to this text. So no divorce and remarriage whether the person was the one who initiated it or not (The irrelevance of who initiated it is also confirmed by Matt 5:32). That's clear.
Romans 7:1-3 is a factual statement given by Paul as an analogy that one must die to be unbound to the penalty of the law.
Or do you not know, brothers and sisters (for I am speaking to those who know the law), that the law is lord over a person as long as he lives? For a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives, but if her husband dies, she is released from the law of the marriage. So then, if she is joined to another man while her husband is alive, she will be called an adulteress. But if her husband dies, she is free from that law, and if she is joined to another man, she is not an adulteress.
So if the condition exists that the husband lives while a woman is joined to someone else in marriage, she is an adulteress. There is no exception. The statement is absolute, and if it isn't, the analogy fails, as one can be separated from the penalty of the law by some other way than dying. Paul's entire point is that only death breaks the law that binds her to her husband. That's clear.
The remaining texts in Matthew and 1 Corinthians are also very clear with the exception of a single ambiguous word used in each.
Matthew 19:3-12 is made clear by the dialogue that ensues (i.e., how the Pharisees react to what Jesus says, how Jesus reacts to what the Pharisees say, and how the disciples react to what Jesus says).
Then some Pharisees came to him in order to test him. They asked, “Is it lawful to divorce a wife for any cause?”
He answered, “Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator made them male and female, and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and will be united with his wife, and the two will become one flesh’? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, no one is to separate what God has joined together.”
They said to him, “Why then did Moses command us to give a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her?”
Jesus said to them, “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because of your hard hearts, but from the beginning it was not this way. Now I say to you that whoever divorces his wife, except for immorality, and marries another commits adultery.”
The disciples said to him, “If this is the case of a husband with a wife, it is better not to marry!”
He said to them, “Not everyone can accept this statement, except those to whom it has been given. For there are some eunuchs who were that way from birth, and some who were made eunuchs by others, and some who became eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. The one who is able to accept this should accept it.”
The clear statements:
1. The Pharisees ask if there is any reason a man can divorce his wife.
2. Jesus says that the two are one flesh now and cannot be separated, and therefore, commands that no one is to separate what God has joined together, i.e., No.
3. The Pharisees understand that He has just said that there is no reason a man can divorce his wife, so they argue by saying that Moses permitted them to divorce. Notice, they do not argue for what reason because Jesus has just said that there is no reason for which they can divorce.
4. Jesus responds, not by clarifying that He thinks they can be divorced for a particular reason, and so agrees with Moses, but by saying that Moses was conceding to their rebellion, not because it was the moral will of God for them to do so.
5. Jesus declares that whoever divorces and remarries, except for porneia, he is committing adultery.
6. The disciples are all shocked and say that if that is true, a couple who may get divorced should not marry in the first place, which means that Jesus' teaching is absolute and the only way to avoid the adultery of divorce is to not get married.
7. Jesus confirms by saying that some make themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of God.
All of this adds up to the fact that Jesus has prohibited divorce and remarriage absolutely, as in the other texts.
But here comes the ambiguous word porneia. Now, all of the teaching on the matter has been clear up to this point. Th interpreter now has to make a choice. He can throw all of the clear statements that make Jesus' teaching absolute out the window by interpreting them in light of a possible meaning of the word that cannot be confirmed (since there are multiple options for what the world might mean), or he can interpret the word in light of all of the clear teaching of these texts (hence, choosing the meaning or meanings of the word that are consistent with what is clearly stated about the absoluteness of the principle of no divorce and no remarriage.
If we conduct our inquiry according to the proper methodology of interpreting the ambiguous in light of the clear, then a word that can refer to five different things must be reduced to whatever meanings do not muddy the clear teaching. If we conduct our inquiry improperly and unethically, we will use the ambiguity of the word to distort the clear teaching. I believe this is what happened in church history as well. The church for the first 1500 years attempted to employ this rightful methodology and interpret the ambiguity in the light of the clear, and many in the church of the Reformation, fundamentalism, and evangelicalism to follow have ignored proper methodology and muddied the clear teaching by choosing meanings of the ambiguous word to contradict the clear.
This same thing happens in 1 Corinthians 7. Paul makes a similar statement in 1 Corinthians 7 that he does in Romans 7. In case anything is misuderstood, the section ends by Paul stating,
A wife is bound as long as her husband is living. But if her husband dies, she is free to marry anyone she wishes (only someone in the Lord). (v. 39)
So she is deō "bound (contextually: in marriage)" as long as her husband lives and is only freed to marry in the Lord if her husband dies. No exception, and the teaching is clear.
Furthermore, Paul states, based on the Gospel of Mark, that no believer is permitted to get a divorce, and for some reason they do divorce, are to remain agamos "umarried."
To the married I give this command—not I, but the Lord—a wife is not to divorce a husband (but if she does, she is to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband), and a husband is not to divorce his wife. (vv. 10-11)
When it comes to an unebeliever, the believer is not to divorce him or her either, but to remain married with them. If the unbeliever divorces the believer, Paul says to let them do so. But suddenly he makes an ambiguous statement that, again, is wrapped around one word.
He states that the believer is not douloō "obligated/bound." Now, this is a different word than Paul's normal use of the marital term deō, which makes it even more ambiguous. Is Paul arguing that the believer is no longer bound by the marriage and free to get remarried, or is he arguing that the believer is not obligated to force the unbeliever to stay? Could he be arguing the believer is simply not at fault and will not be held to it in judgment, or that he or she is not obligated to save the unbeliever by remaining married to them if they divorce? There are multiple options for the word. The more likely in the context seems to refer to being not obligated to force the unbeliever to stay, since he makes the statement that "called you in peace" (v. 15). It seems also the statement in verse 16, the one does not know if he or she will save his or her spouse anyway, seems to indicate that the believer is not obligated to keep the unbelieving spouse married to them in order to save them, since Paul had just made the argument that remaining married makes the spouse and children holy (v. 14).
Nevertheless, the interpreter could take the unethical route and obscure the clear teaching with the ambiguous word, as in Matthew. Yet, we know that the meaning of a word cannot dictate the context, but rather the context dictates the meaning of the word.
My point is that it is methodologically and ethically wrong to do this to someone's speech when they are communicating to you. It is methodologically and ethically wrong to do it to someone's writing. it is also, therefore, methodologically and ethically wrong par excellence to do it to God's Word.
I realize most people don't think about it, and are just trying to figure out what is right and wrong. Got it. That isn't really my point. We employ unsound methodologies and unethical behaviors all of the time without the intent of doing so. I'm just pointing out that, regardless of intent, to force the clear to bend to the ambiguous when doing so contradicts the clear, and when bending the ambiguous to the clear does not do so, is a fallacious method of reading texts and interpreting the Bible. There would be no disagreement, and was virtually none, when a right methodology was employed in the interpretation of these texts. There is tons of disagreement and confusion now because a wrong methodology was employed, and that, perhaps, is the tragedy that resulted from men changing the church's position on the matter, and thus, unwittingly adopting a poor hermeneutic in the process, even with good intentions.
The Identification of the Beast as the Roman 10th Legion and Titus: An Example of Context Replacement
I recently had a brief interaction with Peter Pike, who contributes over at Triablogue, concerning my post on Domitian. He is a Preterist who had a rather imaginative interpretation of the beast in Revelation and the 10 horns that were upon the beast’s heads. I argued that what he was doing committed all sorts of fallacies, especially that of context replacement, but he seems to have doubled-down to continue this line of argument in a post here. I go through this now because it is a good demonstration of the types of errors that people make in their effort to interpret texts. Methodology is extremely important. Paying close attention to the text is not only good methodology though. It is also ethically responsible to treat a text in accordance to what it supplies itself, and to minimize anything that needs to be supplied that is not being referenced clearly by the text.
“Previously, I have presented some evidence for why I think the beast in Revelation 13 could have referred to the Roman X Legion Fretensis. To give a brief overview of some of the evidence for context in this post: it was the X Legion and the beast in Revelation was said to have "ten horns and seven heads, with ten diadems on its horns"; "Fretensis" means "of the sea strait" and the beast was said to have come "out of the sea"; the X Fretensis had auxillaries from seven different legions assigned to it (seven heads)--one of which, the XII Fulminata, had been ambushed and routed to the point of losing it's aquila and one of the heads of the beast was said "to have a mortal wound, but its mortal wound was healed"; despite losing the aquila (which normally resulted in a legion being disbanded), the XII Fulminata was not disbanded and in fact was used as the primary force in the siege of Jerusalem; the X Fretensis was headed by General Titus and, according to Irenaeus, the Aramaic form of "Titus" numerologically added up to six hundred sixty-six; Roman legions carried images (literally: imago) of either the current emperor or the emperor who founded the legion, and the beast in Revelation was said to set up an image that it forced people to worship--something that Titus did when he destroyed the temple in 70 AD and set up the legion's image there; if that image was of the current emperor it would have been Vespasian, the father of General Titus and who's real name was also Titus and thus would have also added up to six hundred sixty-six; the beast was "allowed to make war on the saints and conquer them" which the X Fretensis literally did; and finally, it was "allowed to exercise authority for forty-two months" which is how long it took the X Frentensis from the time it landed in Judea until the fall of the Temple.”
The federal head represents what is owned, i.e., the city and empire in this case, what is owned does not represent the federal head. Likewise, the royal city can represent the empire over which it rules.
I’m not aware of an army representing the federal head, but one could argue that Antiochus’ brutality references the brutality of the armies he unleashes.
The bigger issue here is the interpretive methodology used. This is a case of context replacement via familiarization. In other words, these words sound like something with which we are familiar. For some interpreters its 10 kingdoms throughout the history of the church that support the one Holy Roman Empire, for others its 10 divisions within the empire, for yet others, as Pike’s view here, it’s the 10th Legion. Assuming a Preterist paradigm, it is too juicy of a coincidence to pass up if Titus used the 10th Legion in the destruction of Jerusalem. Of course, many legions were used, not just the 10th, but it makes for interesting speculation. The problem is that it is just that.
The book does not make these connections at all. Chapter 17 is the interpretation of the beast, the seven heads, and the ten horns (17:7). The woman is the city of Rome (vv. 9, 15, 18), the seven heads are the seven hills and seven kings upon which the city is geographically and politically established (v. 9). The seven kings can be understood by seeing the beast as Nero, the head that was slain, and the name that historically is linked to the number 666. The fact that christological language is used of him (was, is not, and is coming), the fact that the number is that of a man, and hence, John wants his readers to identify him (13:18; 17:9), and the fact that the beast kills Christians, not Jews in Jerusalem (17:6; 20:4) displays that this king can only refer to two emperors in the first century (Nero and Domitian). The author further tells us that the “beast” “was, and is not, and is about to come up from the abyss to go to destruction” (v. 8), and what he means by this is that five kings have fallen of the seven, the sixth is, and the seventh will only come for a little while. The beast is actually an eighth king that was one of the seven (vv. 9-11). So putting this all together, the author explicitly tells us that the beast here is dead and he now anticipates the false resurrection of the beast as it manifests in an eighth king. If Nero is the first beast-king, as only he could be, then he is one of the five fallen kings. That means that one either has to count the three usurpers (as they were considered such in the Flavian Dynasty, and commit treason by counting them in a work written during the Flavian Dynasty), and end up with Vitellius as the eighth beast who fights the Lamb and kills the saints because they do not worship him or his image, something that is completely lost to history if true; or one must throw out the usurpers from the list, as a writer during the Flavian Dynasty would likely do, and conclude that Vespasian is the sixth king, Titus is the seventh king who only reigns for a little while (2 years, the shortest reign of all of the recognized emperors), and Domitian is the eighth. But they all must be kings, not regiments, legions, guards, states, etc., as they are spoken of as individual kings who have died or are living. This means that the beast in Revelation with whom the author is actually concerned is either Vitellius, which removes any relevance to Vespasian or Titus who take down Jerusalem, or he is Domitian, who we know persecutes Christians and demands to be worshiped while living, especially from those in the region of Asia Minor (as that is historically how they showed their allegiance to the emperors).
Hence, the image not being worshiped by Christians and causing their persecutions is either that of Vitellius (doubtful), or Domitian. It cannot be that of Vespasian or Titus, and thus the attempt to connect the number 10 in the book to them is dubious.
Furthermore, we are told by the author to what the number 10 refers. It refers to 10 kings who do not currently at the time of the author’s writing have their power over a kingdom. They are installed by the beast and then give their authority back to the beast to do his will (vv. 12-14). Their work is solely given for the purpose of making war with the Lamb (vv. 13-14), after which they will turn on the city of Rome and destroy it themselves (v. 16). It is these kings who do the destruction, not any legion led by the emperor unless one wants to very loosely make that connection once removed from the emperor. There is certainly no direct connection as though one of the emperors, like Titus is leading it himself (of course, Titus would have led armies against Jerusalem before he was emperor, so he was not even the beast to be worshiped at that point).
“Now the first question that could be asked here is whether or not this is even the same beast as in Revelation 13. And that brings up more discussion. After all, in Revelation 13 there are actually two beasts mentioned: "I saw a beast rising out of the sea" (verse 1); "Then I saw another beast rising out of the earth" (verse 11). Finally, Revelation 17 describes the beast in that chapter as: "I saw a woman sitting on a scarlet beast" (verse 3). Many have concluded the scarlet beast is the same as the beast from the sea because both are said to have "seven heads and ten horns" but this is not a necessary conclusion. However, even granting they are the same beast (as I do lean toward), it is clear that the horns on the scarlet beast have multiple meanings, standing both for seven mountains and for seven kings even within chapter 17. Furthermore, in chapter 17, the horns, heads, and beast itself all stand for kings at various times.”
It is clear that the beast that comes out of the abyss of Chapter 13 is the same beast described in Chapter 17 for numerous reasons. For one, the beast comes up from the sea/abyss, i.e., places of chaos, in both texts (13:1; 17:8), and although they are not exactly parallel in terminology are parallel in reference. It does at least mean that he is not the land beast, i.e, land being a place of creation and order, of Chapter 13. However, he also has seven heads and ten horns in both texts. The wounded head of the seven that is then healed (13:3) is no doubt parallel to the beast who was and is not and is to come (v.8), i.e., a false resurrection (notice that the world is astounded and follows the beast because of it in both texts). The blasphemies are no doubt the case in which the emperor takes upon himself divine names in both texts and opposes Christ as Lord by doing so. Even more so, however, there is a major exegetical reason to link them and that is the practice of assuming the unmarked meaning, in this case, the previous meaning assigned to the specific symbol. If a beast with seven heads and ten horns is presented in one text, and then a beast with seven heads and ten horns is presented in the same work later without any distinguishing factors made explicit in the new context that would cause the reader to think that they were different beasts, the assumption of the unmarked meaning, i.e., that both beasts are the same beast, should be taken for granted by the reader.
“But beyond even that, I would maintain that all three of the beasts (if they are three distinct entities, or both of them if there's just two) are actually referencing different aspects of the same structure. After all, in historical times, kings and kingdoms were synonymous, as were generals and their armies. In the case of the X Fretensis, since General Titus moved on to become emperor after the death of his father, you could have army, general, king, and kingdom all wrapped up in the same entity.”
Again, although it may be true that one could wrap them all up into one entity, the identification of that one entity as being X Fretensis and Titus is not a legitimate interpretation from the context itself. A context and the new referents it brings, must be supplied. This is why this is eisegesis and not exegesis. There is nothing in the text that links itself to the historical background presented. Instead, what is supplied in the context links to a very different historical background than the one presented here.
“To give some more credence to this view we can look at Daniel. In Daniel 7, the prophet also had a vision of four beasts. The last beast "had great iron teeth" and "was different from all the beasts that were before it, and it had ten horns" (Daniel 7:7). The fact that this beast had ten horns, like the beasts mentioned in Revelation, is an indication that it might be referring to the same beast as in Revelation 13 and/or 17. Additionally, the "great iron teeth" gives a callback to Daniel 2, where Nebuchadnezzar had the dream of the statue with iron legs and feet made of iron mixed with clay--a reference to the Roman Empire, which would be "a divided kingdom" (Daniel 2:41, Rome being divided between the East and West) destroyed by a rock "cut out by no human hand" which destroyed all empires forever. And indeed, after the Roman Empire collapsed, there has been no empire since. Even those that wished to be empires (e.g., the Holy Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, etc.) were hardly like the previous empires that have been destroyed by the rock, which is Christianity.”
I’m not sure where to begin with this one. For one, Daniel does not mention Rome, except in a brief comment in Chapter 11 about the Kittim (v. 18). The empire that crushes Jerusalem is the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus IV. So Rome is not predicted by Daniel as the last empire. This is made clear by the parallel passages in the book when one compares the antagonist of the final kingdom in all of them. Furthermore, Daniel 2 does not say that either the Seleucid Empire or the Roman Empire is the last empire. It says the last empire is God’s and it crushes all other kingdoms so that there is no kingdom left for any other people group beside the kingdom of God for His people (2:44). There seems to be quite a whittling down what constitutes a kingdom. Surely, the Holy Roman Empire or the Ottomon Empire or the British Empire would at least be as strong and big as the Seleucid or Median Empires. There are actually lots of empires after these that would qualify. Each of these are seen as rather weak in the symbolism of Daniel 2, and yet, they still make up what the author considers empires. This is a case, I think, of attempting to define away facts. The only reason interpreters have made the final kingdom about Rome is because they think the text says that the kingdom of God is set up during it, but that is not what the text says at all. The text says that the kingdom of God shatters and destroys all of the kingdoms, including the last one, and then grows and takes over the world. It does not exist side-by-side with any of them, including the last one. In fact, Rome is not destroyed by Christianity at all. It is destroyed by numerous other factors (e.g. expansion, invasion, internal rivalries, etc.). Christianity merely takes Rome over, but it is not what destroys it. If anything, it saves it for another two hundred years. Hence, there is no need to identify the last kingdom as Rome because it doesn’t fit with it either. The author of Daniel is using apocalyptic speech that ties the macrocosmic end of the world with the end of a microcosmic, socio-political event or structure in history. He is not telling the future as it will unfold, nor is the author of John’s Apocalypse.
“The fact that this beast had ten horns, like the beasts mentioned in Revelation, is an indication that it might be referring to the same beast as in Revelation 13 and/or 17.”
This is actually the exegetical fallacy of illegitimate referential transference. John is using the imagery of Daniel, but he is repurposing it. In Daniel, it refers to the Seleucid Empire with Antiochus IV as its head. In Revelation, John uses the imagery to refer to Rome with Nero/Domitian as its head. One notices that John also bunches up all of the beasts of Daniel into one, so that Rome is Babylon, Persia, and Greece, along with the horrible beast that attacks God’s people, all rolled into one. This is not what Daniel envisions, but it is how the author of Revelation is using Daniel. Revelation, of course, adds the seven heads to the beast because it represents the seven hills and seven kings upon which Rome had been previously established in the author’s day.
“Additionally, the "great iron teeth" gives a callback to Daniel 2, where Nebuchadnezzar had the dream of the statue with iron legs and feet made of iron mixed with clay--a reference to the Roman Empire, which would be "a divided kingdom" (Daniel 2:41, Rome being divided between the East and West) . . .”
So here we have another case where we either let the text define the terms and provide the referents, or we provide our own via eisegesis. Where does the Book of Daniel say anything about this kingdom being divided between East and West? The divided kingdom in the immediate context and later in the book is interpreted as the breakup of the Greek Empire (8:1-8 and its interpretation in 11:1-4). The immediate context indicates this by presenting the mixed kingdom as a part of the substance representing the Greek Empire, i.e., iron, and part of a weaker substance that does not have the strength of the former kingdom, i.e., clay. In other words, it was part of the larger kingdom that broke up and became a weaker kingdom. That isn’t Rome. What comes after the Greek Empire, according to the book itself, is the Seleucid Empire that ends with Antiochus IV’s death.
“But there's something else in Daniel too which bears more directly on the identity of the beast. The ten horns are also defined: "As for the ten horns, out of this kingdom ten kings shall arise, and another shall arise after them; he shall be different from the former ones, and shall put down three kings" (verse 24). Additionally, we are told: "But the court shall sit in judgment, and his dominion shall be taken away, to be consumed and destroyed to the end" (verse 26).
What makes this interesting is that the 10th emperor of Rome was Titus. After those ten, "another shall arise after them". The 11th emperor was Domitian. Domitian was also the third emperor of his family (the Flavian family), and after he was assassinated the Roman senate enacted "damnatio memoriae" on him--literally damning his memory as a form of dishonor. Thus, one could say he brought down his family (three kings) and his dominion was taken away, consumed, and destroyed--literally. And again, remember that each ruling member of the Flavian family was named "Titus" so each of them would have added up to six hundred sixty-six in numerology, to link it back to Revelation too.”
What makes this interesting is that the 10th emperor of Rome was Titus. After those ten, "another shall arise after them". The 11th emperor was Domitian. Domitian was also the third emperor of his family (the Flavian family), and after he was assassinated the Roman senate enacted "damnatio memoriae" on him--literally damning his memory as a form of dishonor. Thus, one could say he brought down his family (three kings) and his dominion was taken away, consumed, and destroyed--literally. And again, remember that each ruling member of the Flavian family was named "Titus" so each of them would have added up to six hundred sixty-six in numerology, to link it back to Revelation too.”
The 10 horns in Daniel are the kings that lead up to Antiochus IV. That’s made clear in what Epiphanes does throughout the book, and the timeline of the book itself. Daniel 7:7-8 actually describe 11 horns (vv. 7-8, 24), not just 10. The 11th horn is the actual king who represents the horrible beast and persecutes the saints in the book. I could bolster my view that Domitian is the beast in Revelation by the same eisegesis, where the context of Revelation is read into Daniel, and then I include the illegitimate usurpers as emperors, but this would be to commit this same fallacy of context replacement. The 11th horn in the book is Antiochus IV, who stops the daily sacrifices. We know this from the parallels of each passage in terms of what he does, as well as the fact that after he does it, the temple and the daily sacrifices are restored (8:13-14), which means this can only refer to someone that desecrates the Second Temple long before the destruction of the temple in A.D. 70. The temple and daily sacrifices are not restored after Titus demolishes it, but it is restored after Antiochus IV defiles it with the abomination of desolation.
“Not only that, but remember that Daniel was speaking to the king of Babylon of the statue and said that when the rock crashed into the feet of the statue: "it broke in pieces the iron, the bronze, the clay, the silver, and the gold" (Daniel 2:45). The gold head was Babylon itself. And what happens when the beast falls in Revelation? "Fallen, fallen is Babylon the great!" (Revelation 14:8 and 18:2).”
The city isn’t the beast in Revelation. It’s the woman. The beast is the one who destroys the city through his rulers he sets in place, a likely image drawn from Nero burning the city of Rome. The beast actually doesn’t fall until Chapter 19 when Christ fights him in a war and throws him alive into the lake of fire. There seems to be a confusion of referents here.
“So what to make of all this? The beast motif used in Daniel is echoed in Revelation, so in both places probably refers to the same thing.”
That’s the core fallacy here. One author is using the imagery found in another book for another purpose. It is a non sequitur to argue that they both must refer to the same thing. Instead, the context in each book indicates that they are not both referring to the same thing, so the astounding coincidence is not at all that astounding.
“There are very clear signs in both Daniel and Revelation that link the beast to Roman history, from the "seven mountains" being the seven hills of Rome, to Rome being the final empire, to the oddities of the X Legion, to the result of Domitian's end.”
Where does Daniel talk about seven hills or that Rome is the final empire? The same loose connections are being made between these texts and the X Legion. Daniel can in no way be talking about the 10th Legion because he isn’t really talking about Rome at all.
“The beast stands in for the entire system of Rome, from its armies to its leaders. There are certainly a lot of coincidences, far more than would happen by chance, in two different books of the Bible written six or seven hundred years apart not to treat Rome as the intended referent.”
It should be made clear, the beast is Rome and is personified in two specific kings in the book. Notice, it is two specific kings that are described as the beast, one that has died and the eighth king. Hence, all of the kings, and all of the army, and all of the other things are not personifying Rome in the book. In Daniel, Babylon is personified/characterized by the one king, Nebuchadnezzar. Likewise, the horrible beast is personified/characterized as the one king, Antiochus IV, as the kingdom of God/Israel is likely characterized by the Messianic/Davidic King, although this is assumed based on the analogy of the other two kingdoms that form an inclusio of the wicked kingdoms that come before it, and is not made explicit in the context. So the argument made here has failed to show that the beast in Revelation, which demands worship of its image, likely describes a Roman Legion led by Titus.
“Ultimately this means that we can broadly conclude that since Daniel and Revelation both reference the Roman Empire, the events that feature the beasts have a historical fulfillment already. Of course many who agree that these are referring to Rome also claim that there will be a dual fulfillment in the future. Is it possible for a future fulfillment? Well, I suppose anything is possible. But what reason do we have to suspect that these events will happen again?”
Actually, what this all means is that the symbols are not stuck in time, but can be applied to different rulers in the past and future. Even the things said of Rome do not ultimately occur. Rome and the beast itself stand in as representations of something else, as does Antiochus IV whose death brings about the end of all things and the resurrection of the dead in the book. These are microcosmic pictures that the Bible itself, by combining the macrocosmic end to each and repurposing them, indicates have larger referents to a yet unfulfilled event. They have been fulfilled on a smaller scale, and yet, they have not been fulfilled in the fullest sense.
“What will it affect for you, theologically, if it turns out that the preterist view is correct and only the final judgment depicted in Revelation 20 remains to be completed?”
Why stop there? The final judgment in Revelation 20 has the beast and false prophet thrown in. Immediately after the rest of the wicked are thrown in with them. If that is only Rome in the past, then that judgment has occurred. Why would that, as opposed to the rest, await a fulfillment? Because it is obviously not true. That reading is absurd. Likewise, it is obviously not true that Christ picked up one of the Roman emperors in history and threw him alive into the lake of fire after the city of Rome was destroyed in the first century. None of that happened. Perhaps, the author wishes us to see pictures of a future in his interpreted symbols, and not literal fulfillments of them in the past.
“So I think it's clear that the ancients did not differentiate between kings and their kingdoms, generals and their armies. Indeed, this is the natural outworking of societies built on federal headship, where the federal head stands in place of everything that head oversees.”
I’ll end on a note of agreement that the empires are personified in a specific king with whom the author wishes to characterize the empire. I wouldn’t say that ancients don’t distinguish between them, but that a federal head can represent and characterize the empire over which he rules. The extension of that to a specific legion in an army representing the emperor would not necessarily follow. Either way, it doesn’t seem to be happening in Revelation, as the contextual referents are already supplied as referring to something else, and end up rejecting this interpretation once identified correctly.
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